Vers l’anti-criminalistique en images numériques via la restauration d’images by Fan, Wei
Towards digital image anti-forensics via image
restoration
Wei Fan
To cite this version:
Wei Fan. Towards digital image anti-forensics via image restoration. Signal and Image process-
ing. Universite´ Grenoble Alpes, 2015. English. <NNT : 2015GREAT035>. <tel-01216243>
HAL Id: tel-01216243
https://tel.archives-ouvertes.fr/tel-01216243
Submitted on 15 Oct 2015
HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access
archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci-
entific research documents, whether they are pub-
lished or not. The documents may come from
teaching and research institutions in France or
abroad, or from public or private research centers.
L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est
destine´e au de´poˆt et a` la diffusion de documents
scientifiques de niveau recherche, publie´s ou non,
e´manant des e´tablissements d’enseignement et de
recherche franc¸ais ou e´trangers, des laboratoires
publics ou prive´s.
THÈSE
pour obtenir le grade de
DOCTEUR DE L’UNIVERSITÉ DE GRENOBLE ALPES
préparée dans le cadre d’une cotutelle entre
l’Université Grenoble Alpes et Beihang University
Spécialité : signal, image, parole, télécommunications (SIPT)
Arrêté ministériel : le 6 janvier 2005 - 7 août 2006
Présentée par
Wei FAN
Thèse dirigée par Jean-Marc BROSSIER et Zhang XIONG
et encadrée par François CAYRE et Kai WANG
préparée au sein du laboratoire Grenoble, images, parole,
signal, automatique (GIPSA-lab) et School of Computer
Science and Engineering
dans l’école doctorale d’électronique, électrotechnique,




via la restauration d’images
Thèse soutenue publiquement le 30/04/2015,
devant le jury composé de:
Jean-Marc CHASSERY
Directeur de Recherche CNRS, GIPSA-lab, Examinateur, Président
Jean-Luc DUGELAY
Professeur, EURECOM, Sophia Antipolis, Rapporteur
Stefano TUBARO
Professeur, Politecnico di Milano, Rapporteur
Teddy FURON
Chargé de Recherche INRIA, INRIA Rennes, Examinateur
Jiwu HUANG
Professeur, Shenzhen University, Examinateur
Zhang XIONG
Professeur, Beihang University, Co-directeur
François CAYRE
Maître de Conférences, Grenoble INP, GIPSA-lab, Co-encadrant
Kai WANG
Chargé de Recherche CNRS, GIPSA-lab, Co-encadrant

UNIVERSITY OF GRENOBLE ALPES
Doctoral school EEATS
(Électronique, Électrotechnique, Automatique et Traitement du Signal)
T H E S I S
for obtaining the title of
Doctor of Science
of the University of Grenoble Alpes
Speciality: SIPT
(Signal, Image, Parole, Télécommunications)
Presented by
Wei FAN
Towards Digital Image Anti-Forensics
via Image Restoration
Thesis supervised by Jean-Marc BROSSIER and Zhang XIONG
and co-supervised by François CAYRE and Kai WANG
prepared at
Grenoble - Images, Parole, Signal, Automatique Laboratory (GIPSA-lab)
and School of Computer Science and Engineering, Beihang University
presented on 30/04/2015
Jury:
President: Jean-Marc CHASSERY - CNRS, GIPSA-lab
Reviewers: Jean-Luc DUGELAY - EURECOM, Sophia Antipolis
Stefano TUBARO - Politecnico di Milano
Examiners: Teddy FURON - INRIA Rennes
Jiwu HUANG - Shenzhen University
Supervisor: Zhang XIONG - Beihang University
Co-Supervisors: François CAYRE - Grenoble INP, GIPSA-lab
Kai WANG - CNRS, GIPSA-lab

Acknowledgements
First and foremost, I would like to express my deepest gratitude to my four thesis supervi-
sors: Prof. Jean-Marc Brossier, Dr. François Cayre, and Dr. Kai Wang in GIPSA-lab, and
Prof. Zhang Xiong in Beihang University. I am grateful to Prof. Brossier and Prof. Xiong,
for offering me the wonderful opportunity to conduct a co-supervised Ph.D. thesis between
GIPSA-lab/Grenoble INP and Beihang University. Not only did Dr. Cayre give me countless
insightful suggestions on the research work, but he also consistently encouraged me when I
faced difficulties. He created a motivating, pleasant and relaxing working environment, where
I could work effectively and at my pace. I owe my eternal thanks to Dr. Wang for his close
guidance as well as constant support, which pushed me to achieve what I never thought possi-
ble. He is always patient in answering my questions, always efficient in correcting my mistakes,
and always inspiring in our discussions, which are reflected throughout this thesis. Besides, I
also would like to sincerely thank Prof. Gang Feng in GIPSA-lab and Prof. Shixiang Qian in
Beihang University, who made this thesis opportunity accessible to me.
I would like to express my sincere gratitude to Prof. Jean-Luc Dugelay, and Prof. Stefano
Tubaro, for taking their precious time to review my thesis manuscript. I also would like to
gratefully thank Prof. Jean-Marc Chassery, Dr. Teddy Furon, and Prof. Jiwu Huang, for
being examiners of my Ph.D. defense committee.
I am grateful to Dr. Xiyan He, who not only is a very good friend in the personal life
but also provided me with insightful discussions on the total variation and the support vector
machine. I would like to thank Dr. Rodrigo Cabral Farias for answering my many mathe-
matical questions and for referring me to many interesting materials. I am grateful to Dr.
Zhenyong Chen and Ming Chen for their valuable suggestions and help when I started to work
on multimedia security. I also want to thank Dr. Chuantao Yin and Hui Chen for their kind
help and support for my coming to GIPSA-lab for study.
I want to thank my colleagues in the same office, Fatima, Jérémie, Fakhri, and Quentin
in GIPSA-lab, and Shuo, Xiaolan, Jiahui, and Jianyuan in Beihang University, for creating
such a crazy, funny, and friendly office atmosphere. It was the best I could expect, especially
when there was a lot of stress from work. My thanks also go to Aude, Cyrille, Diyin, Gailene,
Guanghan, Jonathan, Junshi, Longyu, Matthieu, Robin, Sheng, Vincent, Yang, Ying, and
Zhongyang for making my stay in France much easier. They have helped me during my daily
life in various forms, supporting me through hard times, integrating me into many interesting
outings and activities, introducing me to French culture, kindly helping me on my French, etc.
I am indebted to my dearest family, for their endless love and unconditional support. No
matter how far away I am from home, it is the source of my strength knowing that they are
always there for me.
The work presented in this thesis is supported in part by the China Scholarship Council
under Grant 2011602067, in part by the French ANR Estampille under Grant ANR-10-CORD-
v
vi
019, in part by the French Eiffel Scholarship under Grant 812587B, and in part by the French
Rhône-Alpes region through the CMIRA Scholarship program. I would like to express my
gratitude to them for the financial support, without which this thesis would not exist.
Abstract
Image forensics enjoys its increasing popularity as a powerful image authentication tool, work-
ing in a blind passive way without the aid of any a priori embedded information compared
to fragile image watermarking. On its opponent side, image anti-forensics attacks forensic
algorithms for the future development of more trustworthy forensics. When image coding
or processing is involved, we notice that image anti-forensics to some extent shares a similar
goal with image restoration. Both of them aim to recover the information lost during the
image degradation, yet image anti-forensics has one additional indispensable forensic unde-
tectability requirement. In this thesis, we form a new research line for image anti-forensics,
by leveraging on advanced concepts/methods from image restoration meanwhile with inte-
grations of anti-forensic strategies/terms. Under this context, this thesis contributes on the
following four aspects for JPEG compression and median filtering anti-forensics: (i) JPEG
anti-forensics using Total Variation based deblocking, (ii) improved Total Variation based
JPEG anti-forensics with assignment problem based perceptual DCT histogram smoothing,
(iii) JPEG anti-forensics using JPEG image quality enhancement based on a sophisticated im-
age prior model and non-parametric DCT histogram smoothing based on calibration, and (iv)
median filtered image quality enhancement and anti-forensics via variational deconvolution.
Experimental results demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed anti-forensic methods with
a better forensic undetectability against existing forensic detectors as well as a higher visual
quality of the processed image, by comparisons with the state-of-the-art methods.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Can You Believe Your Eyes?
Seeing is believing.
A picture is worth a thousand words.
Seeing is believing, or a picture is worth a thousand words, they always say. That is
probably why the digital image is one of the most commonly used multimedia types on In-
ternet. According to Mary Meeker’s annual Internet trends report [Mar], over 1.8 billion
photos are uploaded and shared on Internet per day! Digital images are literally ubiquitous,
in which we historically have trust. However, this confidence is being constantly shaken due
to the widespread availability of high-quality cameras and powerful photo-editing tools. In
Figure 1.1-(b), the Girl with A Pearl Earring, portrayed by the 17-century painter Johannes
Vermeer, appears to appreciate the music coming from the beats. Can you believe your eyes?
(a) Original (b) Edited1
Figure 1.1: (a) is the Girl with A Pearl Earring painted by Johannes Vermeer around
1665. The beats, a product of modern technologies, were integrated into the digital version
of this classic painting by the Worth1000 website user bigchopper in (b).
1Downloaded from: http://www.worth1000.com/entries/740270/girl-with-the-beats.
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It can be seen that nowadays creating visually plausible fake images has become a less and
less challenging task. People’s trust in digital images is being gradually eroded by the devel-
opment of modern information technologies. Doctored images, which are able to fool human
naked eyes, are appearing with a growing frequency. Unfortunately, not every doctored image
is as “innocent” as the one shown in Figure 1.1-(b), which may be mainly for amusement. The
image editing can be malicious, to be used for instance in political and personal attacking. For
example, Fourandsix Technologies, Inc. maintains an image gallery2 which collects notable
photo manipulations throughout history. Among these tampered pictures, some were abom-
inable enough to have led to severe financial losses and even have brought negative impacts
to the society.
The doubt thrown upon digital images has urged the development of digital image
forensics, trying to restore some trust to digital images. The main objectives of forensics are
to analyze a given digital image so as to detect whether it is a forgery, to identify its origin,
to trace its processing history, or to reveal latent details invisible to human naked eyes [Fou].
During the last decade, researchers have proposed various image forensic techniques. In
the early stage, fragile digital image watermarking was a popular choice for image authentica-
tion purposes. Fragile watermarking in literature is regarded as the so-called active forensics
[Con11]. It actively embeds the authentication information (i.e., the watermark) into the im-
age when it is captured or before its transmission. Thereafter, the image can be authenticated
if the extracted watermark matches the embedded one; otherwise the failure of watermark
extraction or any mismatch between the extracted and embedded information can serve as
evidence of tampering. To this end, a special image acquisition device is required. In fact,
the idea of trustworthy camera equipped with a watermarking system was proposed as early
as 1993 [Fri93]. However, its realization in industry encountered many difficulties, which cur-
rently still remain hard to be resolved. Firstly, it is hard for different camera manufacturers
to reach an agreement on a common standard protocol. In addition, the consumers may find
it unacceptable regarding the visual quality decrease of the watermarked image. Furthermore,
once the inside watermarking system of the so-called trustworthy camera is hacked, its secu-
rity will become a very problematic matter. One example of attempt in industry is the Aigo
V80PLUS camera [Aig] marketed by Beijing Huaqi Information Digital Technology Co., Ltd.
in 2005. Inside this camera, a digital watermarking system is included, which embeds the
authentication information into the image at the time of recording. Yet, it did not bring a
popularization of the trustworthy camera, due to the previously described concerns.
Aware of the limitations of active forensics, researchers are gradually shifting their attention
to the so-called passive forensics [Far09a, Con11]. Compared with the image authentication
based on digital watermarking, the passive forensic techniques seeks to assess the authenticity
of a given image in a blind way, without resorting to any a priori embedded information (e.g.,
a watermark). The assumption here is that image manipulation may create forgeries without
leaving visual traces, yet it will probably disturb the intrinsic properties of the authentic
image. Therefore, tampering can be detected by examining the inconsistency/deviation of
underlying statistics of an image. In literature, “passive forensics” is often directly referred to
2Available at: http://www.fourandsix.com/photo-tampering-history/.
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as “forensics”. In the following of this thesis, we will also omit the adjective “passive” for the
sake of brevity.
Digital forensics has become a hot research topic during recent years. Figure 1.2 shows the
variation trend of the annual number of IEEE publications [Iee] related to forensics, starting
from 2000. In the figure, the gray bar stands for publications with the keyword “forensics”,
whereas the hatched lightgray bar is for the publications with the keywords “forensics” and
“image”. It can be seen that forensics has received an increasing attention in the last decade.
Among the forensics research, as an important branch image forensics takes up around 40%
of the total relevant publications.
Year


































Figure 1.2: Annual number of IEEE publications whose keywords include “forensics” (the
gray bar), and both “forensics” and “image” (the hatched lightgray bar).
1.2 Image Anti-Forensics
Every coin has two sides.
Similar to cryptography vs. cryptanalysis and steganography vs. steganalysis, the two
sides of the coin regarding image authentication are forensics and anti-forensics. Digital
image anti-forensics is the technique to expose the limitations of forensic methods, with
the ultimate goal to develop more trustworthy forensics [BK13]. In literature, anti-forensics is
also synonymously referred to as counter-forensics. This research direction is important, since
we have to design against possible anti-forensics for reliable forensics. The main objective of
image anti-forensics is to perform certain operations to digital images, disguising traces left
by image editing so that they will no longer be detected by forensic algorithms.
Image forensics is still at its early stage, and image anti-forensics is an even younger re-
search topic [KB07]. In literature, the publications of forensics largely outnumber those of
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anti-forensics. Moreover, existing anti-forensic methods often use simple image processing to
disguise traces left by a targeted operation, e.g., using filtering to hide compression artifacts
[SL11], or using noise addition to disguise footprints left by filtering [WSL13]. Indeed, such
anti-forensic methods can be very successful in defeating the targeted forensic detectors, but
can also be easily exposed by more advanced detectors. Moreover, the anti-forensic image gen-
erated by these methods often suffers from a low visual quality. This is a worrying issue, since
an image of low quality (e.g., a blurry/noisy image) may spontaneously rouse the suspicion of
its authenticity.
In summary, image anti-forensics has a two-fold end: a good forensic undetectability as
well as a high visual quality of the processed image [KR08]. Between these two goals, the
forensic undetectability is more important than the image quality for image anti-forensics.
Anti-forensics cannot claim to be successful if there exist a certain detector which is able to
detect the anti-forensic images.
1.3 Objectives and Contributions
In this thesis, we stand on the image anti-forensic side, with the focus on JPEG (Joint Pho-
tographic Experts Group) compression and median filtering anti-forensics. From a JPEG
compressed or median filtered image, if we can successfully create a “fake” image that ap-
pears never processed, it would be a relatively easy task to conduct image processing history
falsification or even tampering afterwards. To this end, we employ some frameworks from
image restoration field meanwhile integrating some anti-forensic terms/strategies, for creating
anti-forensic images with a good tradeoff between forensic undetectability and image quality.
1.3.1 JPEG Compression and Median Filtering
Firstly, we choose to conduct our research on image anti-forensics to JPEG compression,
because JPEG is probably the most common image format in use today on Internet, and can
be easily found in various forensic scenarios. According to the statistics of the usage of image
file formats for websites on December 8, 2014, JPEG is the most widely used one, with the
usage by 68.7% of all the websites [W3t].
We can imagine the following forgery creation scenario involving JPEG compression, as
illustrated in Figure 1.3. In order to make people believe that someone has participated in
a certain event, the forger will probably create a composite with the scene and the person
from two JPEG images with different quality factors3. The resulting image is likely to be
JPEG compressed again before publishing. Careful image editing may leave no visual clues
noticeable by human naked eyes, yet the forgery can be exposed by detecting different kinds
of double JPEG compression artifacts present in different areas of the image [BP12b].
3The quality factor is an integer between 1 and 100. The greater the quality factor is, the higher the quality
of the compressed image is, and the larger the JPEG file will be. A more detailed description of the quality
factor can be found in Section 3.1.1.
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Figure 1.3: Illustration of creating a composite JPEG image. Here q1, q2 and q3 are three
possibly different quality factors for JPEG compression.
Generally speaking, the goal of JPEG anti-forensics is to remove all possible footprints left
by JPEG compression, so that the resulting anti-forensic JPEG image looks as if it were an
original uncompressed one. Now, count for the possibility that a smart forger employs JPEG
anti-forensics to hide JPEG compression artifacts of the two source JPEG images so that
they seem never compressed. Therefore, no (different types of) JPEG compression artifacts
indicating image manipulation will appear in the composite image forgery. Thereafter, the
image can be re-compressed using another compression setting, so as to either hide traces of
double JPEG compression, or falsify the image origin, or serve for other possible anti-forensic
purposes [SL11].
In the very recent work of JPEG anti-forensics [SL11] as well as the image resampling anti-
forensics conducted in [KR08], median filtering shows its destructive nature to other image
processing footprints. However, the median filter, as a well-known and widely used image
denoising and smoothing operator, leaves trackable clues in the image. They can be detected
by various median filtering forensic detectors. The presence of median filtering traces, not only
suggests the image has been previously median filtered, but also implies the possibility that
other image processing operations may have been applied to the image. Hence, it is of great
significance to conduct median filtering anti-forensics, which constitutes the second research
subject of this thesis.
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1.3.2 Image Anti-Forensics and Image Restoration
When it goes to image coding or processing, we notice that image anti-forensics to some extent
shares a similar goal to image restoration, which is to recover the information lost during the
image degradation, via solving an ill-posed inverse problem. Indeed, for certain anti-forensic
scenarios, e.g., attacking physically based or geometric-based forensic algorithms (see Sec-
tion 2.1.1 for their brief descriptions), this similarity no longer holds. However, their relevant
anti-forensic study is beyond the scope of this thesis, and we mainly focus on JPEG com-
pression and median filtering anti-forensics here. The objective of image restoration usually
goes to the visual quality improvement of degraded images. While image anti-forensics hopes
to recover the underlying statistics of the original, genuine image to the utmost, so that the
resulting image forgery appears to be authentic. High visual quality of the processed image
is certainly one important goal of image anti-forensics. Besides, it is also worth noticing that
image anti-forensics has an additional indispensable goal, i.e., a good forensic undetectability,
compared with image restoration.
Given the similarities between image anti-forensics and image restoration, this thesis aims
to generate, from a JPEG compressed or median filtered image, a “natural” image which
appears to be never processed. To this end, the maximum a posteriori (MAP) estimation
(or one of its variants) is employed. Under this framework, several different natural image
statistical models from image restoration are adopted and enriched by integrating some anti-
forensic terms/strategies concerning the forensic undetectability. In order to solve different
proposed image anti-forensic problems, several numerical optimization methods are used. By
doing so, we hope to be able to estimate the “best” anti-forensic image in some sense. At
last, the anti-forensic images, with a good tradeoff between forensic undetectability and image
quality, are generated.
1.3.3 Methodology
Different from the state-of-the-art JPEG/median filtering anti-forensics work based on simple
image processing [SL11, WSL13], here a new research line is proposed to conduct image
anti-forensics. In this thesis, we propose sophisticated digital image anti-forensic methods
to JPEG compression and median filtering, leveraging on advanced concepts and tools from
image restoration, natural image statistics and numerical optimization.
The blocking artifacts in the spatial domain and the quantization artifacts in the DCT
(Discrete Cosine Transform) domain of one image are both evidence of JPEG compression
[FD03]. In this thesis, the following methods are developed for JPEG anti-forensic purposes:
• Firstly, a constrained Total Variation (TV) based minimization [ADF05] is employed for
removing the JPEG blocking artifacts. Moreover, in order to ensure the visual quality
of the final obtained anti-forensic JPEG image, a modified Quantization Constraint Set
(QCS) projection [RS05] is used.
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• For the quantization artifacts in the DCT domain, a perceptual DCT histogram smooth-
ing method is proposed based on the local Laplacian model and the partly recovered
DCT-domain information obtained after applying the TV-based deblocking.
• Furthermore, in order to study the impact of a more advanced image prior model to the
JPEG anti-forensics task, the Gaussian Mixture Model (GMM) for overlapping image
patches [ZW11] and a likelihood term modeling the JPEG compression process [RS05]
are considered. Besides, we also propose a new, non-parametric method to DCT his-
togram smoothing based on calibration [FGH02].
As to median filtering anti-forensics, this thesis proposes an image variational deconvo-
lution framework, inspired by the literature on image deconvolution [KF09, KTF11]. This
optimization-based framework consists of a convolution term approximating the median fil-
tering process, a fidelity term with respect to the median filtered image, and an image prior
term based on the generalized Gaussian distribution in the pixel value difference domain.
In order to validate the efficiency of the proposed JPEG/median filtering anti-forensic
methods, large-scale forensic tests are carried out. Experimental results demonstrate that
the proposed methods outperform the state-of-the-art anti-forensics, with a better forensic
undetectability against existing forensic detectors as well as a higher visual quality of the
anti-forensic image.
1.4 Outline
The remainder of this thesis4 is organized as follows.
Chapter 2 presents some background knowledge on image forensics and anti-forensics,
including the classification, evaluation metrics, natural image datasets used in forensic testing
of this thesis, and relevant optimization methods which will be used in the proposed image
anti-forensic methods.
Chapter 3 reviews the state-of-the-art image forensic algorithms and anti-forensic methods
to JPEG compression and median filtering. The reviewed forensic algorithms are the attacking
targets of the proposed anti-forensic methods, while the reviewed anti-forensic methods are
used for experimental comparisons.
Chapter 4 proposes a JPEG deblocking method, by optimizing a constrained TV-based
minimization problem, whose cost function is composed of a TV term and a TV-based block-
ing measurement term. Besides a good deblocking effect, the resulting anti-forensic JPEG
4In this thesis, most of the contents in Chapters 4-7 were published or have been accepted for publication
in international conferences or international journals. As to JPEG anti-forensics, we published three papers
[Fan+13a, Fan+14, Fan+13b] where different divisions of datasets, compression quality factors and evaluation
metrics were used. For consistency consideration of the thesis, we will use the same setting (see Sections 2.2
and 2.3 for details) across Chapters 4-6. Therefore, the relevant figures and tables may not be exactly the
same, but should be in accordance with those shown in our published papers.
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image also achieves relatively good forensic undetectability even against quantization artifacts
detectors. Yet, the DCT-domain quantization artifacts still to some extent exist, which may
be used by potential forensic detectors. Therefore, this method will be further improved in
Chapter 5.
Chapter 5 describes an improved JPEG anti-forensic method based on the work in Chap-
ter 4 yet with a different parameter setting. The remaining comb-like quantization artifacts
in the TV-based deblocked JPEG image are explicitly filled by a perceptual DCT histogram
smoothing procedure.
Chapter 6 presents a JPEG quality enhancement method based on an MAP-based frame-
work using the GMM as the image prior model for the overlapping image patches. For
JPEG anti-forensic purposes, the DCT histogram smoothing is performed using a new, non-
parametric method based on calibration.
Chapter 7 proposes a median filtered image quality enhancement approach as well as a
median filtering anti-forensic method, by approximating the median filtering process using
image convolution and by using the generalized Gaussian to model the pixel value difference.
Chapter 8 concludes this thesis, by summarizing the contributions and proposing several
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his chapter firstly presents the basic knowledge of digital image forensics and anti-
forensics, including the classification and evaluation metrics. After that, the natural
images datasets used in the forensic testing of this thesis are introduced. Finally, we briefly
review the optimization algorithms which will be used for solving the optimization problems
proposed in this thesis.
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2.1 Classification of Image (Anti-)Forensics
2.1.1 Farid’s Classification of Image Forensics
Digital image forensics makes the assumption that the forgery creation process has disturbed
a certain kind of intrinsic scene/image properties (e.g., statistical, physical or geometrical
properties). In this context, Farid [Far09a] groups digital image forensics into the following
five categories:
• Pixel-based image forensics analyzes pixel-level anomalies caused by image tampering.
Some frequently used image manipulation means are, for instance, copy-and-paste, splic-
ing, resampling and median filtering. Targeting at each of these image operations, vari-
ous forensic techniques are proposed.
• Format-based image forensics detects the image statistical change introduced by a certain
lossy compression method. Popular image compression algorithms include JPEG based
on the DCT transform, SPIHT (Set Partitioning In Hierarchical Trees) and JPEG2000
based on the wavelet transform, etc.
• Camera-based image forensics studies digital image ballistics [Far06] from the imaging
stage inside the camera. Typical forensic methods in this category are for instance
based on the chromatic aberration, the color filter array (CFA), the photo response
non-uniformity (PRNU) noise, etc.
• Physically based image forensics examines anomalies of interaction between objects,
light, and the camera in the 3-dimensional physical world. For example, the consis-
tencies of light direction or of lighting environment estimated from different physical
objects can be used as criteria for forensic purposes.
• Geometric-based image forensics measures the positions of physical objects with respect
to the camera. For instance, image tampering can be detected if across the image there
exist inconsistencies in the principal point5.
Despite that [Far09a] mainly reviews image forensics, Farid also points out that new techniques
(i.e., anti-forensics) will be developed to create fake images which are harder to be detected.
The arms race between forensic analysts and forgers is inevitable.
2.1.2 Redi et al.’s Classification of Image Forensics
In [RTD11], Redi et al. review image forensic methods in the following two categories:
5The principal point is the projection of the camera center onto the image plane.
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• Image source device identification is to identify the device which is used for the acquisi-
tion of the given image. Relevant source identification methods can be further grouped
into the following three subcategories:
– Identification through artifacts produced in the acquisition phase, such as forensic
methods based on the chromatic aberration, the CFA, etc.
– Identification through sensor imperfections, such as forensic methods based on pixel
defects, the fixed pattern noise (FPN), the PRNU, etc.
– Source identification using properties of the imaging device, such as forensic meth-
ods based on the color processing, the JPEG compression, etc.
• Tampering detection is to expose the intentional image manipulation which modifies the
semantic meaning of the image. Relevant tampering detection methods can be further
grouped into the following three subcategories:
– Detecting tampering performed on a single image, in one of the most common ways,
is to expose the copy-move of a region within an image. Some relevant known
forensic methods leverage on the tools such as the principal component analysis
(PCA), the scale-invariant feature transform (SIFT), etc.
– Detecting image composition, in other words, is to expose image splicing. Incon-
sistencies of certain properties across different parts of the image can all serve as
evidence of tampering, such as the light direction, the complex lighting environ-
ment, shadows/reflections of objects, the PRNU, the JPEG compression, etc.
– Tampering detection independent on the type of forgery, is a general technique which
covers both tampering involving a single image and tampering involving multiple
images. In order to realize this general forensic method, possible ways are to exploit
the resampling traces, compression artifacts, acquisition device fingerprints, etc.
Meanwhile, Redi et al. [RTD11] also point out that image anti-forensics is the new phase for
developing new and more powerful forensic methods.
2.1.3 Piva’s Classification of Image Forensics
In [Piv13], Piva surveys digital image forensics according to the image life cycle, which are
divided into three stages: image acquisition, image coding, and image editing. Digital image
forensics can therefore be divided into the following three categories:
• Acquisition footprints based image forensics. When a digital image is recorded by a
camera, each imaging stage introduces intrinsic footprints due to the imperfection of the
device (e.g., PRNU noise caused by the image sensor) or because of the different camera
manufacturer choices in both the hardware (e.g., different lens leading to different chro-
matic aberration parameters) and software (e.g., different CFA configurations). These
image artifacts vary according to different camera brands and/or models, and can be
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considered as the signature of a specific camera type (i.e., the so-called image ballistics
defined in literature [Far06]). Inconsistencies in these footprints across the image can be
considered as evidence of tampering.
• Coding footprints based image forensics. Lossy compression is widely used to reduce
image redundancy for efficiently storing and transmitting the data. Different coding
architectures leave different telltale footprints, which can be used for image forensic
purposes. In literature, JPEG compression probably draws the most attention in this
category. Researchers also notice that artifacts present in a single JPEG compressed
image (i.e., compressed only once) will vary when the JPEG compression is applied
again. Image manipulation can therefore be exposed when inconsistencies of coding
footprints are detected.
• Editing footprints based image forensics. Careful image editing may not leave visual
traces, yet will probably disturb the intrinsic properties of the authentic image. There-
fore, inconsistency/deviation of these intrinsic properties across the image can be con-
sidered as evidence of tampering.
Besides, Piva also provides a brief review and discussion concerning image anti-forensics in
[Piv13], based on Böhme and Kirchner’s [BK13] classification of image anti-forensics (to be
described in Section 2.1.5). Almost all the existing image anti-forensic methods are designed
to target one particular forensic tool. Conversely, universal anti-forensics aims to maintain
image statistics which are not known to the image forger. It is certainly a more difficult
problem and an interesting open research question, but should be able to escape the eternal
loop between targeted forensics and anti-forensics.
2.1.4 Stamm et al.’s Classification of Image Forensics
Stamm et al. [SWL13] review the information forensics in the last decade. Concerning image
forensics, the following two aspects are discussed in detail:
• Detection of tampering and processing operations. In many scenarios, the processing
history of the image is one of the primary concerns to determine whether it can be
trusted. This can be identified by exploiting intrinsic properties of the digital content.
Relevant forensic techniques can be further divided into the following five subcategories:
– Forensics based on statistical classifiers;
– Forensics detecting device fingerprints;
– Forensics exposing manipulation fingerprints;
– Forensics examining compression and coding fingerprints;
– Forensics checking physical inconsistencies.
• Device forensics. Digital images have seen a huge growth because of the advancement
of digital cameras. Identifying the acquisition device of an image is an important step
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to ensure the security and trustworthiness. Relevant forensic techniques can be further
divided into the following four subcategories:
– Forensics exploring color processing traces;
– Forensics linking to individual device units;
– Forensics identifying imaging type;
– Forensics detecting manipulation using device fingerprints.
Meanwhile, Stamm et al. [SWL13] also present a brief overview of some current image anti-
forensic work. More specifically, there exist image anti-forensic techniques based on PRNU,
resampling, compression, etc.
2.1.5 Böhme and Kirchner’s Classification of Image Anti-Forensics
In [BK13] Böhme and Kirchner divided image anti-forensic techniques into two categories
along the following three dimensions, respectively:
• Robustness vs. Security. In general, image forgers can exploit robustness or security
weaknesses of image forensics for anti-forensic purposes.
– The robustness of image forensics is its reliability under legitimate post-processing.
For instance, many forensic algorithms (lighting-based forensics is a good example
of exception here) fail when strong JPEG compression is applied. Such legitimate
post-processing can serve as an anti-forensic technique, as long as it is able to move
the plausible forgeries outside the detection region of the forensic detectors.
– The security of image forensics shows how much it is able to expose intentionally
concealed illegitimate post-processing. That is to say, the security indicates the
ability to withstand anti-forensics. Image forgers can exploit the weaknesses of the
image model used by forensics. This more powerful anti-forensic attack creates
image forgeries which are moved in a particular direction outwards the decision
region of the authentic images.
• Post-Processing and Integrated Attacks.
– Post-Processing anti-forensic attacks edit the image, as an additional processing
step, such that it does not leave traces which can be detected by image forensics.
– Integrated anti-forensic attacks directly interfere the image generation process.
They do not address the robustness of image forensics, by definition.
• Targeted and Universal Attacks.
– If the anti-forensic method exploit the weaknesses of a specific forensic tool, it is
targeted. It is possible for this kind of anti-forensics to be detected by other forensic
algorithms using alternative/improved image models.
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– Universal anti-forensic attacks try to create image forgeries whose statistical prop-
erties are maintained as much as possible, so the fake images remain undetectable
even when examined by unknown forensic tools. This is clearly a more difficult
task and an interesting open research problem. The main difficulty here is whether
we can find a good enough image model which is able to resist combined analysis
of forensic algorithms.
2.1.6 Classification of Proposed Anti-Forensic Methods
In this thesis, from the image restoration field, we borrow some MAP (or one of its variants)
based frameworks meanwhile integrating some anti-forensic terms/strategies concerning the
forensic undetectability, in order to cope with the anti-forensics problems to JPEG compression
and median filtering. According to Farid’s classification [Far09a] of digital image forensics,
JPEG forensics is format-based, whereas median filtering forensics is pixel-based. Based on
Redi et al.’s classification [RTD11], JPEG compression can be involved in both source identi-
fication and tampering detection, and median filtering forensics belongs to tampering detection.
According to Piva’s classification [Piv13], JPEG forensics analyzes the coding footprints, while
median filtering forensics detects editing footprints. However, for both JPEG and median
filtering forensic techniques, they detect tampering and processing operations [SWL13]. More
specifically, JPEG forensics examines compression and coding fingerprints, and median filtering
forensics exposes manipulation fingerprints. According to Böhme and Kirchner’s classification
[BK13] of image anti-forensics, the proposed JPEG and median filtering anti-forensic methods
are post-processing/targeted attacks analyzing the security of forensic algorithms.
2.2 Evaluation Metrics
As noted in Chapter 1, image anti-forensics has a two-fold goal: a good forensic undetectability
and a high visual quality of the anti-forensic image. Forensic undetectability (on the anti-
forensic side) is a metric versus forensic detectability (on the forensic side). Both of them
can be measured by analyzing the ROC (Receiver Operating Characteristic) curve (to be
described in Section 2.2.1). Good forensic undetectability means good performance of the anti-
forensic method, and poor performance of the forensic algorithm. Conversely, good forensic
detectability means poor performance of the anti-forensic method, and good performance of
the forensic algorithm.
Image anti-forensics consists in creating visually plausible fake images. Indeed, the forensic
undetectability is the priority objective of image anti-forensics. Meanwhile, the visual quality
is also an important factor to evaluate the anti-forensic performance, since the low quality
image may spontaneously rouse the concerns of its authenticity. The image quality evaluation
can be performed by using the well-known PSNR (Peak Signal-to-Noise Ratio) and SSIM
(Structural SIMilarity) metrics described in Section 2.2.2.
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Besides, JPEG/median filtering anti-forensics often involves certain histogram recovery
(see Sections 5.3.1 and 7.3.4 for details). In order to evaluate the histogram restoration,
we adopt the Kullback-Leibler divergence [KL51] (in short, KL divergence), which will be
described in Section 2.2.3.
2.2.1 Forensic (Un)detectability
In most forensic scenarios, digital image forensics builds a binary classifier6. Given a digital
image, the forensic detector makes a decision to say that it is either genuine or fake. In other
words, the main objective of digital image forensics is to establish a detector, which is able to
differentiate genuine images from image forgeries with a high detection accuracy. In this thesis,
we study JPEG compression and median filtering and try to disguise the compressed/filtered
image as never processed. Here, the genuine image refers to the original, unprocessed image.
Whereas the image forgery refers to the processed image, more specifically, the (anti-forensic)
JPEG image described in Chapters 4-6, and the (anti-forensic) median filtered image described
in Chapter 7.
The performance of a forensic algorithm or an anti-forensic method can be evaluated by
comparing the forensic detector’s classification outcome obtained on a set of images with the
ground-truth. Let us consider a forensic testing with NN genuine images (i.e., the unprocessed
images, here considered as negative samples) and NP fake images (i.e., the processed images,
here considered as positive samples). Among the NN negative samples, let NFP denote the
number of negative samples which are falsely classified as positive. Among the NP positive
samples, let NTP denote the number of positive samples which are correctly classified as
positive. For each classification strategy of a forensic detector, a false positive rate (RFP ) and








With (RFP , RTP ) pairs obtained by different classification strategies of a forensic detector,
a ROC curve can be plotted in the ROC space. The final classification strategy is determined
by analyzing this ROC curve. Usually it is required that the false positive rate should not be
too high. In layman’s terms, we should not wrong an innocent person (i.e., classify a genuine
image as fake in digital image forensics), which is critical in some scenarios such as the law
enforcement. Under this criterion, the detector chooses the ROC point corresponding to the
biggest true positive rate with the constraint that the false positive rate is smaller than a
certain threshold. In this context, many anti-forensic methods aim to lower the true positive
rate of a detector when the false positive rate is below a certain threshold. Yet, the more
comprehensive way is still to analyze the trend of the whole ROC curve.
Figure 2.1-(a) illustrates the ROC space, which is defined by false positive rate RFP and
6Indeed, in certain forensic cases, e.g., image source identification, may require a multi-class classifier.
However, it is beyond the scope of this thesis and will not be discussed here.
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true positive rate RTP as x and y axes respectively. If the upper-left point (0, 1) in the ROC
space is included in a ROC curve, it indicates that the corresponding forensic detector is
able to achieve the so-called perfect classification. In this case, the detector can successfully
discriminate between genuine and fake images without any error. This is ideal for forensics,
yet very hard to achieve in practice. In general, the goal of the forensic detector is to drag
the ROC curve towards the perfect classification point of the ROC space to the utmost. An
example can be seen at point A in Figure 2.1-(a). Here, the forensic detector is able to achieve


















































Figure 2.1: The ROC space and an example of ROC curve.
On the anti-forensic side, the forger hopes to create image forgeries so that the ROC curve
achieved by a forensic detector is close to the diagonal line (i.e., the random guess line) of
the ROC space. In this case, the detector is not able to tell the image forgeries from the
genuine images even when the “best” classification strategy is used. For example, at point B
in Figure 2.1-(a), the detector’s classification outcome is equivalent to a random guess. That
is to say, given any image, the chances of the detector saying it is either genuine or fake are
equal. It is equivalent to randomly deciding whether a given image is genuine/fake. This is
the worst classification outcome of a detector. Statistically, the forensic features of the genuine
images and of the image forgeries are well mixed together, which are non-distinguishable by
the forensic detector.
The point C in Figure 2.1-(a) indicates that the detector achieves a quite low true positive
rate at a quite high false positive rate. In this case, the classification outcome appears to be
even worse than that of point B on the random guess line. Yet, this does not imply that the
forensic feature is not well designed. Conversely, it indicates that the classification strategy
is not appropriate. This issue can be resolved by simply flipping the classification strategy,
i.e., classifying the image deemed as forgery in the original classification strategy as genuine,
meanwhile classifying the image deemed as genuine image in the original classification strategy
as fake. Therefore, the ROC point in the bottom right corner of the ROC space will switch
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to the top left corner.
With multiple ROC points, a ROC curve can be plotted in the ROC space. An example
can be found in Figure 2.1-(b). It is more comprehensive to analyze the trend of the whole
ROC curve than a single ROC point, for evaluating the forensic undetectability of the anti-
forensic method or the forensic detectability of the forensic algorithm. For a quantitative
evaluation, we use the popular AUC (area under curve) metric, by measuring the area under
the ROC curve. The AUC value varies in the range [0, 1]. When the AUC value is close to
1, it means that the ROC curve is close to the perfect classification point of the ROC space,
indicating a good forensic detectability and a poor forensic undetectability. When the AUC
value is close to 0.5, it means that the ROC curve is close to the random guess line, indicating
a good forensic undetectability and a poor forensic detectability. When the AUC value is close
to 0, it means that the ROC curve is close to the bottom-right point of the ROC space. This
does not really mean that the forensic detectability of the detector is poor. As stated above,
the AUC value can reach close to 1 when the classification strategy is flipped.
The forensic testing requires a set of images including both genuine and fake images, as
well as a forensic detector. In the forensic experimental setting of this thesis, certain image
dataset (described in Section 2.3) containing genuine images is used. For each genuine image,
it is processed to generate a corresponding image forgery. At last, an equal number of genuine
images and image forgeries are used for forensic testing. On the other hand, the feature of a
forensic algorithm can be either a scalar or a vector, depending on the specific method. Their
corresponding forensic tests are to some extent different. In the image forensics literature
where the feature is vector-based, it is a common practice to adopt the SVM (Support Vector
Machine) for training the forensic detector. In Sections 2.2.1.1 and 2.2.1.2, we will describe
how to conduct the forensic test for forensic (un)detectability evaluation, using scalar-based
detectors and SVM-based detectors, respectively.
2.2.1.1 Scalar-Based Detectors
Given an image, the scalar-based forensic algorithm outputs a feature value. The forensic
detector classifies the image as either genuine or fake, by comparing this feature value with
a pre-defined threshold. If the feature value is greater (or smaller) than the threshold, the
image is classified as fake. Otherwise, the image is classified as genuine.
The threshold can vary, thereafter producing different classification outcomes. Then dif-
ferent classification strategies of the detector are defined by different thresholds. Indeed, the
threshold can be defined as any value. In the experiments of forensic testing, the common prac-
tice is as follows. The detector outputs the feature value for each image under examination.
Then, all these obtained feature values (or their uniformly sampled values) are used as the
different thresholds for producing different classification strategies of the detector. Thereafter,
a ROC curve can be plotted and an AUC value can be calculated.
18 Chapter 2. Preliminaries
2.2.1.2 SVM-Based Detectors
Many forensic features are vector-based. In the image forensics literature, probably the most
common way to build a forensic detector based on a vector-based feature is to use a two-class
SVM7. In this thesis, we follow this common practice of adopting the SVM in image forensics.
For the feature vectors computed from the positive and negative samples, the SVM builds a
maximum-margin hyperplane that achieves the largest distance to the nearest training feature
vector of either of the two classes. On the two sides of the separating hyperplane, two parallel
supporting hyperplanes are selected in a way that there are no feature vectors between them
(namely, hard margin) and their distance is maximized. The region bounded by these two
hyperplanes is the so-called “margin”. The feature vectors on the margin are, namely, the
“support vectors”.
In practice, it happens that certain training samples are mislabeled, i.e., some positive
samples are labeled negative, or some negative samples are labeled positive. In order to control
the sensitivity of the SVM to noisy data, the so-called soft-margin method (with respect to
the hard-margin one described earlier) is introduced. It allows that a few training samples fall
into the margin but are on the correct side of the separating hyperplane, or that some training
samples are even on the wrong side of the separating hyperplane. For the soft-margin SVM,
the degree of misclassification of the data is penalized by the parameter C.
It often happens that the positive and negative samples are not linearly separable in the
feature space. To cope with this problem, the so-called kernel trick is introduced to implicitly
map the feature vectors into a higher-dimensional space, where hopefully the separation is
easier. This trick makes the SVM very powerful to perform non-linear classifications, and
therefore bring its popularization in various classification applications. Some widely used
kernels include, the Gaussian kernel (also known as the Radial Basis Function (RBF) kernel),
the polynomial kernel, the sigmoid kernel, etc.
In the image forensics literature where the feature is vector-based, the soft-margin SVM
with the following Gaussian kernel is often used:
k(φ,ψ) = exp(−γ||φ−ψ||22), γ > 0, (2.2)
where φ and ψ are two feature vectors, and γ is the kernel parameter. To follow the common
practice in image forensics literature, this thesis keeps the above choice of using soft-margin
SVM with Gaussian kernel so as to build the SVM-based forensic detector, when the forensic
feature is vector-based.
The penalization parameter C and the kernel parameter γ (interested readers can refer
to [CL11] for more details) need to be determined before the SVM classifier is trained. The
complexity and accuracy of the SVM classifier are balanced by the parameter setting of (C, γ).
Pevný et al. [PBF10] have discussed the impact of different values of C and γ to the SVM
7In the following, we omit the word “two-class” for describing the SVM, for the sake of brevity. Here, we
do not consider multi-class SVM. The SVMs we use in this thesis are all two-class.
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classifier in detail. High value of C can improve the accuracy of the classifier on the training
dataset but also increases the complexity. On the contrary, low value of C decreases the
accuracy of the classifier but can normally achieve a good generalization with low complexity.
Similarly, high value of γ may cause the over-fitting problem of the classifier, while low value
of γ has the opposite impact.
The parameter setting of (C, γ) should well balance both the accuracy and complexity of
the SVM classifier. In order to choose proper values for them, the standard way is to carry
out a grid search with cross-validation. In this thesis, we follow the suggestion in [PBF10] and
use the five-fold cross-validation with the following multiplicative grid:
C ∈ {0.001, 0.01, · · · , 10000}
γ ∈ {2i | i ∈ {−log2D − 3, · · · ,−log2D + 3}} , (2.3)
where D is the dimensionality of the feature vector. In this thesis, we use the LIBSVM library
[CL11] to train and test the SVM-based forensic detectors.
In this thesis, we consider some forensic feature which can be as high as 686-dimensional
(i.e., the KS686SPAM in Table 3.3). However, for the forensic testing of both JPEG compression
and median filtering, we “only” use 500 samples (the datasets used for forensic testing are
to be described in Sections 2.3.1 and 2.3.2) for each of the positive and negative classes for
training the SVM classifiers. Fortunately, the SVM is by concept a classifier designed to be less
sensitive to the problem of curse of dimensionality. As pointed out by Vapnik [Vap98], “One
can consider the SV technique as a new type of parameterization of multidimensional functions
that in many cases allows us to overcome the curse of dimensionality.” (Note: here the “SV”
stands for the “Support Vector”.) In fact, the SVM appears to be especially advantageous
when there are only a few training samples available and the feature is high-dimensional, a
scenario rather quite frequently encountered in practical applications. This is mainly because
of the fact that the classification strategy of the SVM is based on maximizing the margin in
an implicit higher-dimensional space. This “geometrical” nature of the SVM does not require
an estimation of the statistical distributions of classes, leading to a good generalization even
when there are only limited number of training samples [MB04].
Steganography is the art of embedding secret message into an image, a video, or other
forms of data. It is another domain in multimedia security field, which is different from anti-
forensics but shares some common goals with anti-forensics [BK13]. In one of the most recent
steganography work [HF13], the undetectability of the stego-images becomes poor when the
payload reaches 0.5 bpp (bits per pixel).
It is a popular way to create image forgeries by compositing two images. An example in-
volving JPEG compression is illustrated in Figure 1.3. Inspired by this common practice, we
use a similar experimental setup to steganalytic testing, in order to conduct forensic testing
using SVM-based detectors. As illustrated in Figure 2.2, for a given genuine, unprocessed
image, the center part of the image is replaced by its corresponding processed image (JPEG
compressed/median filtered, or processed again using anti-forensic methods) with a replace-
ment rate around the values in {0.05, 0.1, 0.15, 0.2, 0.3, 0.4, 0.5, 0.6, 0.8, 1} to create the image
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forgery. For each replacement rate, the resulting composite image forgeries and the original
images are then mixed together for training and testing the SVM-based detectors. Here, the
image replacement rate in forensic testing can be taken as a counterpart of the bpp in image
steganography.
Figure 2.2: Illustration of creating a composite image forgery for training/testing the
SVM-based detector.
Given an SVM-based detector and a set of images for forensic testing, a decision value is
output by the SVM for each image. Similar to the scalar-based detectors, different classifica-
tion strategies are implemented by varying the thresholds for the decision values. Thereafter,
a ROC curve is plotted and an AUC value is calculated.
The SVM-based detectors are built based on the assumption that the forensic investigator
has the knowledge of the anti-forensic method and is able to create a large amount of image
forgeries for training the detector. This is standing on the beneficial side for forensics and is
the worst-case scenario for anti-forensics. In practice, we also find it very difficult to disguise a
whole processed (JPEG compressed or median filtered in this thesis) image as never processed,
when examined under an SVM-based detector under this worst-case scenario. Currently, there
are no JPEG or median filtering image anti-forensic algorithms which are able to fool powerful
SVM-based detectors. This can be reflected by high AUC values when the replacement rate
is close to 1 (Please see Sections 5.3.2, 7.3.4 and 7.4 for detailed experimental results). This
observation in practice backs the statement of [BK13]: it is a challenging task to develop
anti-forensic methods capable of resisting machine learning based detectors.
Standing on the anti-forensic side, this thesis mainly considers the results obtained with
a relatively low replacement rate. We remain reserved on the undetectability of a whole
image generated by anti-forensics. However, it can still find many applications in various anti-
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forensic scenarios, e.g., image splicing and tampering with relatively low replacement rate. For
example, an image forgery can be created by replacing the head of one person in the picture
without being detected.
2.2.2 Image Quality
The image quality assessment methods can be grouped into two categories: the no-reference
methods and the full-reference methods, depending on whether the original “clean” image is
known [WB06]. In real-world scenarios, the original image is usually unaccessible. However,
we often hold the ground-truth in the scientific research. In this case, algorithm performance
evaluation is possible in the full-reference way. In this thesis, we only consider 8-bit grayscale
images. Here, we adopt two widely used full-reference image quality evaluation metrics: PSNR
and SSIM, which will be respectively described in detail in the following.
2.2.2.1 PSNR
PSNR is probably the most widely used image quality assessment criterion in literature. It
can be defined via the well-known MSE (Mean Squared Error). Given a reference grayscale
image X with size H ×W , and its approximation or degraded version Y, the PSNR in dB
(deciBel) is calculated by:














(Xi,j −Yi,j)2 . (2.5)
Note that MAX is the maximum possible image pixel value. For 8-bit grayscale images,
MAX = 255. The PSNR is a symmetric measure, i.e., PSNR(X,Y) = PSNR(Y,X). The
greater the PSNR value is, the closer to the reference image X the approximated or degraded
image Y is. In other words, the image quality of Y is higher.
2.2.2.2 SSIM
As an improvement of the traditional image quality evaluation metrics such as PSNR, Wang et
al. [Wan+04] proposed the SSIM metric which correlates better with subjective scores of image
visual quality. Compared with PSNR, the properties of human visual system (HVS) are taken
into consideration for SSIM. Given the reference grayscale image X and its approximation or
degraded version Y to be evaluated, the SSIM is defined as:
SSIM(X,Y) = (l(X,Y))a × (c(X,Y))b × (s(X,Y))c , (2.6)
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where l(X,Y) compares the luminance, c(X,Y) compares the contrast, and s(X,Y) compares
the structure (see [Wan+04] for more details). Parameters a, b and c are used to balance the
above three comparison functions. The widely used setting is a = b = c = 1. The SSIM is
also a symmetric measure, i.e., SSIM(X,Y) = SSIM(Y,X). The greater the SSIM value is,
the higher the image quality of Y is. When X = Y, the SSIM metric achieves its maximum
value 1.
2.2.3 Histogram Recovery
In information theory, the KL divergence [KL51] is a widely used non-symmetric metric to
evaluate the similarity between two discrete distributions. Given a discrete distribution PT
and its approximation PF , the KL divergence of PF from PT is defined as:
DKL (PT , PF ) =
∑
i
PT (i)× logPT (i)
PF (i)
,
PT (i) > 0, PF (i) > 0,∑
i PT (i) = 1, and
∑
i PF (i) = 1.
(2.7)
It measures the information lost during the approximation. The smaller the KL divergence
value is, the closer the two distributions in comparison are.
The KL divergence will be used to evaluate the DCT histogram of (anti-forensic) JPEG
images (in Sections 5.2.1, 5.3.1 and 6.3) and the pixel value difference histogram of (anti-
forensic) median filtered images (in Section 7.3.4).
2.3 Natural Image Datasets
As mentioned in Section 2.2.1, the forensic testing requires certain image dataset with genuine
images. In the following, we will respectively present public natural image datasets which are
used in the JPEG forensic testing and the median filtering forensic testing in the large-scale
experimental tests of this thesis.
2.3.1 JPEG Forensic Testing
In the literature of JPEG anti-forensics [Sta+10a, Sta+10b, VTT11, SS11], the UCID (v2)
corpus [SS04] is used for forensic testing. In this dataset, there are 1338 24-bit RGB (Red,
Green, Blue) images of size 512 × 384 and of TIFF (Tagged Image File Format) format.
During the JPEG compression, the color representation of the image is firstly converted from
RGB to Y ′CBCR. In each of the Y ′ (luma), CB (blue-difference chroma component), and CR
(red-difference chroma component) components, the data is individually JPEG compressed.
Without loss of generality, only the luma component of the image is considered in the JPEG
forensic testing of this thesis. We use the Matlab function rgb2ycbcr to extract the luma
data from each RGB UCID image, which is thereafter saved as an 8-bit grayscale image in
PGM (Portable GrayMap) format.
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In Chapter 6, the proposed JPEG anti-forensic method requires an image prior model
and the covariance matrices of the spatial-domain JPEG compression noise, which need to
be learned on a dataset. To this end, the last 338 images of the UCID corpus are put into
a dataset called UCIDLearn. The first 1000 UCID images are then put into a dataset called
UCIDTest for forensic testing. Since there is a training procedure for establishing the SVM-
based forensic detectors, we randomly choose 500 images from UCIDTest dataset and put them
into the UCIDTR dataset for this purpose. The rest 500 images in the UCIDTest dataset then
constitute the UCIDTE dataset for forensic testing using the SVM-based detectors. Note that
for the forensic testing using scalar-based detectors, all the 1000 images in UCIDTest dataset
are used. For JPEG forensic testing, each image of UCIDTest dataset is JPEG compressed
using a quality factor randomly selected from {50, 51, · · · , 95}.
In Sections 4.4.1, 5.2.1, and 5.2.2.4, in order to tune a proper parameter setting or quickly
analyze the proposed JPEG anti-forensic method, we use another dataset called UCIDTest92.
It contains 92 images randomly chosen from the UCIDTest. Each UCIDTest92 image is JPEG
compressed with a quality factor selected from {50, 51, · · · , 95}, and every two images have
the same factor. Besides, in Section 5.4.3, we conduct the double JPEG compression forensic
testing on a relatively small dataset called UCIDTest100, which includes 100 randomly chosen
images from the UCIDTest dataset.
In summary, the following image datasets are used for conducting the test of the JPEG
anti-forensic methods:
• UCIDLearn, the last 338 images of UCID corpus, for learning an image prior model and
the covariance matrices of the spatial-domain JPEG compression noise.
• UCIDTest, the first 1000 images of UCID corpus, for forensic testing using the scalar-
based detectors, and also for the evaluations the image quality and the DCT histogram
recovery.
– UCIDTR, 500 images randomly selected from UCIDTest, for testing the SVM-based
detectors.
– UCIDTE, the rest 500 images in UCIDTest which are not chosen by UCIDTR, for
training the SVM-based detectors.
– UCIDTest92, 92 randomly selected images from UCIDTest, for tuning the param-
eters or for quickly analyzing the performance of the proposed JPEG anti-forensic
method.
– UCIDTest100, 100 randomly selected images from UCIDTest, to be used in a sce-
nario of double JPEG compression anti-forensics.
Besides the above image datasets constituted from the UCID corpus [SS04], we also con-
sider another relatively big image dataset – BOSSBase (v1.01) [BFP11]. This is for a deep
analysis of the quantization table estimation based JPEG forensic detector [FD03] (to be de-
scribed in Section 4.2.1). BOSSBase contains 10,000 raw images. For forensic testing, each
of the raw image is converted to an 8-bit grayscale image of PGM format, using the UFRaw
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utility8. The resulting image is thereafter down-scaled and then cropped to generate the final
testing images of size 512× 512. The 10,000 images are divided into 10 archives, according to
the original numbering of the BOSSBase raw image file. The i-th (i = 1, 2, · · · , 10) archive
contains 1000 images from the number 1000 · (i− 1) + 1 to 1000 · i.
The BOSSBase images are relatively smooth compared to other images (e.g., UCID images
[SS04] or the images described in Section 2.3.2 for median filtering forensic testing) which are
not originally stored in the raw format. This is probably due to the fact that the sharpening
feature is still missing in the UFRaw utility (see its webpage for details). The BOSSBase
images may not be “natural” enough, leading to possible bias in forensic testing. Compared
with cropping sub-images directly from the high-resolution PGM image, the down-sampling
operation may produce final testing images containing more texture, hoping to some extent to
mitigate the smoothness in the original image. In our JPEG forensic testing, we do not consider
any interference from resampling. Moreover, one of the weaknesses of the quantization table
estimation based JPEG forensic detector [FD03] is exposed under relatively smooth images.
Therefore, in this thesis we use the BOSSBase dataset only for JPEG forensic testing using
the quantization table estimation based detector [FD03].
2.3.2 Median Filtering Forensic Testing
As to the median filtering forensic testing, we do not use the UCID (v2) corpus [SS04], though
it is the testing dataset for the median filtering anti-forensic work presented in [FB12, WSL13,
DN+13]. This is based on the confirmation that UCID images have been processed by down-
sampling, according to a personal communication with the authors of [SS04]. In addition, we
do not want the resampling artifacts to interfere with the forensic testing of median filtering.
In Section 7.4.1, we will consider the application for median filtering in disguising image
resampling artifacts, where never resampled images are required for forensic testing. We also
do not consider raw image datasets such as BOSSBase [BFP11], given the reasons described
in the end of Section 2.3.1.
Based on the above considerations, we choose other image datasets which are created from
545 never resampled, non-compressed TIFF images capturing various indoor and outdoor
scenes. Among them, 200 images9 were taken by a Nikon D60, and have been used for
resampling forensics [VPPG11, VPPG12]; whereas the rest 345 images10 were taken by a
Nikon D90, a Canon EOS 450D, and a Canon EOS 5D, and have been used for double JPEG
compression forensics [BP12a, BP12b]. We crop 3 adjacent non-overlapping sub-images of
size 512 × 512 from the center of each original high-resolution TIFF images, and convert
them to grayscale images using the Matlab function rgb2gray. For some sub-images, one
or more median filtering forensic detector outputs of Eqs. (3.12)-(3.15) (to be presented in
Section 3.2.2) cannot yield valid values. For instance, the 0-valued denominator of Eq. (3.15)
8The UFRaw is probably the best utility for reading and manipulating raw images from digital cameras.
It can be downloaded from: http://ufraw.sourceforge.net.
9Available at: ftp://firewall.teleco.uvigo.es:27244/DS_01_UTFI.zip.
10Available at: ftp://lesc.dinfo.unifi.it/pub/Public/JPEGloc/dataset/.
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leads to the infinity. We observe that this normally happens for very smooth images, e.g., the
whole image only contains the scene of the sky. Besides the invalid detector outputs, it is not
very likely for this kind of images to appear in real anti-forensic scenarios, which are therefore
excluded from our forensic testing.
At last, we obtain 1607 8-bit grayscale images, which are randomly divided into 3 datasets:
MFTE (Median Filtering TEsting), MFTR (Median Filtering TRaining), and MFPE (Median
Filtering Parameter Estimation). MFTE contains 1000 images for forensic testing. MFTR
comprises 500 images for training the SVM-based median filtering detectors. The remaining
107 images are put into MFPE for parameter estimation, which will be used for creating Wu
et al.’s [WSL13] and our anti-forensic median filtered images (to be described in Section 7.3).
Note that, we also make sure that all the sub-images (at most 3) cropped from a single high-
resolution TIFF image are in either MFTE, or MFTR, or MFPE. Moreover, 100 images are
randomly picked from MFTE to form a smaller dataset MFTE100, which will be used for the
parameter grid search to be described in Sections 7.3.2, 7.3.3 and 7.3.4.
In summary, we use the following four image datasets for the forensic testing of median
filtering:
• MFTR, 500 images for training the SVM-based forensic detectors.
• MFTE, 1000 images for forensic testing using the scalar-based or SVM-based forensic
detectors, and also for the evaluations of the image quality and the pixel value difference
histogram recovery.
• MFPE, 107 images for parameter estimation.
• MFTE100, 100 images randomly selected from MFTE dataset, for the grid search of
parameters of the proposed median filtering anti-forensic method.
2.4 Relevant Optimization Algorithms
In this thesis, the proposed JPEG or median filtering anti-forensic methods often involve nu-
merical optimization so as to estimate the “best” processed image in some sense. In this section,
we briefly review four optimization algorithms that will be used in the subsequent chapters:
the subgradient method, the Hungarian algorithm, and the “Half Quadratic Splitting” as well
as the split Bregman method.
2.4.1 Subgradient Method
In order to minimize the cost function f(u) : Rn → R of a convex optimization problem, the
subgradient method iteratively solves the problem by [BXM03]:
u(k+1) = u(k) − tkg(k). (2.8)
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Note that u(k) is the k-th iterate, g(k) is one subgradient of f at u(k), and αk > 0 is the
step size at the k-th iteration. It is possible that f has more than one subgradient. When f
is differentiable, the only subgradient of f is its gradient. The subgradient method is not a
descent method, it is therefore common to keep the smallest objective function value found
so far, that is:
fkbest = min{fk−1best , f(u(k))}. (2.9)
There are many different types of step-size rules used by the subgradient method, such as
the constant step size, the constant step length, the square summable but not summable step
size, etc. In this thesis, we use the nonsummable diminishing step size [ADF05], i.e.,






For this step size rule, the algorithm is guaranteed to converge to the optimal value [BXM03].
One important extension of the subgradient method is the projected subgradient method,
which is to solve the following constrained convex optimization problem:
minimize f(u)
subject to u ∈ C, (2.11)






Here P (·) projects the input onto the constrained convex set C.
We will use the subgradient method in Sections 4.3.1, 4.3.2, and 6.4.
2.4.2 Hungarian Algorithm
The Hungarian algorithm [Kuh55] is a well-known optimization method for solving the assign-
ment problem in polynomial time. The assignment problem is defined as follows. Given two
sets, X and Y of equal cardinality n, and the nonnegative weight function W : X × Y → R,
the goal is to find a bijection f : X → Y such that the cost function:∑
x∈X
W (x, f(x)), (2.13)
is minimized.
The above assignment problem can also be interpreted by a square matrix of size n × n.
The (i, j)-th entry of the matrix is the cost (defined by the weight function W ) of assigning
the i-th member of X to the j-th member of Y. The Hungarian algorithm finds an optimal
assignment by applying the following steps in Algorithm 2.1 to the cost matrix.
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Algorithm 2.1 The Hungarian algorithm (in brief description).
Require: Cost matrix C of size n× n, minimum number of zero-covering lines m = 0
1: For each row, subtract all the entries of C by the row minimum.
2: For each column, the column minimum is found and subtracted from all the column entries
of C.
3: while m 6= n do
4: Cover all the zero entries of the C, by drawing the minimum number of lines across
rows and columns.
5: if The minimum number of zero-covering lines is n then
6: The optimal assignment is found.
7: return.
8: else
9: Find the minimum among the non-covered entries of the C.





The time complexity of the Hungarian algorithm is O(n3). When n is small, the problem
can however be solved in a reasonable time.
Compared with other optimization methods (described in Sections 2.4.1, 2.4.3, and 2.4.4)
which output an image in our image anti-forensic applications, the Hungarian algorithm is the
only discrete optimization method used in this thesis. We will use the Hungarian algorithm
in Sections 5.2.2.3, for the solving the perceptual DCT coefficient mapping problem. For this
problem, the two finite DCT coefficient sets X and Y are known.
2.4.3 Half Quadratic Splitting
In image restoration, a popular method is to minimize an objective function with regulariza-
tion. Linear regularization function is easy to optimize but incapable of recovering certain
image details such as discontinuities. In contrast, non-linear (even non-convex) regularization
is able to achieve this goal but is hard to optimize. In order to solve this kind of optimiza-
tion problem, Geman and Yang [GY95] proposed the “Half Quadratic Splitting” method. It
is thereafter widely adopted by various image restoration methods [KF09, ZW11], especially
when the image prior term (can be taken as regularization) of the cost function is non-convex.
Let y denote the image corrupted from its original version x. In order to estimate the
original image from y, the typical optimization problem takes the following form:
xˆ = arg min
u
Θ(u;y) = arg min
u
λΨ(u;y) + Φ(u), (2.14)
where λ is a parameter balancing different terms in the cost function. A common choice for
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Ψ(u;y) is ||Au− y||22, where A depends on the image corruption model. The regularization
term Φ(u) can be non-convex, which leads to direct optimization difficulties.
The basic idea of “Half Quadratic Splitting” is to introduce an auxiliary variable w. Then
the resulting new cost function takes the form:
Θ′(u,w;y) = λΨ(u;y) + Φ′(u,w), (2.15)





for every u. This method is “half quadratic” because it is requested that Φ′(u,w) is quadratic
in u when fixing w. Thereafter, the cost function can be minimized by alternatively solving
the following two sub-problems:
• w sub-problem, solving w given u;
• u sub-problem, solving u given w.
We will use the “Half Quadratic Splitting” method in Sections 6.4 and 7.3.1.
2.4.4 Split Bregman Method
The split Bregman method is an effective method which can solve a broad range of ℓ1-




H(u) + ||Φ(u)||1, (2.17)
where H(u) and ||Φ(u)||1 are convex, and Φ(u) is differentiable. Usually, H(u) is a ℓ2 term,
e.g., H(u) = ||Au−y||22. The “coupling” between the ℓ1 and ℓ2 terms makes the optimization
problem in Eq. (2.17) hard to solve. In order to “de-couple” these two ℓ1 and ℓ2 components
of this cost function, an auxiliary variable is introduced:
w = Φ(u). (2.18)
We therefore hope to solve the following constrained problem:
min
u,w
H(u) + ||w||1, such that w = Φ(u), (2.19)
which can be further converted to an unconstrained problem:
min
u,w
H(u) + ||w||1 + λ
2
||w − Φ(u)||22, (2.20)
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by adding an ℓ2 penalty term whose strength is control by the parameter λ. This introduction
of the auxiliary variable w can also be taken as a “Half Quadratic Splitting” described in
Section 2.4.3. It can be solved by alternating between the w sub-problem and the u sub-
problem, with increasing λ. When λ → ∞, we restrict Φ(u) to be equal to the auxiliary
variable w and the solutions of Eq. (2.17) and Eq. (2.20) converge [ZW11]. This is the so-
called continuation method, where Φ(u) in fact is not necessarily convex.
By contrary to the continuation method, the split Bregman method recursively solves the







H(u) + ||w||1 + λ2 ||w − Φ(u)− b(k)||22
b(k+1) = b(k) +
(
Φ(u(k+1))−w(k+1)) , (2.21)
where b is the Bregman variable. The above minimization problem can also be solved by
alternating between the w sub-problem and the u sub-problem, similar to Section 2.4.3.
The split Bregman method has several advantages over the traditional continuation meth-
ods [GO09]. The Bregman iteration can converge quickly, especially when there is an ℓ1 term
and a properly chosen λ. Moreover, the parameter λ remains constant, which avoids the
instabilities that happen when λ→∞ for the continuation method.
Indeed, the Bregman method requires the original cost function in Eq. (2.17) is ℓp-
regularized and p = 1. Practically, it can also give good results for p < 1 [Cha09, KTF11]. We
will use the split Bregman method to solve the image variational deconvolution problem pro-
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I
n this chapter, we present the related work of JPEG and median filtering (anti-)forensics,
respectively. Firstly, the basics and artifacts of JPEG compression and median filtering
are described. Then, the state-of-the-art forensic and anti-forensic methods are introduced.
Finally, we summarize the existing forensic detectors which we aim to attack in the proposed
anti-forensic methods, and the existing anti-forensic methods which we will compare with the
proposed anti-forensic methods in this thesis.
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3.1 JPEG Forensics and Anti-Forensics
3.1.1 Basics of JPEG Compression
Detailed descriptions of JPEG compression can be found in [PM93]. Here we briefly review
the process of JPEG compression and decompression for 8-bit grayscale images.
The original uncompressed imageX of sizeH×W is firstly split into L non-overlapping 8×8
pixel value blocks. Here, without loss of generality, we assume that both H and W are integer
multiples of 8. For each block, a 2-dimensional DCT is applied to obtain its corresponding
DCT coefficient block. As DCT is an orthogonal linear transform, this mapping can be
modeled as a matrix multiplication DX. More specifically, the (r, c)-th (r, c = 1, 2, · · · , 8)







Xlr,c · f br,c(i, j), (3.1)
where the (r, c)-th DCT basis function f br,c(i, j) is defined as:











(2j − 1)(c− 1)
)
, for i, j = 1, 2, · · · , 8.
(3.2)
Note that, w(k) = 1/
√
2 if and only if k = 1, and w(k) = 1 otherwise. Fixing a (r, c) pair,
we call the set of DCT coefficients {(DU)lr,c|l = 1, 2, · · · , L} the “subband (r, c)”, for a generic
image U. The (0, 0) subband is the DC (Direct Current) component, whose DCT coefficients
are called DC coefficients. The remaining 63 subbands are in general the AC (Alternating
Current) components, whose DCT coefficients are called AC coefficients.








where the 8× 8 matrix Q with positive integers is the so-called quantization table, and Qr,c is
its (r, c)-th entry (also called “quantization step”). Moreover, round(·) is the rounding function.
The resulting, quantized DCT coefficients Q(DX) are then losslessly encoded.
The quantization steps in a quantization table Q can vary according to a user’s concrete
setting. In this thesis, we consider the widely used JPEG quantization tables suggested by the
Independent JPEG Group (IJG) [Ijg]. In their method, the quantization matrix is defined by
an integer quality factor q (q = 1, 2, · · · , 100). According to the concrete value of the quality
factor, the corresponding quantization matrix Q is obtained by properly scaling a template
table using q. The smaller the value of q is, the greater the quantization steps in Q are. This
leads to a lower bit-rate JPEG compression. The resulting JPEG compressed image will be
of lower visual quality, but of smaller file size.
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As to the decompression, the quantized DCT coefficient is extracted from the decoded
bitstream, and then dequantized by multiplying it by the corresponding quantization step:
(Q−1(Q(DX)))lr,c .= (Q(DX))lr,c ×Qr,c. (3.4)
The dequantized DCT coefficients are then transformed to the spatial domain by the 2-
dimensional inverse discrete cosine transform (IDCT), which can be expressed as multipli-
cation by the 8× 8 block IDCT matrix D−1Q−1(Q(DX)). At last, rounding and truncation
operation (denoted as RT (·)) is applied to constrain the pixel values to be integers within
[0, 255], and the decoded JPEG image is obtained by:
Y = RT (D−1Q−1(Q(DX))). (3.5)
In this thesis, at the standpoint of a forger, we make the reasonable assumption that the
quantized DCT coefficients Q(DX) and the quantization table Q are available to us. For
example, we can use Sallee’s Matlab JPEG toolbox [Sal03] to read them from the JPEG file
that we want to manipulate.
3.1.2 JPEG Artifacts
After the JPEG compression, two known kinds of artifacts appear, indicating the JPEG
compression history of one image. They are the quantization artifacts in the DCT domain
and the blocking artifacts in the spatial domain, respectively. Both of them are traces left
from an image’s JPEG compression history.
Figure 3.1 shows the two kinds JPEG artifacts present in the “Lena” image after it is
JPEG compressed with quality factor 10. Figure 3.1-(a) is the close-up image of original,
uncompressed “Lena” image, while -(b) is its corresponding JPEG compressed version. In
Figure 3.1-(c) and -(d), the DCT histograms of subband (2, 2) corresponding to -(a) and -(b)
are shown, respectively. Note that in Figure 3.1-(d), the DCT coefficient error introduced by
the rounding and truncation operation RT (·) during the JPEG decompression process is not
counted.
3.1.2.1 DCT-Domain Quantization Artifacts
From Eq. (3.4), we can see that the dequantized DCT coefficient (Q−1(Q(DX)))lr,c are ob-
tained by multiplying the quantized DCT coefficient (Q(DX))lr,c by its corresponding quan-
tization step length Qr,c. Therefore, the DCT coefficients in the JPEG images are clustered
around the integer multiples of the quantization step. From Figure 3.1-(d), compared with
-(c), a comb-like distribution of DCT coefficients can be seen. This kind of artifacts is namely
the quantization artifacts in the DCT domain of the JPEG image.









































Figure 3.1: Examples of JPEG artifacts. Here the JPEG image is compressed from the
“Lena” image with quality factor 10.
3.1.2.2 Spatial-Domain Blocking Artifacts
As shown in Figure 3.1-(b), in the spatial domain of JPEG images, there are blocking artifacts.
This is mainly due to that JPEG compression is based on the block DCT transform. During
the JPEG compression process, the image is first divided into non-overlapping 8 × 8 blocks.
Each block is thereafter individually DCT transformed and quantized, leading to pixel value
discontinuities across the block borders [Far09a], namely, the blocking artifacts.
Besides, Robertson and Stevenson [RS05] also point out that the form of blocking artifacts
is related to the image itself. For the relatively smooth signal, there is more energy contained in
the low-frequency subbands. The high-frequency subbands contribute less quantization noise,
since they have relatively little energy. Because of the DCT basis functions (see Eq. (3.2)
for the formula, and Figure 3.2 for the illustration), the considerable quantization noise in
the low-frequency subbands leads to high error variance in the locations next to the block
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boundaries. On the other hand, for the relatively complex signal, e.g., the textured regions
of the image, a higher error variance will appear in the center of the block than the borders.
The above also explains the presence of blocking artifacts in the JPEG images.
Figure 3.2: Illustration of DCT basis functions. Basis image values are normalized for a
better visibility. Each 8× 8 block corresponds to a (r, c) pair.
3.1.3 JPEG Image Quality Enhancement
As discussed in Sections 1.3.2-1.3.3, we propose to conduct JPEG anti-forensics by leveraging
on advanced concepts/methods from the image restoration field. There are various JPEG
post-processing methods in the literature of image restoration. They are designed to im-
prove the visual quality of the JPEG compressed image especially at low bit-rates [YGK95,
LY04, ADF05, RS05, SC07, Zha+08], without any special consideration of the forensic un-
detectability. In this section, we will briefly describe two JPEG image quality enhancement
(or post-processing) methods which inspired us for designing the proposed JPEG anti-forensic
methods in Chapters 4-6.
Alter et al. [ADF05] proposed a JPEG image quality enhancement method based on
the adapted TV, by solving a constrained TV minimization problem. This method is able
to partly remove the spatial-domain blocking artifacts from a JPEG image, for improving
its visual quality. Yet, Figure 4.6-(a) indicates that it is not able to create anti-forensic
JPEG images with a good forensic undetectability. The TV-based deblocking method to
be proposed in Chapter 4 is to some extent inspired by this TV-based JPEG image post-
processing method [ADF05], yet with a properly re-designed variation form and a new TV-
based blocking measurement. More details about the proposed JPEG anti-forensic method
using TV-based deblocking can be found in Section 4.3.1.
For JPEG image post-processing, Robertson and Stevenson [RS05] proposed to model the
JPEG compression process as an addition of spatial-domain compression noise to the original
image. The 0-mean multivariate Gaussian is used to model this compression noise, which is
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treated as a random quantity. Moreover, the compression noise and the original image are
assumed to be independent. With a proper image prior model, quality enhanced JPEG image
can be obtained by using the MAP estimation. A more detailed description can be found
in Section 6.2.1. Moreover, a novel JPEG image quality enhancement method is proposed in
Section 6.2.2, inspired by the JPEG compression noise model [RS05] and a sophisticated image
prior model [ZW11]. From Table 6.5, again we can see that JPEG image quality enhancement
method does help to partly remove JPEG artifacts, yet not enough to reach a satisfactory
forensic undetectability level. Anti-forensic terms/strategies are to be proposed to fulfil the
task for further removing the remaining JPEG artifacts for anti-forensic considerations. A
detailed description of the proposed JPEG anti-forensic method supported by experimental
results can be found in Sections 6.3-6.4.
3.1.4 Detecting JPEG Compression
Fan and De Queiroz [FD03] proposed an algorithm for maximum-likelihood estimation (MLE)
of the JPEG quantization table, from a spatial-domain bitmap representation of the image.
The method can also serve as a detector to classify an image as not JPEG compressed, if
each entry of the estimated quantization table is either 1 or “undetermined” [FD03, Sta+10a,
SL11].
Focusing on 8 × 8 block boundaries, Fan and De Queiroz [FD03] also proposed a JPEG





where HI and HII are normalized histograms of pixel value differences across block boundaries
and within the block, respectively (see [FD03] for details).
Luo et al. [LHQ10] proposed a scalar feature to distinguish JPEG images from uncom-
pressed ones, based on the AC coefficient distribution change in the range of (−1, 1) and that
in the union range of (−2,−1] and [1, 2).
As to the quantization step estimation, Luo et al. [LHQ10] further estimated the AC
component quantization step as the integer, which is greater than 2 and gives the maximum
value of the DCT histogram. Experimental results show that this JPEG image detector
outperforms Fan and De Queiroz’s method [FD03].
3.1.5 Disguising JPEG Artifacts
In the DCT domain, subband (r, c) contains the (r, c)-th DCT coefficient from each DCT coef-
ficient block. For the AC component, i.e., subband (r, c) 6= (1, 1), the Laplacian distribution is
a popular choice [LG00] for modeling the distribution of unquantized DCT coefficients. For the
DC component, i.e., subband (1, 1), there is no general model representing its distribution.
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Nevertheless, its DCT quantization noise can be assumed to follow a uniform distribution
[Sta+10a, SL11].
In order to disguise the DCT-domain quantization artifacts of a JPEG image, Stamm et
al. [Sta+10a, SL11] proposed to add a dithering signal to the dequantized DCT coefficients
Q−1(Q(DX)), so that the dithered DCT coefficients approximate the estimated distribution
of the unquantized ones. This JPEG anti-forensic method succeeds in fooling the quantization
table estimation based detector proposed in [FD03].
After the dithering operation, Stamm et al. [Sta+10b, SL11] later proposed an anti-forensic
deblocking operation against the blocking artifacts detector in [FD03], that is, the blocking
signature measure KF of Eq. (3.6). For a given image U, the anti-forensically deblocked image
U˜ is obtained according to:
U˜i,j = meds(Ui,j) + wi,j , (3.7)
where meds(·) is the median filtering operation with local window size s × s, and wi,j is a
low-power white Gaussian noise of variance σ2.
Valenzise et al. proposed a perceptual anti-forensic dithering operation [VTT11], whose
resulting anti-forensic JPEG image has a higher perceptual quality than the one processed
by Stamm et al.’s dithering method [Sta+10a, SL11]. A “just-noticeable distortion” (JND)
[WN09] criterion is adopted to control the amount of introduced distortion. A minimum-cost
bipartite graph matching problem is used as the mathematical model for the adaptive insertion
of the dithering signal. A greedy algorithm is implemented to get an approximate solution in
order to reduce the computation cost.
3.1.6 Attacking JPEG Anti-Forensics
Valenzise et al. [VTT11, Val+11, VTT13] claimed that the dithering signal of [Sta+10a] de-
grades the image quality by introducing noise. Inspired by the JPEG ghosts detector [Far09b],
they designed an efficient detector against JPEG anti-forensic dithering, which examines the
noisiness of re-compressed versions of the image under test. The TV of the re-compressed
image (the ℓ1 norm of the spatial first-order derivatives) [ROF92] is employed as the image
noisiness measure. For a given image U, the detector re-compresses it using different quality
factors q = 1, 2, . . . , 100, as a function of which, TV(q) is computed as the total variation of
the re-compressed image. The first order backward finite difference ∆TV(q) is calculated as:
∆TV(q) = TV(q)− TV(q − 1), (3.8)




Lai and Böhme [LB11] proposed another calibration-based detector to counter Stamm
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et al.’s JPEG anti-forensic method [Sta+10a, SL11], borrowing the idea of calibration from
steganalysis [FGH02]. The detector compares the variances of the corresponding subbands
from a given image U and its calibrated version Ucal, which is obtained by cropping U by 4








where var(·) returns the sample variance of the input vector, and Dk is a matrix extracting
the DCT coefficients of the k-th high-frequency subband (as defined in [LB11]).
3.1.7 Other Relevant Methods
Moreover, some relative techniques can also be extended for JPEG anti-forensics, e.g., the
Shrink-and-Zoom (SAZ) attack proposed by Sutthiwan and Shi [SS11], though it was initially
designed for double JPEG anti-forensics. Given a JPEG image, a shrinkage (image down-
scaling) operation is firstly applied; then the processed image is zoomed back to the same size
as the original one, to obtain the anti-forensic JPEG image.
Li et al. [LLH12] considered the process of creating anti-forensic JPEG image [Sta+10a,
Sta+10b, SL11] as data hiding, in the view of JPEG steganalysis. The anti-forensic process
changes the intra- and inter-block statistics of the image, which can be measured using a group
of Markov process transition probability matrices [CS08]. A 100-dimensional feature vector
is then extracted and fed to an SVM for building the JPEG forensic detector. Similarly, the
well-known Subtractive Pixel Adjacency Matrix (SPAM) feature vector [PBF10] has also been
used for countering JPEG anti-forensics [VTT13].
3.1.8 Summary
In this thesis, the JPEG forensic detectors described in Sections 3.1.4, 3.1.6, and 3.1.7 are
used for forensic testing for different (anti-forensic) JPEG images. For the sake of conciseness,
we hereafter use symbols for referring to the detectors, which are summarized in Table 3.1.
Here, we mainly name the detectors directly after the feature value name, e.g., KF , KV , and
KL in Eqs. (3.6), (3.9), and (3.10), respectively. The subscript of the detector name is based
on the surname of the first author of the corresponding algorithm. We use the superscript
‘S’ together with the dimensionality of the feature vector to indicate that KS100Li and K
S686
P
are SVM-based detectors. Meanwhile, the superscript ‘Q’ of KQF and K
Q
Luo shows that they
estimate quantization steps. Note that KpU (parameters p = 1, and p = 2 are considered
here) is a new family of JPEG blocking detectors proposed in this thesis (see Eq. (4.3) in
Section 4.2.2).
Practically, in some high-frequency subbands of highly JPEG compressed images, all the
DCT coefficients are quantized to 0 and no quantization step could be determined. Hence,
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Table 3.1: JPEG forensic detectors.
KQF Fan and De Queiroz’s [FD03] quantization table estimation based
detector;
KF Fan and De Queiroz’s [FD03] JPEG blocking artifacts detector;
KLuo Luo et al.’s [LHQ10] JPEG identifying detector;
KQLuo Luo et al.’s [LHQ10] quantization step estimation based detector;
KV Valenzise et al.’s [Val+11, VTT13] TV-based JPEG anti-forensic
detector;
KL Lai and Böhme’s [LB11] calibration-based detector;
K1U ,K
2
U the proposed JPEG blocking artifacts detectors (see Eq. (4.3));
KS100Li Li et al.’s [LLH12] 100-dimensional intra- and inter-block
correlation feature [CS08] based detector;
KS686P Pevný et al.’s [PBF10] 686-dimensional SPAM feature based
detector.
for detector KQLuo, we use the number of defined estimated quantization steps greater than
1 as the final feature value. Besides, the range of the re-compression quality factor q in
Eq. (3.9) is shrunk to {45, 46, · · · , 100}, as we use the JPEG images compressed with quality
factors randomly selected from {50, 51, · · · , 95} in this thesis. Though detectorKQF is analyzed
as not very reliable in Section 4.2.1, as it may result in relatively high false positive rate
(detecting never compressed images as anti-forensic JPEG images), we still test it. Following
the suggestion in [FD03, Sta+10a, SL11], a given image is classified as never compressed if
and only if its estimated quantization table is full of entries 1 or “undetermined”. We will
report the rate of correctly detecting anti-forensic JPEG images for detector KQF .
Table 3.2 briefly reviews the state-of-the-art anti-forensic JPEG images, which will be used
for comparison with the anti-forensic JPEG images processed using the proposed methods in
Chapters 4-6. In order to create this state-of-the-art anti-forensic JPEG image FJSqSb [Sta+10a,
Sta+10b, SL11], we set s = 3 and σ2 = 2 (see Section 3.1.5 and Eq. (3.7)), following the
setting in the original papers. Also for the sake of brevity, we hereafter use the symbols listed
in Table 3.2 for referring to the original, JPEG, or state-of-the-art anti-forensic JPEG images.
From Sections 3.1.5 and 3.1.7, we can see that the state-of-the-art JPEG anti-forensic
methods use noise injection [Sta+10a, SL11, VTT11] or simple image processing operations
(e.g., median filtering [Sta+10b, SL11], and resampling [SS11]), in order to remove telltale
artifacts from a JPEG image. These operations may be effective for removing the DCT-
domain quantization artifacts or the spatial-domain blocking artifacts. However, they also
largely degrade the visual quality of the processed image [VTT11, Val+11, VTT13], which
can still detected by other advanced JPEG forensic detectors [Val+11, LB11, VTT13].
In Chapters 4-6, we follow another research line for JPEG anti-forensics, by adopting some
concepts/methods from JPEG image restoration field. We hope to created anti-forensic JPEG
images with a better forensic undetectability against the detectors listed in Table 3.1 as well
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Table 3.2: Notations for original, JPEG, and state-of-the-art anti-forensic JPEG images.
I genuine, uncompressed image;
J JPEG image;
FJSq Stamm et al.’s [Sta+10a, SL11] anti-forensic JPEG image created
from J using the dithering operation (see Section 3.1.5);
FJSqSb Stamm et al.’s [Sta+10b, SL11] anti-forensic JPEG image created
from FJSq using the median filtering based method (see Section 3.1.5);
FJV Valenzise et al.’s [VTT11] anti-forensic JPEG image created from J
using the perceptual anti-forensic dithering operation (see
Section 3.1.5);
FJSu Sutthiwan and Shi’s [SS11] anti-forensic JPEG image created from
J using the SAZ attack (see Section 3.1.7).
as a higher visual quality of the anti-forensic JPEG image, compared with the state-of-the-art
anti-forensic JPEG images listed in Table 3.2.
3.2 Median Filtering Forensics and Anti-Forensics
3.2.1 Median Filtering Basics and Artifacts
Let x = (x1,x2, · · · ,xi, · · · ,xN )T denote the given original grayscale image (in vectorized
form) of N pixels, the i-th pixel of its median filtered version can be obtained by:
yi = median (P
ix), (3.11)
where Pi is an s2×N sparse matrix extracting the i-th overlapping image block of size s×s (s
is an odd number), and xi locates in the geometrical center of block Pix. Note that median(·)
returns the median value of the input sample vector. Different windows can be used for image
median filtering [PV92]. In this thesis, we only consider the square window, which probably
is the most commonly used one. We use the notation MF (m)(·) for the image processing
operation, which applies median filtering to the input for m (> 0) time(s).
Without loss of generality, in this thesis, we perform median filtering anti-forensics on
images which have been median filtered once, with s = 3. It is also the experimental setting
in all the state-of-the-art median filtering anti-forensic methods [FB12, WSL13, DN+13]. For
the sake of brevity, we hereafter use the abbreviation “MF image” to refer to the “median
filtered” image.
Within a certain neighborhood of the MF image, the probability of pixel values originate
from the same pixel of the original image is high. This effect is called “streaking” by Bovik
[Bov87]. The streaking artifacts can also be inferred from the shape change of the pixel
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value difference histogram after median filtering. Comparing Figure 3.3-(b) with -(a), it can
be seen that the peak around the bin 0 of the first-order horizontal pixel value difference
histogram becomes higher after the image is median filtered (more discussion can be found
in Section 7.2.2). It indicates that the pixels in a certain neighborhood tend to have close or

























Figure 3.3: Example results of first-order horizontal pixel value difference histograms of
the original image and its corresponding MF image, respectively.
3.2.2 Detecting Median Filtering
3.2.2.1 Kirchner and Fridrich’s Method
Based on the “streaking artifacts” [Bov87], Kirchner and Fridrich [KF10] proposed a forensic
feature for detecting MF images:
KK = h0/h1, (3.12)
where h0 and h1 are the occurrance frequencies of bins 0 and 1 of the first-order pixel value
difference histogram, respectively. This feature KK is expected to be around 1 for original
images, whereas to be much greater than 1 for MF images. The underlying motive here is
that the median filtering acts approximately as a low-pass filter, in a way that processed
pixel values are appearing with a growing frequency to be constant in a certain neighborhood
[Bov87]. Furthermore, in order to avoid strong saturation effects in original images, the given
image is firstly divided into a set of b × b non-overlapping blocks. In the i-th block, the
histogram ratio in Eq. (3.12), namely KiK , is calculated. A more powerful median filtering
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is the weight function. Note that hi0 is the occurrence frequency of bin
0 for the first-order pixel value difference histogram in the i-th block. In [KF10], it is suggested
to set b = 64, for a good tradeoff between the forensic detectability and computation cost of
the feature.
By adopting the SVM, Kirchner and Fridrich [KF10] also showed the effectiveness of using
the well-known SPAM feature vector [PBF10] to discriminate MF images from the original
images.
3.2.2.2 Cao et al.’s Method
After an original image is median filtered, the probability of zero values in the first-order pixel
value difference map increases, especially in textured regions. Based on this analysis, Cao et
















where (∆ru)i (or (∆cu)i) is 1 if the i-th element in the first-order row (or column) pixel value
difference map is zero, or is 0 otherwise; and v is the binary local variance map, indicating
textured regions (vi = 1) or smooth regions (vi = 0) of the image (see [Cao+10] for more
details).
3.2.2.3 Yuan’s Method
Median filtering is based on order-statistics. Therefore, it affects the order and the pixel value
level inside the image block Piu. Besides, the median filter works on overlapping blocks,
which leads to the appearance of certain dependency artifacts. In order to capture these
local dependency artifacts, Yuan [Yua11] proposed 5 feature vectors: fDBM , fOBC , fQGL,
fDBC , and fFBC (see [Yua11] for details), which are together recognized as the MFF (Median
Filtering Forensics) feature vector fMFF . The median filtering forensic detector is thereafter
built with the adoption of the SVM. Moreover, the above 5 feature vectors can be further

























Experimental results show that the merged discriminating feature also performs excellently,
though the MFF feature is more powerful.
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3.2.2.4 Chen et al.’s Method
It is obvious that the overlapping median filter windows lead to certain correlations in a
neighborhood of the MF image. Moreover, the median filter is based on order statistics,
and is known to have good edge preserving capability. This makes the median filtered pixel
neighbors correlate in a different way compared to those of the original or average filtered
images. For median filtering detection, Chen and Ni [CN11] proposed the EBPM (Edge
Based Prediction Matrix) feature to examine the statistical change among edge regions of the
image. The given image is firstly divided into non-overlapping blocks, which are classified to
three types. For each type of blocks, a neighborhood prediction model is employed, and the
estimated prediction coefficients constitute the discriminating feature vector.
Chen et al. [Che+12, CNH13] further proposed a more powerful median filtering detection
feature based on the analysis of statistical characterization in the pixel value difference domain.
The proposed Global and Local Feature (GLF) vector fGLF consists of two sub-vectors: the
global probability feature vector fGPF , and the local correlation feature vector fLCF . The
construction of fGPF is based on the observation that the empirical cumulative distribution
in the pixel value difference domain differs considerably among different types of images, e.g.,
original, median filtered, and average filtered images. The motivation to build fLCF is that the
MF image has a rather distinct intrinsic fingerprint for the adjacent difference pair correlation
in the pixel value difference domain.
3.2.2.5 Kang et al.’s Method
Kang et al. [PK12, Kan+12, Kan+13] proposed to use the median filter residual of a given
image u (input of the forensic detector) to distinguish MF images from other kinds of images:
r =MF (1)(u)− u. (3.16)
In [PK12], Peng and Kang used the second-order Markov process [PBF10] to model the me-
dian filtered residual. The MFRTP (Median Filter Residual Transition Probabilities) feature
vector is thereafter extracted and fed to the SVM for building the median filtering detec-
tor. Later, Kang et al. [Kan+12, Kan+13] adopted the autoregressive model to analyze the
median filter residual, and the coefficients are extracted as the MFRAR (Median Filter Resid-
ual AutoRegressive) feature vector, which has a low dimensionality but still performs very
well. Their methods also achieve good robustness of median filtering detection against JPEG
compression post-processing.
3.2.2.6 Zhang et al.’s Method
Zhang et al. [Zha+14] investigated the median filtering from the angle of micro-texture struc-
ture, with the adoption of the so-called local ternary pattern [TT10] and local derivative
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pattern [Zha+10]. In order to speed up the SVM training procedure, the dimensionality of
the extracted MFLTP (Median Filter Local Ternary Patterns) feature is reduced from 2048
to 220 using the kernel principal component analysis technique, without harming the forensic
performance of the detector.
3.2.3 Disguising Median Filtering Artifacts
3.2.3.1 Fontani and Barni’s Method
Fontani and Barni [FB12] pioneered the median filtering anti-forensic work, against the forensic
detectors proposed in [KF10, Cao+10, Yua11] (see Sections 3.2.2.1-3.2.2.3). The main idea of
their method is to find a proper convolution filter f , so that the filtered MF image f(y) has
low detector output while still close to y. The searching of f is performed by minimizing the
following cost function:
fˆ = arg min
f
(exp (KY (f (y))− 2.2)− PSNR (y, f (y))) , (3.17)
whereKY (·) (see Eq. (3.15)) returns the value of Yuan’s merged discriminating feature [Yua11]
for the input image, and the definition of PSNR(·, ·) can be found in Section 2.2.2.1. The final
anti-forensic MF image is generated by convolution filtering: x˜ = fˆ(y).
3.2.3.2 Wu et al.’s Method
Wu et al. [WSL13] modeled the pixel value difference pair di,j(u) = [Ui,j − Ui,j+1,Ui,j −
Ui+1,j ]
T , using a 2-dimensional generalized Gaussian distribution. Targeting at median fil-
tering forensic detectors in [KF10, PBF10, Yua11] (see Sections 3.2.2.1 and 3.2.2.3), a noise
attack algorithm is thereafter proposed for median filtering anti-forensic purposes:
di,j(x˜) = di,j(y) + ni,j , (3.18)
where n is the attacking noise. The goal is to bring the distribution of di,j(x˜) close to the
estimated one of the original image pixel value difference di,j(x). The distribution of ni,j
is obtained based on the following two assumptions: the convolution of the distributions of
di,j(y) and ni,j yields the distribution of di,j(x); and the parameters of the two distributions
of di,j(y) and di,j(x) have linear correlations.
3.2.3.3 Dang-Nguyen et al.’s Method
Dang-Nguyen et al. [DN+13] proposed another noise attack to the MF image, targeting at
forensic detectors in [KF10, Cao+10, Yua11] (see Sections 3.2.2.1-3.2.2.3). The given image is
firstly divided into non-overlapping blocks. The major noise attack is performed in relatively
complex blocks, whose variances are greater than a certain threshold T . If the complex block
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does not contribute to Yuan’s fDBM and fOBC features [Yua11], the block is then dithered
with random noise uniformly distributed in [−7,−3] ∪ [3, 7]. At last, the whole image is
attacked by random noise uniformly distributed in [0, 1].
3.2.4 Summary
For the sake of conciseness, we henceforth use symbols for referring to the detectors considered
in our work on median filtering anti-forensics, which are summarized in Table 3.3. Similar to
Table 3.1, we mainly name the detectors directly after the feature value name for the scalar-
based median filtering forensic detectors. As to the SVM-based detectors, the superscript ‘S’
together with the dimensionality of the feature vector is used to indicate that they are SVM-
based. Note that, if the same (group of) authors have contributed more than one SVM-based
detectors, we choose the latest (also the strongest) one for forensic testing.
Table 3.3: Median filtering forensic detectors.
KK Kirchner and Fridrich’s [KF10] first-order pixel value difference
histogram based detector;
KˆK the block-based version of detector KK [KF10];
KC Cao et al.’s [Cao+10] first-order pixel value difference based detector;
KY Yuan’s [Yua11] merged discriminating feature based detector;
KS686SPAM the 686-dimensional SPAM feature based detector [PBF10];
KS44MFF Yuan’s [Yua11] 44-dimensional MFF feature based detector;
KS56GLF Chen et al.’s [Che+12, CNH13] 56-dimensional GLF feature based
detector;
KS10AR Kang et al.’s [Kan+12, Kan+13] 10-dimensional MFRAR feature
based detector;
KS220LTP Zhang et al.’s [Zha+14] 220-dimensional MFLTP feature based
detector.
From Section 3.2.3, we can see that the state-of-the-art median filtering anti-forensic meth-
ods use image processing operations (e.g., convolution filtering [FB12]), or noise injection
[WSL13, DN+13], in order to remove telltale artifacts from an MF image. The resulting
anti-forensic MF image not necessarily achieves a good forensic undetectability against the
forensic detectors listed in Table 3.3, and normally suffers from low visual quality.
In Chapter 7, we follow another research line for median filtering anti-forensics, leveraging
on image deconvolution. We hope to create anti-forensic MF images with a better forensic
undetectability against the detectors listed in Table 3.3 as well as a higher visual quality of
the anti-forensic MF image, compared with the state-of-the-art anti-forensic MF images listed
in Table 3.411.
11In [DN+13], Dang-Nguyen et al. show that their median filtering anti-forensic method outperforms Fontani
and Barni’s [FB12]. In Chapter 7, we refrain from comparing with Fontani and Barni’s pioneer anti-forensic
MF image [FB12], which is therefore not included in Table 3.4.
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Table 3.4: Notations for original, MF, and state-of-the-art anti-forensic MF images.
I original, intact image;
M MF image;
FMW Wu et al.’s [Sta+10b, SL11] anti-forensic MF image created from M using
the dithering operation (see Section 3.2.3.2);
FMD Dang-Nguyen et al.’s [DN+13] anti-forensic MF image created from M
using the noise injection based method (see Section 3.2.3.3).
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I
n this chapter, we focus on removing the JPEG blocking artifacts at the anti-forensic
level. To this end, we propose a constrained TV-based minimization problem, whose cost
function consists of a TV term and a TV-based blocking measurement term. The resulting
anti-forensic JPEG image successfully fools the forensic methods detecting JPEG blocking,
and other advanced JPEG forensic detectors. The calibration-based detector is also defeated
by conducting a further feature value minimization. Experimental results show that the
proposed method outperforms the state-of-the-art JPEG anti-forensic methods in a better
forensic undetectability and a higher visual quality of the processed image.
A paper describing the proposed method was published in an international conference
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4.1 Introduction and Motivation
For JPEG anti-forensic purposes, we need to consider both the quantization artifacts in the
DCT domain and the blocking artifacts in the spatial domain. In practice, we find it extremely
difficult to conduct a single-step attack to defeat multiple JPEG forensic detectors that work
in different domains, while keeping a high image visual quality. Therefore, in this thesis, we
consider removing JPEG artifacts alternatively in the spatial and in the DCT domains. A
similar strategy is adopted in Stamm et al.’s JPEG anti-forensic method [Sta+10a, Sta+10b,
SL11], where the DCT-domain quantization artifacts and the spatial-domain blocking artifacts
are handled separately in different domains.
For JPEG post-processing in image restoration, the quantization artifacts in the DCT
domain is not the main concern. Its main objective is to remove the spatial-domain JPEG
blocking artifacts for visual quality enhancement purposes [LY04, ADF05, Zha+08]. Unfor-
tunately, these JPEG deblocking methods may not be able to create post-processed JPEG
images which are able to pass the examination of JPEG blocking detectors. However, by
integrating some additional anti-forensic terms, these methods can contribute in the JPEG
blocking artifacts removing task at the anti-forensic level. Based on the above analysis, here
we choose to firstly focus on the spatial-domain JPEG blocking artifacts. We leave the task
of DCT-domain quantization artifacts removing in Chapter 5. Following the research line of
conducting image anti-forensics leveraging on image restoration, in this chapter, we devise a
JPEG anti-forensic method based on TV regularization.
The concept of Total Variation (i.e., TV for short) regularization was pioneered by Rudin
et al. [ROF92] in 1992. Ever since then, it has been widely used in image restoration, for
various applications such as denoising, deconvolution, inpainting, etc. Take denoising as an
example, the integral of the absolute gradient of the noised signal is high, in other words, the
noised signal has high TV. Therefore, the signal restoration can be conducted by reducing the
TV of the noised signal, usually with a signal fidelity constraint with respect to the noised
signal. Compared with traditional techniques, e.g., linear smoothing, and median filtering, the
TV-based denoising is not only simple and effective in noise removal but also able to preserve
details such as edges.
For JPEG image, the blocking artifacts in the spatial domain are presented in the form
of pixel value discontinuities around the 8 × 8 block borders. This kind of artifacts leads to
high TV of the JPEG image. Therefore, JPEG deblocking can be performed by minimizing
a TV-based energy function [ADF05]. Traditionally, its main objective is to improve the vi-
sual quality of the JPEG image. In this chapter, we add another TV-based JPEG blocking
measurement term into the TV-based minimization cost function. By solving the new mini-
mization problem, we may need to sacrifice some image quality of the JPEG image. However,
we hope to create anti-forensic JPEG images which are able to fool existing scalar-based JPEG
forensic detectors.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 4.2 experimentally analyzes
the forensic performance of 8 existing scalar-based JPEG forensic detectors listed in Table 3.1.
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In Section 4.3, we describe the proposed TV-based deblocking method for JPEG anti-forensics.
Experimental results with comparisons with state-of-the-art JPEG anti-forensic methods are
presented in Section 4.4. At last, Section 4.5 summarizes this chapter.
4.2 Performance Analysis of Scalar-Based JPEG Detectors
In this section, we experimentally analyze the performance of the 8 scalar-based JPEG de-
tectors. As to the other 2 SVM-based JPEG detectors listed in Table 3.1, we leave it to be
discussed in Chapter 5.
4.2.1 Quantization Table Estimation Based Detector
Fan and De Queiroz’s [FD03] JPEG forensic detector KQF (see Section 3.1.4 and Table 3.1)
classifies a given image as not compressed, if all the estimated quantization steps are either 1
or “undetermined” [Sta+10a]. It is the targeted quantization artifacts detector of the JPEG
anti-forensic method proposed in [SL11]. However, as pointed out by Böhme and Kirchner
[BK13], we lack knowledge on the false positive rate of KQF [FD03].
In order to investigate the reliability of KQF [FD03], we estimated the quantization table of
10, 000 genuine, uncompressed 512× 512 PGM images from BOSSBase dataset [BFP11] (see
the end of Section 2.3.1 for more descriptions and discussions concerning this dataset). Table
4.1 lists the false positive rate PFP of all the 10 archives of BOSSBase. Surprisingly, PFP can
reach as high as 61.50% for the 6-th archive. The average rate 25.22% also indicates that KQF
is not very reliable to determine whether an image has been JPEG compressed.
Furthermore, we found that among all the “non-1” and “non-undetermined” estimated
entries by KQF [FD03], 3 takes a large portion, as shown in the P3 column in Table 4.1.
Figure 4.1-(a) is an example DCT histogram from a never compressed image, which has no
comb-like quantization artifacts but is detected as quantized by 3 according to KQF . Here we
go back to review the MLE of quantization table [FD03]. For the sake of simplicity, we only
analyze why KQF picks 3 instead of 1 in this case. Based on the Eq. (14) of [FD00] and the
Eq. (15) of [FD03], for quantization step q = 1, the log-likelihood is:
L(1) = N × w(0, 1) +N × log 1, (4.1)
while the log-likelihood for q = 3 is:
L(3) = p0 ×N × w(0, 3) + (1− p0)×N × w(1, 3) +N × log 3, (4.2)
where N is the total number of blocks used in estimation, and w(i, q) is an even function
of i defined in [FD00] (more details can be found in [FD00, FD03]). We denote p0 as the
percentage of coefficients which are the integer multiples of 3. KQF chooses 3 instead of 1
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Table 4.1: PFP and P3 for detector K
Q
F [FD03] on BOSSBase dataset [BFP11]. PFP is
calculated as the portion of images which are mistakenly classified as JPEG compressed
among all the original images under examination. P3 is the fraction of the number of
estimated quantization steps being 3 over the number of the estimated “non-1” and “non-
undetermined” quantization steps.
Archive PFP (%) P3
01 18.70 1653/1959 = 84.38%
02 12.40 957/1118 = 85.60%
03 4.50 175/187 = 93.58%
04 5.70 111/125 = 88.80%
05 10.50 986/1141 = 86.42%
06 61.50 9243/11033 = 83.78%
07 17.50 1084/1155 = 93.85%
08 43.90 5655/6670 = 84.78%
09 33.20 5062/5895 = 85.87%
10 44.30 6780/7720 = 87.82%
Average 25.22 87.49%
when L(3) > L(1). This happens when p0 > 67.28%. For Figure 4.1-(a), among all 408312
DCT coefficients in use for quantization step estimation, there are 2797 coefficients which are
integer multiples of 3, namely p0 = 68.50%. Hence K
Q
F detects that it is quantized by 3. This
frequently happens in the high-frequency subbands for relatively smooth images.
Another interesting point is that KQF outputs 1 for some DCT histograms which are obvi-
ously not from genuine, uncompressed images. Figure 4.1-(b) is from a post-processed JPEG
image. It is obvious that the comb-like quantization artifacts still remain, but KQF fails to
estimate the correct quantization step.
WhenKQF is tested on UCIDTest dataset (see Section 2.3.1 for more details concerning this
dataset) with 1000 UCID images [SS04]. The false positive rate is PFP = 16/1000 = 1.6%,
and P3 = 15/16 = 94.74%. This low false positive rate is due to the fact that most UCID
images contain a large portion of highly textured regions, which decreases the occurrences of 3
in the quantization step estimation. Nevertheless the weakness of KQF is exposed when tested
on the dataset BOSSBase where images are relatively smooth (also see the discussion in the
end of Section 2.3.1).
From the above analysis of detector KQF , it can be seen that it is not a very reliable forensic
detector to determine whether an image has been previously JPEG compressed. However, in
our JPEG anti-forensic work, we still consider the outputs of KQF trying to decrease the
12For an image with size of 512× 512, there should be 4096 DCT coefficients in each subband. However, for
estimating the quantization step [FD03], the 8×8 block with equal value for all the 64 pixels is excluded in the
MLE. Therefore, here in this example DCT histogram, there are only 4083 instead of 4096 DCT coefficients
used in the estimation.















































Figure 4.1: (a) is an example unquantized DCT histogram which is detected as quantized
by 3 according to KQF [FD03], while the quantization step is detected as 1 (namely never
quantized) for (b), which is from a post-processed JPEG image.
occurrences of 3 in the anti-forensic JPEG image on UCID dataset [SS04], so as to prevent
the processed image from getting over-smoothed.
4.2.2 Other Scalar-Based JPEG Forensic Detectors
Besides the JPEG forensic detectors descried in Sections 3.1.4, 3.1.6 and 3.1.7, here we further
propose to build a family of measures, for detecting JPEG blocking artifacts:
KpU =
∣∣Bpgr(U)−Bpgr(Ucal)∣∣ , (4.3)
where Bpgr is the gradient aware blockiness [UW08], which is the normalized ℓp norm of the
weighted gradient computed from each group of four adjacent pixel values across 8× 8 block
borders (see [UW08] for details). Note that the parameter p can vary to build a family of
different measures. In this thesis, we use p = 1 and p = 2 to build two JPEG blocking artifacts
detectors K1U and K
2
U , respectively.
Besides the analysis of the quantization table estimation based detector KQF in Sec-
tion 4.2.1, in this section, we study the other scalar-based JPEG forensic detectors. Here,
we report the ROC curves obtained by the (state-of-the-art anti-forensic) JPEG images listed
in Table 3.2 against the 7 other scalar-based JPEG forensic detectors listed in Table 3.1.
Shown in Figure 4.2 are ROC curves achieved by 7 scalar-based JPEG forensic detectors
examining 5 kinds of (state-of-the-art anti-forensic) JPEG images on UCIDTest dataset. In
Figure 4.2-(a), all the 7 ROC curves are all close to the upper-left point (0, 1) in the ROC
space (the performance of detector K2U is slightly worse compared with others). It indicates
that all these JPEG forensic detectors perform well to detect JPEG compression without any
anti-forensics applied.











































































































































































Figure 4.2: ROC curves achieved by 5 kinds of (state-of-the-art anti-forensic) JPEG images
against 7 scalar-based JPEG forensic detectors. Results are obtained on UCIDTest dataset.
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Detectors KV [Val+11, VTT13] and KL [LB11] are proposed aiming at detecting the anti-
forensic JPEG image FJSq [Sta+10a, SL11]. Therefore, from Figure 4.2-(b), we can see that
both the two ROC curves respectively achieved by KV and KL are close to the upper-left
point of the ROC space, which implies a good forensic detectability. Valensize et al. [VTT11]
improved the dithering based anti-forensic method of Stamm et al. [Sta+10a, SL11], by
employing the JND criterion to control the distortion introduced by the anti-forensic dithering
operation. The resulting anti-forensic JPEG image FJV [VTT11] is able to achieve higher visual
quality (see Table 4.2 for relevant quality comparison) but about the same level of forensic
undetectability, compared with FJSq [Sta+10a, SL11].
The anti-forensic JPEG image FJSqSb [Sta+10b, SL11] is obtained by processing FJSq
[Sta+10a, SL11] using median filtering combined with white Gaussian noise addition. The
ROC curves in Figure 4.2-(c) show that median filtering performs very well in disguising
JPEG blocking artifacts, against detectors KF [FD03], K1U and K
2
U . Compared with other
state-of-the-art anti-forensic JPEG images, FJSqSb [Sta+10b, SL11] is able to drag the ROC
curves the closest to the random guess. However, the ROC curves achieved by KLuo [LHQ10]
and KV [Val+11, VTT13] are still quite far away from the random guess. Moreover, Böhme
and Kirchner [BK13] point out that FJSqSb [Sta+10b, SL11] has not been examined by median
filtering forensic detectors yet. In Chapter 7, we will further discuss this issue.
From Figure 4.2-(e), it can be seen that Sutthiwan and Shi’s [SS11] anti-forensic JPEG
image FJSu can be detected by most of the 7 JPEG forensic detectors in consideration. The
exceptions are K1U and K
2
U , which indicates that the blocking artifacts are well suppressed by
the SAZ operation, yet still remain detectable by KF [FD03].
4.3 JPEG Anti-Forensics via TV-Based Deblocking
For JPEG anti-forensic purposes, we need to remove from the JPEG image the quantization
artifacts in the DCT domain as well as the blocking artifacts in the spatial domain. Unlike
[Sta+10a, Sta+10b, SL11], here we firstly focus on the blocking artifacts removal, leveraging
on the widely used TV in the image restoration field.
4.3.1 JPEG Deblocking Using Constrained TV-Based Minimization
In image restoration, researchers have investigated the problem of removing JPEG blocking
artifacts. However, their efforts mainly focused on improving the image visual quality [LY04,
ADF05, Zha+08], especially for highly compressed images. Anti-forensics should take into
account both the forensic undetectability and the perceptual quality. For JPEG deblocking
purposes, we hereby propose a variational approach to minimize a TV-based energy function
consisting of a TV term and a TV-based blocking measurement term.
Inspired by [ADF05], which aims to improve the visual quality of JPEG images compressed
at low bit-rates by solving a constrained and weighted TV minimization problem, for any given
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with the variation at location (i, j) defined as:
νi,j =
√
(Ui−1,j +Ui+1,j − 2Ui,j)2 + (Ui,j−1 +Ui,j+1 − 2Ui,j)2, (4.5)
where Ui,j is the value of the (i, j)-th pixel of image U.
In order to remove the statistical traces of JPEG blocking artifacts, we define a second
term which measures the JPEG blocking. The idea is very simple: it assumes that if there
is no JPEG compression, statistically the energy sum of the pixel value variation along the
block borders should be close to that within the block. In other words, the energy sum shall
statistically remain the same no matter where the 8 × 8 block starts. Hence, we divide all
the pixels in the image into two sets according to their positions in the block. The pixel
classification strategy is illustrated in Figure 4.3. Pixels at shaded locations are put into set










Figure 4.3: Pixel classification according to its position in the 8× 8 pixel value block.
The rationale behind this simple idea of using TV and pixel classification (according to
Figure 4.3) to conduct JPEG deblocking can be backed by experimental results shown in
Figure 4.4. We can see that for original UCIDTest images (see Section 2.3.1 for more de-
scriptions about the datasets), the values of C(U)/TVb(U) (here, the dividing by TVb(U) is
for normalization purposes, since the TV varies largely for different images) are close to 0.
After JPEG compression, this ratio value largely increases. Therefore, we hope to remove the
blocking artifacts from a given JPEG image by minimizing the two energy terms described in
Eqs. (4.4) and (4.6).



















Figure 4.4: TV-based blocking measurement test conducted on original images and JPEG
images, respectively. Results are obtained on UCIDTest dataset.
We also adopt a similar, yet more flexible constraint (controlled by parameter µ, a small
positive number) than that in [ADF05], with the objective to achieve a good quality of the
processed image. Denote M as the set of integers within the range [0, 255]. We define the
constraint image space S as:
S = {U ∈MH×W ∣∣(DU)lr,c ∈ [(klr,c − µ)Qr,c, (klr,c + µ)Qr,c] ; r, c = 1, 2, · · · , 8; l = 1, 2, · · · , L},
(4.7)
where klr,c = (Q(DI))lr,c are the quantized DCT coefficients, which can be read from the JPEG
image J using the Matlab JPEG toolbox [Sal03]. We set this constraint space to make sure
that the DCT coefficients of the processed image are within the same quantization bins (if
µ ≤ 0.5), or in the same or neighboring bins (if µ > 0.5), as those of the JPEG image J , so
as to ensure an acceptable quality of the processed image.
The final constrained TV-based minimization problem is:
U∗ = arg min
U∈S
E(U) = arg min
U∈S
(TVb(U) + αC(U)) , (4.8)
where α > 0 is a regularization parameter, balancing the two energy terms. It is easy to
demonstrate that E(U) is a convex function (though not differentiable) and S is a convex
set [ADF05, BV04]. The optimization problem can be solved using the projected subgradient
method (see Section 2.4.1 for more descriptions) leading to the iteration:
U(k+1) = PS
(
U(k) − tk × g(U(k))
)
, (4.9)
where U(k) is the processed image at the k-th iteration (note that, U(0) is the given JPEG
image), tk > 0 is the step size, g(U) is a subgradient of E(U), and PS is the projection
operator onto space S that will be explained in detail later.
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4.3.2 De-Calibration
In practice, the TV-based JPEG deblocking method is able to generate anti-forensic JPEG
images which can well fool the 8 scalar-based JPEG forensic detectors listed in Table 3.1
except the calibration-based one KL [LB11] (see Section 3.1.6). In fact the calibrated feature
value, i.e., KL of Eq. (3.10), has also been significantly decreased. However, for genuine,
uncompressed images, this feature value is highly condensed in an interval of very small
values. It is hard to further decrease this value by performing deblocking on JPEG images,
while keeping a good visual quality.
In this section, we will directly optimize an energy function which is very close to Eq. (3.10)
for de-calibration purposes. The minimization problem is formulated as:





which can also be solved using the subgradient method (see Section 2.4.1 for more descrip-
tions).
4.4 Experimental Results
Our large-scale forensic tests are conducted on UCIDTest dataset (see Section 2.3.1 for more
descriptions about the datasets) with 1000 original, uncompressed UCID images [SS04]. From
each uncompressed image I, a JPEG image J is obtained by compressing I with a random
quality factor chosen from {50, 51, · · · , 95}. Thereafter, one kind of post-processed JPEG
image and two kinds of anti-forensic JPEG images are thereafter created from J :
• JA, created from J with the application of Alter et al.’s deblocking method [ADF05];
• FˆJ0 , created from J with the application of the proposed TV-based JPEG deblocking
method described in Section 4.3.1;
• FJ0 , created from FˆJ0 with the application of the proposed de-calibration operation
described in Section 4.3.2.
In this section, the above three kinds of images will be compared with (state-of-the-art
anti-forensic) JPEG images listed in Table 3.2 in terms of both image quality and forensic
undetectability against existing JPEG forensic detectors listed in Table 3.1.
4.4.1 Parameter Settings
Instead of waiting for the convergence of the optimization problem in Eq. (A.4), we have a
different strategy to select the candidate deblocked image, which may not be the solution
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U∗ of the minimization problem. The selection is guided by the JPEG blocking signature
measure KF [FD03] in Eq. (3.6). Indeed, in practice we found that for uncompressed images,
the output of KF has a smaller standard deviation than another blocking signature K
p
U in
Eq. (4.3). Its detection ability is also proven to be stronger than KpU when tested on JPEG
images (see Figure 4.2-(a)). Therefore, although it is difficult to includeKF in our optimization
framework as it is histogram based, it would be reasonable to use KF to guide the selection
of the deblocked result. Experimentally, we run 50 iterations, and choose the resulting image
giving the smallest KF value as the final result. This gives us satisfying deblocked JPEG
image FˆJ0 which is able to achieve a good forensic undetectability against all the three blocking
artifacts detectors KF , K1U and K
2
U .
Furthermore, the regularization parameter α in Eq. (A.4), µ in Eq. (4.7), and the step size
tk in Eq. (4.9) are parameters that we can adjust. Before the discussion about the setting of
α, we discuss about settings for µ and tk first.
As to the setting of the convex set S, here we set µ = 1.5, which strictly constrains the
processed DCT coefficient to stay within the same (or the neighboring) quantization bin of
its original value. If µ is set to be too small, the resulting anti-forensic JPEG image will
have obvious DCT-domain quantization artifacts. On the other hand, if µ is set to be too
big, the resulting anti-forensic JPEG image will suffer from low visual quality. By setting
µ = 1.5, a good tradeoff can be achieved. The projection operator PS works as follows: once
a DCT coefficient under processing goes outside the constrained range, it will be modified
back to a random value uniformly distributed within the original quantization bin. In the
spatial domain the resulting pixel values will at last be rounded and truncated to integers in
the range [0, 255]. In fact, the PS operator can be taken as a modified QCS projection which
is often used in JPEG image post-processing [YGK95, RS05, SC07].
For the step size tk in Eq. (4.9), it is set to tk = 1/k (k = 1, 2, · · · , 50) at the k-th iteration,
following [ADF05].
The regularization parameter α is mainly for balancing the two energy terms TVb(U) and
C(U). We need to consider the AUC values achieved by the detectors as well as the visual
quality of the anti-forensic JPEG image, for choosing a proper value of α. In order to well tune
this parameter, here we conduct the experiments on UCIDTest92 (see Section 2.3.1 for details),
with α varying in {0.5, 1.0, 1.5, 2.0, 2.5, 3.0}. For each α with value in this set, a set of anti-
forensic JPEG images FˆJ0 are generated and tested against the 7 scalar-based JPEG forensic
detectors. Figure 4.5-(a) plots the AUC curves as a function of the value of α for different
JPEG detectors. Since we take special care of the calibration-based JPEG forensic detector
KL [LB11] in a subsequent processing, here we mainly consider the remaining 6 detectors.
The image quality variation can also be seen in Figure 4.5-(b) and -(c) for evaluation metrics
PSNR (see Section 2.2.2.1) and SSIM (see Section 2.2.2.2) with the original image I as the
reference, respectively. It can be seen that, the greater the value of α is, the poorer the quality
of the resulting image FˆJ0 will be. When α = 1.5, the anti-forensic JPEG image FˆJ0 is able to
achieve a good tradeoff between forensic undetectability and visual quality.
For the de-calibration operation, as we almost directly minimize the calibrated feature














































Figure 4.5: The variation trend of the forensic undetectability against 7 scalar-based JPEG
forensic detectors and image quality for FˆJ0 under different settings of α (see Eq. (A.4)).
Results are obtained on UCIDTest92 dataset.
value, we are able to obtain very small KL values when converging to U∗ in Eq. (A.5). In
order to fool the detector, a random threshold for each image is drawn from the distribution of
the calibrated feature values for genuine, uncompressed images, and the iteration stops once
the KL value goes below it.
4.4.2 Comparison and Analysis
Table 4.2 reports the average PSNR and SSIM values, for FJSq [Sta+10a, SL11], FJSqSb
[Sta+10b, SL11], FJV [VTT11], FJSu [SS11], JA [ADF05], FˆJ0 , and FJ0 , respectively. The
image quality evaluation metric values are calculated using the original image I as the refer-
ence, on UCIDTest dataset. The ROC curves achieved by different kinds of images against 7
scalar-based JPEG forensic detectors are plotted in Figure 4.2 (in Section 4.2.2) and Figure 4.6.
Apparently, fooling detectors is not the goal of Alter et al.’s work [ADF05], as their main
focus is to improve the image perceptual quality. Note that in Table 4.2, the average PSNR
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Table 4.2: Image quality comparison of different kinds of (anti-forensic/post-processed)
JPEG images, with the original image I as the reference. Results are obtained on UCIDTest
dataset.
J FJSq FJSqSb FJV FJSu JA FˆJ0 FJ0
PSNR 37.0999 33.4061 30.4591 33.2890 31.6552 35.8541 35.5070 35.4814







































































































Figure 4.6: ROC curves achieved by different kinds of (anti-forensic/post-processed) JPEG
images against 7 scalar-based JPEG forensic detectors. Results are obtained on UCIDTest
dataset.
and SSIM values of JA are both lower than those of J . The reason may be that the parameter
setting in [ADF05] is optimized for low bit-rate compression, but not for the JPEG compression
with relatively high quality factor in {50, 51, · · · , 95}.
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As analyzed in Section 4.2.2, FSq [Sta+10a, SL11] and FV [VTT11] have similar anti-
forensic performance against the 7 scalar-based JPEG forensic detectors. Both of them can
be well detected by the JPEG blocking detectors KF [FD03], K1U and K
2
U , as well as the
detectors KV [Val+11, VTT13] and KL [LB11] which are especially designed to attack the
dithering based JPEG anti-forensic method [Sta+10a, SL11]. As an improved version of FSq
by employing the JND criterion to control the distortion in the spatial domain, we can see from
Table 4.2 that FV achieves a higher average SSIM value than FSq . The median filtering based
JPEG deblocking method [Sta+10b, SL11] improves the forensic undetectability [Sta+10a,
SL11], however, from Table 4.2, we can see that the cost of the resulting anti-forensic JPEG
image FSqSb [Sta+10b, SL11] is to lose 2.95 dB of PSNR value and 0.0247 of SSIM value
on average. As to the anti-forensic JPEG image FJSu generated using Sutthiwan and Shi’s
[SS11] SAZ attack, it can be well detected by most of the detectors meanwhile suffers from a
relatively low visual quality.
From the ROC curves plotted in Figure 4.6-(b) and the average PSNR and SSIM values
listed in Table 4.2 for FˆJ0 , it can be seen that the proposed TV-based JPEG deblocking method
is able to well fool the JPEG blocking detectors KF [FD03], K1U and K
2
U while keeping a
good visual quality of the processed image. Besides, Luo et al.’s [LHQ10] two JPEG forensic
detectors KLuo and K
Q
Luo are also well fooled. Moreover, FˆJ0 is also able to fool another
advanced detector KV [Val+11, VTT13]. The reason may be that the TV term of Eq. (4.4)
suppresses the unnatural noises that can be detected by KV . After processing FˆJ0 with the
de-calibration operation (see Section 4.3.2), the resulting final anti-forensic image FJ0 is able
to drag the 7 ROC curves the closest to the random guess, compared with the state-of-the-art
anti-forensic JPEG images. By comparing the average PSNR and SSIM values achieved by
FˆJ0 and FJ0 listed in Table 4.2, it can be seen that the de-calibration operation does not harm
the image quality of FˆJ0 , but can successfully defeat Lai and Böhme’s [LB11] calibration-based
detector KL.
Among all the anti-forensic JPEG images in consideration, FJ0 generated using the pro-
posed JPEG anti-forensic method is able to achieve a better forensic undetectability as well as
a higher image quality, compared with the state-of-the-art anti-forensic JPEG images. Com-
pared with Stamm et al.’s [Sta+10a, Sta+10b, SL11] FJSqSb , besides a better anti-forensic
performance, FJ0 has a gain of 5.02 dB of PSNR value and 0.0334 of SSIM value on average.
Figures 4.7-4.9 show some example results obtained from a UCID image [SS04]. The JPEG
image J is obtained by compressing the original image I with quality factor 50. Compared
with Stamm et al.’s anti-forensic JPEG images FJSq and FJSqSb , our anti-forensic JPEG image
FJ0 better preserves the image details such as textures and edges. As pointed out by Valensize
et al. [VTT11], the dithering operation [Sta+10a, SL11] introduces extra noise into the anti-
forensic image FJSq . Though the median filtering based deblocking operation [Sta+10b, SL11]
can mitigate the spatial-domain noise introduced by the dithering signal, it can still be noticed
at the smooth areas of the image, e.g., the sky area in Figure 4.9-(a) (please refer to the
electronic version for a better visibility).













































Figure 4.7: Example results (close-up images) and DCT histograms of the (2, 2) subband,
for I and J , respectively.
visual quality than FJSq and FJSqSb (see Figures 4.9-(a) and -(c)). Moreover, it can be seen
from Figure 4.9-(f) that the shape of the DCT histogram of FJ0 has been improved, though in
our JPEG deblocking method no specially designed DCT smoothing is conducted. According
to the quantization table estimation based detector KQF [FD03], 85.70% of FJ0 images are
classified as never JPEG compressed.
4.5 Summary
In this chapter, a new JPEG anti-forensic method is proposed. It is based on removing the
spatial-domain blocking artifacts via minimizing a TV-based energy function. Experimental
results show that it is able to not only defeat the blocking artifacts detectors but also fool other
existing JPEG forensic detectors. As to the advanced JPEG forensic detector KL [LB11], a

































































Figure 4.8: Example results (close-up images) and DCT histograms of the (2, 2) subband,
for JA [ADF05], FJV [VTT11] and FJSu [SS11], respectively.
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(b) FJSq [Sta+10a, SL11]










































Figure 4.9: Example results (close-up images) and DCT histograms of the (2, 2) subband,
for FJSq [Sta+10a, SL11], FJSqSb [Sta+10b, SL11] and FJ0 , respectively.
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calibration-based minimization problem is proposed to slightly modify the deblocked JPEG
image but successfully reduce the calibrated feature of KL into the normal range.
Though the proposed method in this chapter does not explicitly handle with the DCT-
domain quantization artifacts removal task, the DCT histogram of the resulting anti-forensic
image is to some extent smoothed. Experimental results show that most of the anti-forensic
JPEG image FJ0 is able to pass off as never compressed under the examination of Fan and
De Queiroz’s [FD03] quantization table estimation based detector KQF . Besides, Luo et al.’s
[LHQ10] quantization step estimation based detector KQLuo is also fooled.
Figure 4.10 compares two example DCT histograms of FJSqSb [Sta+10b, Sta+10a, SL11]
and FJ0 . We can see that the comb-like DCT-domain quantization artifacts still to some extent
exist in FJ0 . This usually happens in the mid-frequency subbands of FJ0 . This weakness of
FJ0 may potentially be used by advanced JPEG forensic detectors which can expose such kind
of artifacts. In order to cope with the DCT-domain quantization artifacts removal after the
JPEG image is processed by the proposed TV-based deblocking operation, we will propose a
perceptual DCT histogram smoothing method in Chapter 5. Moreover, the SVM-based JPEG
forensic detectors KS100Li [CS08, LLH12] and K
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Figure 4.10: Example DCT histograms of the (4, 4) subband, for FJSqSb [Sta+10a, Sta+10b,
SL11] and FJ0 , respectively.
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T
his chapter proposes a JPEG anti-forensic method, which aims at removing from a given
image the footprints left by JPEG compression, in both the spatial domain and the
DCT domain. With reasonable loss of image quality, the proposed method can defeat existing
forensic detectors that attempt to identify traces of the image JPEG compression history or
JPEG anti-forensic processing. In the proposed framework, firstly because of a TV-based
deblocking operation, the partly recovered DCT information is thereafter used to build an
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adaptive local dithering signal model which is able to bring the DCT histogram of the processed
image close to that of the original one. Then a perceptual DCT histogram smoothing is
carried out by solving a simplified assignment problem, where the cost function is established
as the total perceptual quality loss due to the DCT coefficient modification. The second-
round deblocking and de-calibration operations successfully bring the image statistics that are
used by the JPEG forensic detectors to the normal status. Experimental results show that
the proposed method outperforms the state-of-the-art methods in a better tradeoff between
the JPEG forensic undetectability and the visual quality of processed images. Moreover,
the application of the proposed anti-forensic method in disguising double JPEG compression
artifacts is proven to be feasible by experiments.
A paper describing the proposed method was published in an international journal
[Fan+14]. The Matlab code of the method is freely shared online and can be downloaded from:
http://www.gipsa-lab.grenoble-inp.fr/~wei.fan/documents/AFJPG-TIFS14.tar.gz.
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5.1 Introduction and Motivation
In Chapter 4, a JPEG anti-forensic method based on TV-based deblocking is proposed.
Though the method is initially designed to remove spatial-domain blocking artifacts from
a JPEG image, experimental results show that it also perturbs the DCT coefficients to the
extent that the deblocked JPEG image FJ0 is able to fool existing quantization artifacts de-
tectors. However, it is very difficult to further smooth the DCT histogram of the JPEG image
by simply performing deblocking in the spatial domain while keeping a high visual quality of
the processed image. As shown in Figure 4.10-(b) and discussed in Section 4.5, though the
comb-like gaps in the DCT histogram of the JPEG image are to some extent filled, the quanti-
zation artifacts still exist in FJ0 in a relatively mild way. These artifacts may not be detectable
under the examination of existing quantization artifacts detectors KQF [FD03], KLuo [LHQ10],
and KQLuo [LHQ10]. Yet, we cannot exclude the possibility of the emergence of other JPEG
forensic detectors targeting at this weakness. Therefore, in order to design reliable JPEG
anti-forensics, it is necessary to fill the remaining gaps in the DCT histogram of the deblocked
JPEG image processed by the TV-based deblocking method presented in Chapter 4.
Here, we adopt a similar strategy to Stamm et al.’s JPEG anti-forensic method [Sta+10a,
Sta+10b, SL11] which handles DCT-domain quantization artifacts and spatial-domain block-
ing artifacts separately in different domains. Also following the above discussion, in this
chapter, we propose a four-step JPEG anti-forensic method, as illustrated in Figure 5.1 and
as summarized in the following:
• The first step is the TV-based deblocking in the spatial domain (to be described in
Section 5.2.1). This is the same method with that described in Chapter 4, yet with
different parameter settings. Besides the removal of JPEG blocking artifacts, another
purpose of this step is to partly and plausibly fill gaps in the DCT histogram, so as
to facilitate the following step of explicit histogram smoothing. Experimentally, it is
necessary and beneficial to conduct this first-round deblocking, especially for a better
histogram restoration in the high-frequency subbands where all DCT coefficients are
quantized to 0 in the JPEG image (relevant results will be presented in Section 5.2.2.4).
After the first step, the image generated from the JPEG image J is denoted as FˆJb .
• We found that in the deblocked image FˆJb , the comb-like DCT quantization artifacts
are no longer as obvious as those in the JPEG image J (an example is shown in Fig-
ure 5.3-(c)). Under the hypothesis that the partly recovered DCT-domain information
is reliable, the next step naturally goes to further filling the remaining gaps in the DCT
histogram. This leads us to the construction of an adaptive local model for the DCT
coefficient distribution, with which a perceptual histogram mapping method is there-
after proposed to modify the DCT coefficients while minimizing the total SSIM value
loss (to be described in Section 5.2.2). We denote the intermediate image after applying
the perceptual DCT histogram smoothing as FˆJbq.
• The removal of the DCT quantization artifacts is at the cost of introducing a small
amount of unnatural noise and blocking artifacts in the spatial domain to the output
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image FˆJbq, despite that we have tried to minimize the image quality loss. Hence, we
move to the spatial domain again and conduct a second-round TV-based deblocking and
regularization (to be described in Section 5.2.3). The resulting intermediate image is
denoted as FˆJbqb.
• At last, FˆJbqb is processed by the de-calibration operation (to be described in Sec-
tion 5.2.4), which is the same with that described in Chapter 4, to generate our anti-
forensic JPEG image FJ .
ﬁrst-round TV-based deblocking
perceptual DCT histogram smoothing
second-round TV-based deblocking
de-calibration
Figure 5.1: The proposed anti-forensic JPEG image creation process for FJ .
By processing a JPEG image alternatively in the spatial domain and in the DCT domain,
we hope to create an improved version of anti-forensic JPEG image which achieves better
forensic undetectability than FJ0 , which is generated by the deblocking based JPEG anti-
forensic method in Chapter 4. Meanwhile, by introducing a visual quality control during the
proposed DCT histogram smoothing operation, we hope a high quality of the processed image
can be ensured.
As discussed in Section 1.3.1 and as illustrated in Figure 1.3, one important motiva-
tion/application of JPEG anti-forensics is to disguise double JPEG compression artifacts. In
this chapter, we will also apply the proposed JPEG anti-forensic method in three scenarios
of double JPEG compression, to prove the possibility of creating anti-forensic double JPEG
compressed images.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. The proposed JPEG anti-forensic
method is described in Section 5.2. Section 5.3 shows some experimental results with some
comparisons with the prior art as well as the method proposed in Chapter 4. In Section 5.4,
the application of the proposed JPEG anti-forensic method is proven to be practical in creating
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anti-forensic double JPEG compressed images, with experimental comparisons with the state-
of-the-art methods. Finally, we summarize this chapter in Section 5.5.
5.2 Proposed JPEG Anti-Forensics
5.2.1 First-Round TV-Based Deblocking
According to the flowchart of the anti-forensic JPEG image creation shown in Figure 5.1, the
first step is TV-based deblocking. It is basically what is described in Section 4.3.1, yet in
practice with some different parameter settings. In the proposed TV-based JPEG deblocking
method, µ in Eq. (4.7), the regularization parameter α in Eq. (A.4), and the step size tk in
Eq. (4.9) are parameters that we can adjust.
For the setting of the convex set S, we set µ = 1.5 in Chapter 4. Compared with a relatively
small µ value, it is for better scattering the DCT coefficients in the DCT histogram, so that
the comb-like quantization artifacts are less likely to appear. Compared with a relatively
big µ value, it is for the image quality consideration of the processed image, because the
DCT coefficient is constrained not go too far away from its original quantization bin. The
effectiveness of this setting is proven by the good forensic undetectability of FˆJ0 against the
quantization artifacts detectors KQF [FD03], KLuo [LHQ10] and K
Q
Luo [LHQ10] with a good
image quality (see Table 4.2 and Figure 4.6). In practice, we found that this setting works well
for low-frequency and high-frequency subbands, yet the DCT-domain quantization artifacts
still exist in the mid-frequency DCT subbands (see an example in Figure 4.10-(b)).
Different from the setting in Chapter 4, here we set µ = 0.5 for S in order to generate
FˆJb . This setting strictly constrains the processed DCT coefficient to stay within the same
quantization bin as its original value. Besides the visual quality control, this is also favorable
for the perceptual DCT histogram smoothing to be described in Section 5.2.2, where the
processed DCT coefficient is also constrained to stay within its original quantization bin. The
projection operator PS works as follows: once a DCT coefficient under processing goes outside
the quantization bin of its original value, it will be modified back to a random value uniformly
distributed within the quantization bin. In the spatial domain, the resulting pixel values will
at last be rounded and truncated to integers in the range [0, 255].
In order to select a good value for α in Eq. (A.4), we create a set of intermediate images
FˆJb on UCIDTest92 dataset (see Section 2.3.1 for more descriptions about the datasets) for
comparison. The processed images FˆJb are generated from the JPEG images for different
values of α ranging from 0.5 to 3 with step 0.5. As the first intermediate image during our
anti-forensic JPEG image creation, the output of the JPEG forensic detectors is not taken
into account for comparison now. We hope FˆJb to have a good image quality and to recover
as much DCT-domain information as possible for the consideration of the further perceptual
DCT histogram smoothing. From Figure 5.2-(a) to -(c), the average PSNR, SSIM, and KL
divergence values are respectively compared for different values of α. Note that all the metric
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values are computed using the original image as the reference. We can see that the image
quality, as well as the KL divergence, decreases as α increases. When α > 2.5, the curve of
the average KL divergence trends to be flat. We therefore only consider α ≤ 2.5, as a high
value of α will degrade too much the quality of the processed image, with limited improvement
on the KL divergence. In the end, we choose α = 1.5 as it appears to have a good tradeoff
between the DCT histogram restoration quality (which will contribute to the perceptual DCT








































Figure 5.2: The quality and KL divergence change of the image FˆJb obtained by the first-
round TV-based deblocking for different values of α. The original image is used as the
reference for computing the metric values. Results are obtained on UCIDTest92 dataset.
As to the step size, we set tk = 1/k at the k-th iteration, still following [ADF05].
Similar to the setting in Chapter 4, instead of waiting for the convergence of the opti-
mization problem, we select the candidate deblocked image guided by the blocking signature
measure KF in Eq. (3.6). Experimentally, we run 50 iterations, and choose the resulting
image giving the smallest KF value as the final result. This provides us with a satisfying
intermediate image FˆJb .
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5.2.2 Perceptual DCT Histogram Smoothing
After JPEG image J has been processed using the TV-based deblocking method, the gaps in
the DCT domain have been partly filled in the obtained image FˆJb (an example DCT histogram
is shown in Figure 5.3-(c)). We have confirmed the effectiveness of the TV-based deblocking in
fooling existing JPEG forensic detectors in Chapter 4, yet with a different parameter setting
of µ in Eq. (4.7). However, the periodicity of the DCT histogram in FˆJb may still exist,
which might be utilized by JPEG forensic detectors. This issue will be further discussed in
the application of JPEG anti-forensics in Section 5.4.2. In order to achieve a better forensic
undetectability, it is necessary to fill the gaps left in the DCT histogram of FˆJb . In this section,
we propose a perceptual DCT histogram smoothing method. The partly recovered information
in the DCT domain of FˆJb will help us to build an adaptive local dithering signal model based
on both the Laplacian distribution and the uniform distribution for a better goodness-of-fit,
compared to the global Laplacian distribution.
5.2.2.1 Disadvantages of Global Laplacian Model
Constructing the DCT histogram is a common practice for studying the image statistics in
the DCT domain. In this thesis, all the DCT histograms are constructed using integers as















, k ∈ Z (5.1)
where δ is the indicator function: δ(x) = 1 if and only if x = 0, otherwise δ(x) = 0.
For modeling the DCT coefficients in AC components, the Laplacian distribution is the
dominant choice balancing the model simplicity and the fidelity to real data [LG00], which
is also the basic assumption of Stamm et al.’s dithering-based JPEG anti-forensic method
[Sta+10a, SL11]. Figure 5.3-(a) shows an example DCT histogram from a genuine, uncom-
pressed UCID [SS04] image, and the fitting result using the discrete Laplacian distribution:
P (Y = y) =


1− e−λ/2 if y = 0
e−λ|y|sinh(λ/2) if y ∈ Z, y 6= 0
0 otherwise,
(5.2)
where sinh(·) is the hyperbolic sine function, and the parameter λ can be estimated using MLE
[PR99]. From Figure 5.3-(a), we can see that the Laplacian distribution may not always be
a good model for a precise description of real data.
Furthermore, as known, the kurtosis (different from the excess kurtosis including a −3
term) of the Laplacian distribution is a constant 6. We calculated the kurtosis of all the AC
components for each UCID image [SS04], and 93.68% of them have values higher than 6. The
average kurtosis is 19.99, much higher than 6, which indicates that the actual distribution of

















































































Figure 5.3: (a) is the DCT histogram of subband (2, 2) from an example genuine, uncom-
pressed UCID image [SS04], and the red curve is the fitting result using the discrete Laplacian
distribution model. Then the image is JPEG compressed with quality factor 50, and the
proposed JPEG anti-forensic method is applied. (b), (c), and (d) are the corresponding DCT
histograms of (a) in the JPEG image, after the first-round TV-based deblocking, and after
the adaptive local dithering signal is injected (as described in Section 5.2.2), respectively.
DCT coefficients usually has a much higher peak. This also partly explains the fitting problem
of the DCT histogram using the Laplacian model in Figure 5.3-(a).
Moreover, Robertson and Stevenson [RS05] pointed out that for quantized DCT coefficients
that are observed to be zero, i.e., the DCT coefficients in the quantization bin 0 satisfying
(Q(DU))lr,c = 0, the Laplacian model indeed works well. However, for the other DCT coef-
ficients in the quantization bin b 6= 0 satisfying (Q(DU))lr,c = b, it appears that the uniform
model fits better to the real data than the Laplacian model.
5.2.2.2 Adaptive Local Dithering Signal Model
Based on the above analysis, we hope to build a model having a better goodness-of-fit than
the global Laplacian model. Comparing an example histogram shown in Figure 5.3-(c) with
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that in -(b), we notice that the DCT-domain information has been partly recovered in FˆJb ,
with the help of which we will be able to build an adaptive local dithering signal model.
We still use U to denote a generic image pixel value matrix, however U now contains
pixel values of the processed JPEG image FˆJb using the TV-based deblocking method in
Section 5.2.1. For a given DCT subband (r, c) of FˆJb , with Qr,c, the DCT coefficients
(DU)lr,c (generically denoted as Y
′) are quantized and then dequantized to obtain coeffi-
cients (Q−1(Q(DU)))lr,c (generically denoted as Y ). The goal is to add a dithering signal N
in such a way that the dithered DCT coefficient:
Z = Y +N (5.3)
has no comb-like DCT quantization artifacts while its distribution is to some extent close to
that of Y ′. In this section, we are to find a proper distribution for the dithering signal N .
We firstly consider the AC component. Without special explanation, the DCT coefficients
mentioned in this section are all from the AC component subbands. Inspired by Robertson
and Stevenson’s work about the suitability of the Laplacian model and the uniform model for
different parts of the DCT histogram [RS05], we propose an adaptive local dithering signal
model based on the combination of the Laplacian distribution and the uniform distribution,
with the appropriate parameter tuned in each quantization bin.




as the non-empty quantization bin with the smallest




as the non-empty quantization bin with
the largest bin center value. We build the dithering signal model through one quantization
bin by another, starting from quantization bin b = 0.
Given quantization bin b, we try to seek for parameter λb of the Laplacian distribution by
solving the following constrained weighted least-squares fitting problem:















HUr,c(k)− P (Y = k)
)2
, (5.4)
where HUr,c and P are defined in Eqs. (5.1) and (5.2), respectively. The fitting problem in
Eq. (5.4) means, that we wish to find a local Laplacian distribution which is still close to
the corresponding distribution in FˆJb . We set wk =
(|round( k
Qr,c
) − b| + 1)−1 as the weight
for the deduction of λb, which emphasizes the importance of the DCT coefficients from the
current quantization bin b for the fitting. We also studied some other settings of wk, e.g.,
the same function as the one used above but with different powers, the Gaussian function,
etc. We found that in practice different settings of wk have minor impact on the histogram
restoration quality, and that the current setting yields slightly better results. Moreover, λ−b





defined, then the fitting problem can be established and λb can be found by solving Eq. (5.4);
otherwise, the fitting problem cannot be established and we say that λb cannot be found.
Before we describe how the searching of the two bounds λ−b and λ
+
b is performed, we first
explain the models in use for each quantization bin b.
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If the parameter λb can be found for quantization bin b by solving a well-defined fitting
problem Eq. (5.4), the Laplacian model will be used. In this case, we follow Stamm et al.’s
dithering signal model [Sta+10a]. The distribution of the dithering signal N is given by
(replacing λ by the actual value of λb):
P (N = n|Y = 0) =
{
c0e
−λ|n| if − Qr,c2 < n < Qr,c2
0 otherwise,
(5.5)
P (N = n|Y = y, y > 0) =
{
c1e
−λn if − Qr,c2 ≤ n < Qr,c2
0 otherwise,
(5.6)
P (N = n|Y = y, y < 0) =
{
c1e
λn if − Qr,c2 < n ≤ Qr,c2
0 otherwise,
(5.7)
with c0 = λ2 (1− e−λQr,c/2)
−1
and c1 = λe−λQr,c/2(1− e−λQr,c)−1. Let P om and P em, two
functions of λ, denote the probability mass function (p.m.f.) of the rounded dithering signal
when Qr,c is an odd number and an even number, respectively. The domain of the p.m.f. is
the integer set {−⌊Qr,c2 ⌋,−⌊Qr,c2 ⌋ + 1, · · · , ⌊Qr,c2 ⌋}. For the sake of brevity, here we omit the
equations of the p.m.f., which however can be found in Appendix 5.A. The p.m.f. will be used
later for the searching of λ−b and λ
+
b of Eq. (5.4).
As to the quantization bin b, where λb cannot be found, the uniform model will be used
instead. In this case, the dithering signal N is generated according to:




if n ∈ N
0 otherwise,
(5.8)
where N = (−Qr,c2 , Qr,c2 ) when y = 0, N = [−Qr,c2 , Qr,c2 ) when y > 0, and N = (−Qr,c2 , Qr,c2 ]
when y < 0.
Now, we go back to the searching of the bounds λ−b and λ
+
b used in Eq. (5.4). We start from
the center of the DCT histogram, i.e., quantization bin b = 0. We set λ−b = 10
−3 according to
Valenzise et al.’s statement [VTT11] that the parameter λ of the Laplacian model usually takes
values between 10−3 and 1 for natural images. The constraint used in the searching is based
on the observation that in the distribution of DCT coefficients, the probability decreases when
the coefficient magnitude increases. As an example and as illustrated in Figure 5.4, when Qr,c
is an odd number, we constrain that the probability of DCT coefficient falling in the leftmost
integer bin k = −⌊Qr,c2 ⌋ (or the rightmost integer bin k = ⌊Qr,c2 ⌋) of the quantization bin
b = 0 should be no smaller than either that in the rightmost integer bin of the quantization
bin b = −1 or that in the leftmost integer bin of the quantization bin b = 1. For the moment,
in the neighboring quantization bins −1 and 1, the DCT coefficients are assumed to follow
a uniform distribution. Then λ+b is determined by solving Eq. (5.9), where M0,M−1,M1
are respectively the approximate probabilities of DCT coefficient falling in quantization bins
0,−1, 1, which are estimated directly from the constructed histogram. The searching for
λ+b can be done using a numerical method. A set of numbers are uniformly sampled from
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the interval [10−3, 1]. Given each number in this set as the parameter λ, P om is calculated.
Therefore, λ+b is chosen as the largest number satisfying constraints in Eq. (5.9). When Qr,c is
an even number, the procedure to find λ+b is similar yet slightly different. Detailed information
can be found in Appendix 5.B.
λ+b = arg max
10−3≤λ≤1
















Figure 5.4: Illustration for the constraint used for the searching of λ+b when Qr,c is an
odd number: The probability for the leftmost (or the rightmost) integer bin of the quanti-
zation bin b = 0 should be no smaller than either that of the rightmost integer bin in the
quantization bin b = −1 or that of the leftmost integer bin in the quantization bin b = 1.
For quantization bins b = 1, 2, · · · , B+r,c, we adopt a similar procedure to obtain λ−b and
λ+b . The constraint is that the probability of coefficients falling in the leftmost integer bin of
quantization bin b ≥ 1 should be no bigger than that in the rightmost integer bin of quantiza-
tion bin b− 1, meanwhile the probability of coefficients falling in the rightmost integer bin of
quantization bin b should be no smaller than that in the leftmost integer bin of quantization
bin b + 1. The distribution in the quantization bin b − 1 is already defined at that moment,
and for the quantization bin b+ 1 we assume the uniform distribution. Then λ−b and λ
+
b are
chosen as the smallest and largest number in [10−3, λb−1] satisfying the constraint, respec-
tively. However, if λ−b and λ
+
b cannot be found, the uniform model in Eq. (5.8) will be used as
the dithering signal model for the current and following quantization bin(s). For quantization
bins b = −1,−2, · · · , B−r,c, a similar searching procedure for the values of λ−b and λ+b is applied
(see Appendix 5.B for details).
When we have well defined λ−b and λ
+
b values, the parameter λb of the Laplacian model is
obtained by solving the minimization problem in Eq. (5.4), and the dithering signal N can be
thereafter generated according to Eqs. (5.5)-(5.7); otherwise, the uniform model in Eq. (5.8)
is used. Algorithm 5.1 summarizes the proposed adaptive local dithering procedure for the
AC components.
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Algorithm 5.1 Adaptive local dithering procedure for AC components.
1: require: Y
2: initialization: Z = Y
3: for b = 0, 1, 2, · · · , B+r,c,−1,−2, . . . , B−r,c do
4: Search for λ+b and λ
−
b (e.g., using Eq. (5.9))
5: if λ+b and λ
−
b are well defined then
6: λb ← Eq. (5.4)
7: Generate N using Eq. (5.5)/(5.6)/(5.7)
8: Z ← Z +N
9: else
10: Generate N using Eq. (5.8)




Although we adopt Stamm et al.’s [Sta+10a, SL11] dithering signal model, note that their
model is rather global and our model is local. In Stamm et al.’s model, once the parameter λ
of the Laplacian distribution is estimated for a subband, it will be used for all the quantization
bins of this subband. However, in our model, it is considered locally for each quantization bin b.
We tune parameter λb of the Laplacian model for different quantization bins if it can be found;
otherwise, the uniform model will be used instead. Moreover, in Stamm et al.’s method, the
MLE [PR99] is used to estimate λ from the JPEG image. However, in the proposed method,
λb for each quantization bin is obtained via a weighted least-squares fitting using the post-
processed image FˆJb where the DCT-domain information is partly recovered. We will show
in Section 5.3.1 that our method leads to a better restoration of the DCT histogram of the
original, uncompressed image.
Because there is no general model for the DC component, we use the uniform model for
all the quantization bins to generate the dithering signal N according to Eq. (5.8).
For each quantization bin, the dithering signal generated by numerical sampling of a given
probability distribution function can reproduce the natural, fine-grained details in the DCT
histogram. An example result is shown in Figure 5.3-(d).
5.2.2.3 DCT Histogram Mapping
Now, we can generate the dithered signal Z using the adaptive local dithering signal model.
However, we cannot use Z directly as the altered DCT coefficients by adding the dithering
signal N randomly to Y , without any consideration of the image spatial-domain information:
the processed image will suffer from low visual quality as Stamm et al.’s anti-forensic JPEG
image does [Sta+10a, SL11]. A different strategy is adopted here. We will try to move the
distribution of Y ′ (i.e., the distribution of DCT coefficients of FˆJb ) towards that of Z, while
minimizing the introduced distortion in the spatial domain, by solving an assignment problem
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whose cost function is defined as the total perceptual quality loss.
We still consider the DCT coefficients in each quantization bin individually. In this section,
all the DCT coefficients mentioned are in a single quantization bin b of subband (r, c). A
classical assignment problem can be established as follows. Let Ob denote the set of DCT
coefficients in quantization bin b from Y ′ which are to be modified, and T b is used to denote
the set of target DCT coefficient values from Z (= Y +N) falling in the quantization bin b.
Ob and T b are of equal size. The weight function W : Ob × T b → R is defined as the SSIM
value loss due to the coefficient modification, compared with the currently achieved processed
image from the last solved assignment problem (or FˆJb at the very beginning). Our goal is to
find a bijection f : Ob → T b such that the cost function:∑
o∈Ob
W (o, f(o)), (5.10)
is minimized. This problem can be solved using the well-known Hungarian algorithm13 [Kuh55]
(see Section 2.4.2 for more descriptions of this algorithm). The solution of the assignment
problem can be found in O(D3) time, where D is the dimensionality of the problem. If D is
small, the problem however can be solved within a reasonable time. The setting of D will be
further discussed in Section 5.3.1.
In order to save the computation cost, we hereby propose three strategies to simplify the
building and the solving of this assignment problem. Firstly, not all but only part of the DCT
coefficients in Y ′ are to be modified, so that the dimensionality of the assignment problem can
be largely reduced. For choosing the DCT coefficients to put into Ob, first we compare the
unnormalized DCT histogram (using integers as bin centers) of Y ′, denoted as hbo, and that
of Z, denoted as hbt . Integers bQr,c − ⌊Qr,c2 ⌋, bQr,c − ⌊Qr,c2 ⌋+ 1, · · · , bQr,c + ⌊Qr,c2 ⌋ are all the
possible rounded DCT coefficient values in hbo and h
b
t . It is obvious that the dithering process
in Section 5.2.2.2 ensures that the two histograms in comparison have the same number of
DCT coefficients. We compute their difference histogram as:
hbd(k) = h
b
o(k)− hbt(k), k = bQr,c − ⌊
Qr,c
2
⌋, · · · , bQr,c + ⌊Qr,c
2
⌋. (5.11)
In order to reduce the dimensionality of the assignment problem, the first strategy is that we
do not modify the coefficients in hbo that are already in the correct integer bin with respect to
hbt . More precisely, for each integer bin k with h
b
d(k) ≤ 0, the corresponding DCT coefficients
are left unchanged; and for each integer bin k with hbd(k) > 0, instead of putting all the h
b
o(k)
coefficients in Ob, we only put hbd(k) (< h
b
o(k)) coefficients into O
b while leaving the other hbt(k)
coefficients unchanged. In general, this will yield suboptimal results, however the advantage
is that it will largely reduce the computation cost with still satisfactory final results. In order
to control the distortion in the spatial domain, it is better to choose the DCT coefficient
whose corresponding spatial-domain 8 × 8 block is less sensitive to noise for being altered.
Using a similar strategy with [BFT12], here we adopt the SSIM index [Wan+04] to compute
13We use the Matlab code downloaded from: http://www.mathworks.fr/matlabcentral/fileexchange/
20652-hungarian-algorithm-for-linear-assignment-problems-v2-3.
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a similarity map between the currently achieved image and FˆJb . The DCT coefficients whose
spatial-domain 8× 8 block has a higher SSIM index value are chosen to be modified and put
into set Ob. Note that at the very beginning of the procedure, the SSIM index cannot be
computed because the currently achieved image is exactly FˆJb . In this case, we calculate the
local variance instead. We also have to reduce the dimensionality of the target value set T b
so that Ob and T b are of equal size. To this end, for each k with hbd(k) < 0, in Z we randomly
choose −hbd(k) (> 0) values among the DCT coefficients whose rounded values are k, and put
these values into T b.
The second strategy to simplify the building of the assignment problem in Eq. (5.10) is
to speed up the calculation of the weight function W . Normally, for each DCT coefficient o
in Ob, all the possible modifications to values in T b should be enforced to calculate the cost.
Yet, this can be simplified by only computing the SSIM value loss when the DCT coefficient
o in Ob is changed to a value in T b which is the farthest from o. The linear interpolation is
afterwards used to estimate the cost for all the other possible modifications in T b.
The last strategy is to randomly split the simplified assignment problem into several smaller
ones of lower dimensionality which can be solved in a reasonable time. This will be further
discussed with experimental results in Section 5.3.1, where we also show that the adoption of
all these strategies will not impair the visual quality of the obtained image, despite the fact
that these strategies lead to suboptimal solutions.
After solving a simplified assignment problem for each quantization bin, we are able to
smooth the DCT histogram with minimum introduced distortion in the spatial domain. The
created intermediate image is denoted as FˆJbq.
5.2.2.4 Necessity of First-Round JPEG Deblocking
As one may have noticed, it is possible to perform the perceptual DCT histogram smoothing
described in this section directly on the JPEG image, without the application of the first-
round TV-based deblocking described in Section 5.2.1. Here, FˆJq denotes the image obtained
using the proposed perceptual DCT histogram smoothing directly from the JPEG image J .
For comparing FˆJbq and FˆJq , we conduct a test on UCIDTest92 dataset.
PSNR, SSIM are adopted as the image quality evaluation metrics (see Section 2.2.2 for
more descriptions). In order to give a quantitative evaluation of the DCT histogram, we use
the KL divergence (see Section 2.2.3 for more descriptions) as the difference measure between
the histogram of the uncompressed image and the one of the processed image. A smaller value
of KL divergence means a better resemblance between the two compared histograms. Table
5.1 reports the average PSNR, SSIM, and KL divergence values of FˆJbq and FˆJq . All the metric
values are computed using the original uncompressed image I as the reference. The difference
between the two kinds of KL divergences is that the first one is averaged over the subbands
where not all the DCT coefficients are quantized to 0 in the original JPEG image, whereas the
other is averaged over the rest of the subbands. The lower KL divergence value of FˆJbq than
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that of FˆJq demonstrates that with the partly recovered DCT-domain information in FˆJb we
are able to achieve a more accurate DCT histogram restoration, especially for the subbands
where all the DCT coefficients are quantized to 0 in JPEG images.
Table 5.1: Image quality and KL divergence (with I as the reference) comparison af-
ter the perceptual DCT histogram smoothing, with and without the first-round TV-based
deblocking. Results are obtained on UCIDTest92 dataset.
PSNR SSIM KL divergence-1 KL divergence-2
FˆJbq 36.4419 0.9862 0.0904 0.1054
FˆJq 36.1427 0.9874 0.1316 0.2622
Moreover, FˆJb also helps us to reduce the dimensionality of the simplified assignment
problem during the DCT histogram mapping described in Section 5.2.2.3. The reason is that
in the first strategy of simplifying the assignment problem, more DCT coefficients in FˆJb will
already be in the correct integer bin than those in the JPEG image.
Furthermore, FˆJbq achieves a slightly higher PSNR value, but slightly lower SSIM value,
than FˆJq . Considering the results of both metrics, the two kinds of images have comparable
visual qualities. Another advantage of the TV-based deblocking is the removal of JPEG
blocking artifacts. It is therefore necessary to conduct the first-round TV-based deblocking
for a better tradeoff between the visual quality and the histogram restoration quality of the
processed image.
5.2.3 Second-Round TV-Based Deblocking
In the perceptual DCT histogram smoothing, although we have tried to modify the DCT
coefficients while minimizing the spatial-domain distortion, there must be some unnatural
noise and blocking artifacts introduced in FˆJbq. Hence, we focus on the spatial domain again
and propose to apply the second-round TV-based deblocking and regularization.
5.2.3.1 Parameter Settings
Similar to Section 5.2.1, the deblocking procedure is basically the same as that described in
Section 4.3.1, yet with some modifications to the parameter setting. Since the JPEG blocking
artifacts presented in FˆJbq are not as serious as those in J , hence we lower the parameters α
(see Eq. (A.4)) and tk (see Eq. (4.9)) for a milder JPEG deblocking. We set α = 0.9, and the
step size tk = 1/(k + 1) at the k-th iteration. As to the setting of the convex set S, here we
set µ = 1.5 (see Eq. (4.7)), which constrains that the processed DCT coefficient should stay
within the same or the neighboring quantization bins as its original value. Once a processed
DCT coefficient goes outside of the constrained range, the projection operator PS modifies
its value back to a random value uniformly distributed in the original quantization bin. This
can avoid strong DCT histogram shape modification by the TV-based deblocking and prevent
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the emergence of new DCT quantization artifacts. Using these empirical parameter settings,
experimentally we can achieve satisfactory results considering both the forensic undetectability
and the visual quality of the processed image.
5.2.3.2 DCT Coefficient Perturbation
We also observed that in practice, the TV-based deblocking might interfere with the output of
the quantization table estimation based detector KQF [FD03], especially in the high-frequency
subbands. The image tends to be over-smoothed by the TV-based regularization. As analyzed
in Section 4.2.1, the quantization table estimation based detector will detect one DCT subband
as quantized by 3 instead of 1, when the probability of DCT coefficients whose rounded values
are integer multiples of 3 (denoted as p0) is higher than 67.28%. This frequently happens in
the high-frequency subbands of relatively smooth images, which has a high frequency of DCT
coefficients with rounded value 0.
In order to tackle this problem, we propose to introduce a slight perturbation to the DCT
coefficients in the high-frequency subbands which have a high value of p0 during each opti-
mization iteration. Considering the influence of the subgradient method, the DCT coefficients
projection of PS , and the pixel value rounding and truncation in the spatial domain, for a
given DCT subband, if p0 > 60%, we modify part of the DCT coefficients whose rounded
values are 0 to the integer bins −5,−4, · · · ,−1, 1, 2, · · · , 5. The DCT coefficient whose cor-
responding spatial-domain block has a higher tolerance of distortion (measured by the SSIM
index comparing the currently achieved image and the deblocked image in the last subgradi-
ent iteration, or FˆJbq at the very beginning) will be modified first to a DCT coefficient which
has a bigger rounded amplitude. The modification constrains that the relative probability of
integer bins −5,−4, · · · ,−1, 1, 2, · · · , 5 should stay unchanged. The modification stops once
p0 reaches 50%.
In order to avoid over-smoothing of the image, a random threshold for each image is drawn
from the distribution of the KF values for genuine, uncompressed images, and the iteration
stops once the KF value in Eq. (3.6) decreases below it. Otherwise, if this cannot be achieved
within 30 iterations, the resulting intermediate image with the smallest KF output is chosen
as the final result. The created image after this step is denoted as FˆJbqb.
5.2.4 De-Calibration
For FˆJbqb, all the existing detectors seems to be well fooled except the calibrated feature based
detector KL [LB11]. Based on the same consideration presented in Section 4.3.2, we perform
the de-calibration operation to the intermediate image FˆJbqb. The method is the same as
that described in Section 4.3.2. In order to avoid tedious repetition, here we refrain from
re-presenting it. After de-calibration, the anti-forensic JPEG image FJ is obtained.
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5.3 Experimental Results of JPEG Anti-Forensics
Besides the state-of-the-art anti-forensic JPEG images listed in Table 3.2 and FJ0 created in
Chapter 4, our improved anti-forensic JPEG image and two kinds of intermediate results are
created from the JPEG image J :
• FJ , with the application of the proposed four-step JPEG anti-forensic method;
• FˆJbq, with the application of the proposed first-round TV-based deblocking and the per-
ceptual DCT histogram smoothing method, the maximum dimensionality is set to be
200 when solving the assignment problem;
• Fˆ ′bq, the creation of which is the same as FˆJbq, except that there is no limit set for the
maximum dimensionality when solving the assignment problem.
5.3.1 Comparing Anti-Forensic Dithering Methods
Figure 5.5 shows the SSIM value (with the original image I as the reference) comparison
when tested on the “Lena” image. Note that the difference between the results shown here
and those shown in [VTT11] is probably due to the different versions of “Lena” images in use
and to the different parameter settings of SSIM index. However, the trend of the curves is in
accordance with each other, and the results confirm the conclusion of [VTT11] that it is not
easy to conceal the traces of JPEG compression without serious image quality loss. According
to Figure 5.5, the perceptual anti-forensic dither of Valenzise et al. [VTT11] is able to achieve
a higher SSIM value of the processed image than Stamm et al.’s anti-forensic dither [Sta+10a,
SL11]. However, the proposed DCT histogram smoothing method outperforms both of them
[Sta+10a, SL11, VTT11] in terms of SSIM value. Figure 5.7 shows the close-up images of
Lena. In the relatively smooth area of the image, e.g., the shoulder and the face of Lena, we
can see that less noise is introduced in the spatial domain of FˆJbq compared with FJSq and FJV .
The average PSNR and SSIM values of large-scale test on UCIDTest dataset for FˆJbq are
35.9926 dB and 0.9872, respectively, which are noticeably higher than those of FJSq and of
FJV (see Table 5.4). It demonstrates that the proposed perceptual DCT histogram smoothing
can help us to achieve a higher image quality of the processed image than the state-of-the-art
anti-forensic dithering methods [Sta+10a, SL11, VTT11].
In the proposed DCT histogram smoothing method, we have to solve an assignment prob-
lem for each quantization bin of each subband. As mentioned in Section 5.2.2.3, the computa-
tion cost is O(D3) when using the Hungarian algorithm [Kuh55], whereD is the dimensionality
of the assignment problem. Obviously, the problem solving might be impractical when D is
too large. A possible solution is that we randomly split a single assignment problem into
several smaller ones. From Figure 5.5, we can see that the problem splitting barely affects
the image quality of the processed image. However, it largely saves the computation cost to


















Figure 5.5: SSIM values achieved by J , FJSq [Sta+10a, SL11], FJV [VTT11], FˆJbq, and Fˆ ′bq,
with I as the reference, when tested on the “Lena” image. The FˆJbq plot is almost under
































Figure 5.6: Time taken to create FˆJbq, and Fˆ ′bq from the JPEG compressed “Lena” image
with different quality factors. By reducing the dimensionality of the assignment problem, the
computation cost is largely reduced to conduct the perceptual DCT histogram smoothing.
conduct the perceptual DCT histogram smoothing procedure, as demonstrated by the test
on the “Lena” image, as reported in Figure 5.6. In the large-scale test, in order to speed up
the simulation, we always randomly split the assignment problem into several smaller ones of
maximum dimensionality of 200.
With experiments carried out on UCIDTest dataset, we compute the KL divergence value
between I and FJSq , and that between I and FˆJbq for all DCT subbands. The difference between
these two KL divergence values is reported in Table 5.2. We notice that during the dithering
process, the subband where all the coefficients are quantized to 0 is left untouched in [Sta+10a,
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(a) J (b) FJSq
(c) FJV (d) FˆJbq
Figure 5.7: Example results (close-up images) of FˆJbq compared with J , FJSq [Sta+10a,
SL11], and FJV [VTT11], where J is compressed with quality factor 50. Their SSIM values
(with I as the reference) are: (a) 0.9809, (b) 0.9509, (c) 0.9610, and (d) 0.9731. We can
see that less noise is introduced in FˆJbq especially in the relatively smooth area of the image.
Results are obtained on the “Lena” image.
SL11]. To be fair for FJSq , these subbands were not counted in the comparison. From Table
5.2, we can see that FˆJbq performs consistently better than FJSq . Similar results are obtained
when compared with Valenzise et al.’s anti-forensic JPEG images FJV [VTT11], because the
dithering model used in [VTT11] is exactly the same as in [Sta+10a] in the DCT domain.
We can conclude that the proposed adaptive local dithering model has a better restoration
capability of the original DCT histogram than the one based on the global Laplacian model
[Sta+10a, VTT11].
We also compare the KL divergence value between I and FJ0 obtained using the anti-
forensic method presented in Chapter 4, and that between I and FJ for all DCT subbands.
The difference between these two KL divergence values is reported in Table 5.3. In this
84 Chapter 5. JPEG Anti-Forensics with Perceptual DCT Histogram Smoothing
Table 5.2: The difference of the KL divergence between I and FJSq [Sta+10a, SL11], and
that between I and FˆJbq for all 64 DCT subbands. The average difference value over all
subbands is 0.0552 with standard deviation 0.0249. For a fair comparison for FJSq , the
subbands, whose DCT coefficients are all quantized to 0 in the JPEG image J , are not
counted. Results are obtained on UCIDTest dataset.
r
c 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
1 0.0001 0.0065 0.0118 0.0278 0.0493 0.0634 0.0663 0.0656
2 0.0042 0.0166 0.0229 0.0363 0.0447 0.0565 0.0504 0.0369
3 0.0161 0.0208 0.0291 0.0442 0.0573 0.0665 0.0634 0.0497
4 0.0200 0.0317 0.0409 0.0470 0.0658 0.0802 0.0553 0.0446
5 0.0357 0.0395 0.0522 0.0678 0.0764 0.0930 0.0927 0.0856
6 0.0441 0.0383 0.0642 0.0610 0.0726 0.0769 0.0806 0.0957
7 0.0538 0.0442 0.0678 0.0595 0.0879 0.0809 0.0948 0.0975
8 0.0619 0.0545 0.0697 0.0528 0.0927 0.0880 0.0854 0.0722
comparison, all the DCT subbands of all the images in UCIDTest dataset are considered, no
matter whether there are some DCT subbands whose coefficients are all quantized to 0 in the
corresponding JPEG image J . We can see that the JPEG anti-forensic method proposed in
this chapter has improved the DCT histogram recovery performance compared to the method
presented in Chapter 4. We can conclude that the perceptual DCT histogram smoothing
method proposed in Section 5.2.2 is able to better shape the DCT histogram towards that of
the original image.
Table 5.3: The difference of the KL divergence between I and FJ0 , and that between I and
FJ for all 64 DCT subbands. The average difference value over all subbands is 0.0160 with
standard deviation 0.0139. All the subbands are considered, no matter whether the DCT
coefficients are all quantized to 0 in the JPEG image J . Results are obtained on UCIDTest
dataset.
r
c 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
1 -0.0040 0.0002 0.0047 0.0035 0.0072 0.0135 0.0243 0.0464
2 0.0045 -0.0043 -0.0002 0.0053 0.0127 0.0275 0.0248 0.0451
3 0.0023 -0.0033 0.0037 0.0106 0.0136 -0.0042 0.0001 0.0292
4 0.0060 0.0013 0.0094 0.0132 0.0258 0.0186 0.0288 0.0395
5 0.0035 0.0088 0.0113 0.0254 0.0121 0.0071 0.0128 0.0278
6 0.0109 0.0202 -0.0065 0.0193 0.0138 0.0139 0.0143 0.0291
7 0.0287 0.0298 -0.0036 0.0231 0.0132 0.0151 0.0130 0.0297
8 0.0435 0.0487 0.0243 0.0408 0.0287 0.0281 0.0294 0.0035
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5.3.2 Against JPEG Forensic Detectors
Table 5.4 reports the AUC values achieved by different kinds of (anti-forensic) JPEG images
against 7 scalar-based forensic detectors listed in Table 3.1. Besides, the last two columns
of Table 5.4 also list the average PSNR and SSIM values for the comparison of the visual
quality of processed image with the original uncompressed image I as the reference. Moreover,
Figure 5.8 plots the ROC curves obtained by Stamm et al.’s [Sta+10a, Sta+10b, SL11] anti-
forensic JPEG image FJSqSb and ours FJ .
Table 5.4: From the 2nd to the 8th columns, the AUC values for different kinds of images
when tested against different scalar-based JPEG forensic detectors are listed; the image
quality (with I as the reference) comparison is reported in the last 2 columns. Results are
obtained on UCIDTest dataset.
KF KLuo K
Q





J 0.9991 1.0000 0.9996 0.9976 0.9811 0.9860 0.8840 37.0999 0.9919
FJSq 0.9332 0.4328 0.7328 0.9977 0.9946 0.9633 0.9483 33.4061 0.9756
FJSqSb 0.3783 0.0806 0.6288 0.8337 0.5338 0.6309 0.4854 30.4591 0.9509
FJV 0.9889 0.4330 0.8066 0.9834 0.9958 0.9916 0.9574 33.2890 0.9802
FJSu 0.8802 0.9772 0.9475 0.1115 0.9610 0.7052 0.3149 31.6552 0.9719
FJ0 0.6756 0.6046 0.5194 0.6210 0.4490 0.6772 0.5880 35.4814 0.9843
FˆJb 0.7590 0.4830 0.4354 0.8542 0.9588 0.6813 0.5650 36.7405 0.9891
FˆJbq 0.9170 0.4050 0.5244 0.8435 0.9874 0.8081 0.6531 35.9926 0.9872



































































(a) FJSqSb [Sta+10a, Sta+10b, SL11] (b) FJ
Figure 5.8: ROC curves achieved by FJ and FJSqSb [Sta+10a, Sta+10b, SL11] against
JPEG forensic detectors. Results are obtained on UCIDTest dataset.
From both Table 5.4 and the ROC curves shown in Figure 5.8, we can see that our anti-
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forensic JPEG image has a better forensic undetectability compared with Stamm et al.’s FJSqSb .
The other version of Stamm et al.’s anti-forensic JPEG image FJSq processed by the DCT
histogram smoothing can be well detected by the JPEG forensic detectors which were designed
targeting at it [Val+11, LB11]. The anti-forensic JPEG image FJV created by the perceptual
anti-forensic dithering [VTT11] has a similar anti-forensic performance as FJSq , while achieving
a higher SSIM value on average. The median filtering based deblocking [Sta+10b] improves
the undetectability of the anti-forensic JPEG image FJSqSb against forensic detectors, but with
a PSNR value loss of 6.64 dB on average, compared to JPEG image J (see the last 2 columns
of Table 5.4).
Figure 5.8-(b) shows that the proposed method succeeds in fooling all the 3 JPEG blocking
detectors, yet through the minimization of a different TV-based blocking measure in Eq. (4.6).
Our method is also capable of fooling the advanced detector KV [Val+11, VTT13]. The reason
might be that the TV term in Eq. (4.4) manages to suppress the unnatural noises utilized
by this detector. Furthermore, the calibration-based detector KL [LB11] is defeated by the
de-calibration operation. Even though the quantization table estimation based detector KQF
is proven to be not very reliable in Section 4.2.1, we still test it on our anti-forensic JPEG
images FJ on UCIDTest dataset, 93.70% of which can be passed off as never JPEG compressed
(making the true positive rate be 6.30%). Our method successfully fools existing detectors, at
the cost of a slightly lower visual quality than the JPEG compressed image: 1.11 dB of PSNR
loss and 0.0053 of SSIM value loss on average. Compared to Stamm et al.’s anti-forensic JPEG
image FJSqSb [Sta+10a, Sta+10b, SL11], our method achieves a better tradeoff between the
forensic undetectability and the visual quality of processed images: the average PSNR has
been improved by 5.53 dB and 0.0357 of SSIM gain has been achieved; meanwhile our method
achieves a better overall forensic undetectability.
Concerning the SVM-based detectors KS100Li [CS08, LLH12], and K
S686
P [PBF10] which
are initially designed for steganalysis, we follow the experimental setup described in Sec-
tion 2.2.1.2. The AUC value as a function of the image replacement rate for different kinds
of images, is shown in Figure 5.9. We can see that our anti-forensic JPEG image FJ does
not perform the best when tested by KS100Li and K
S686
P . However, unlike FJV or FJSqSb , the
performance of FJ is quite stable and in general quite satisfactory when compared with other
anti-forensic images. Meanwhile, FJ0 created using the method described in Chapter 4 slightly
outperforms FJ . This is understandable, as we explicitly smooth DCT histograms for creating
FJ , which may lead to more changes in image statistics. When the replacement rate is about
0.10, the performance of our anti-forensic JPEG image is quite good, with a relatively low
AUC value of the SVM-based detectors. In this case, we can safely replace a 112× 160 block
in a 384 × 512 UCID image. This is enough for many image forgery creation scenarios, e.g.,
replacing the head of one person in the picture. We remain reserved on whether the proposed
JPEG anti-forensic method is able to disguise a whole JPEG image as uncompressed, as it
can still be well detected using machine learning based forensic methods. However, it is still
highly applicable in various JPEG anti-forensic scenarios, e.g., image splicing, and disguising
double JPEG compression artifacts (see results in Section 5.4).
Figure 5.10 shows the anti-forensic JPEG images created from an example JPEG image





































Figure 5.9: The AUC value as a function of image replacement rate for different kinds
of images, when tested using the SVM-based detectors. Results are obtained by testing on
UCIDTE dataset and training on UCIDTR dataset.
with quality factor 50. As expected, Figure 5.10-(d) processed using the proposed JPEG
anti-forensic method better preserves the image details and the edges than -(c). It can also
be observed that even after the deblocking operation [Sta+10b, SL11], the spatial-domain
noise introduced by the dithering signal [Sta+10a, SL11] can still be noticed in the smooth
areas of the image in -(c). Some example DCT histograms of the anti-forensic JPEG image
in Figure 5.10-(d) are shown in Figure 5.11: no noticeable artifacts appear.
5.3.3 Computation Cost
Table 5.5: Comparison of the average time taken to create different kinds of anti-forensic
JPEG images. Results are obtained on UCIDTest92 dataset.
FJSq FJSqSb FJV FJSu FJ0 FJ
in second(s) 0.0503 0.0879 0.4380 0.0201 7.0815 176.8205
Table 5.5 records the average time taken for the generation of different anti-forensic JPEG
images on UCIDTest92 dataset, using Matlab R2012b, on a PC with 24G RAM and 2.80GHz
CPU. We can see that the proposed JPEG anti-forensic method requires around 3 minutes
to create an anti-forensic JPEG image on average, using the unoptimized Matlab code. The
bottleneck of the computation cost lies in the perceptual DCT histogram smoothing, as the
computation cost is O(D3) using the Hungarian algorithm. However, the reduction of the
dimensionality of the assignment problem discussed in Section 5.3.1 can effectively lower the
computation cost. Apparently, the proposed method is more complex and more computation-
ally demanding compared to other state-of-the-art JPEG anti-forensic methods. However,
the benefit is a better tradeoff between the forensic undetectability and the image quality as
shown in Section 5.3.2. Moreover, in practice, usually the forger does not need to create a
88 Chapter 5. JPEG Anti-Forensics with Perceptual DCT Histogram Smoothing
(a) I (b) J
(c) FJSqSb [Sta+10a, Sta+10b, SL11] (d) FJ
Figure 5.10: Example results (close-up images) of FJ compared with I, J , and FJSqSb
[Sta+10a, Sta+10b, SL11], where J is compressed with quality factor 50. Our anti-forensic
JPEG image FJ has a better image quality compared with FJSqSb .
large amount of image forgeries. It is therefore acceptable to take several minutes to generate
an anti-forensic JPEG image.
5.4 Hiding Traces of Double JPEG Compression Artifacts
As JPEG is one of the most commonly used image compression formats today, it is a very likely
scenario that a forger alters something in a JPEG image and re-saves it using the JPEG format
again. As explained in Section 1.3.1, this will lead to double JPEG compression artifacts which
may be utilized by forensic investigators. An investigator may wish to tell whether an image
has been double JPEG compressed (exposing aligned or non-aligned double JPEG compression
artifacts), and furthermore which part of the image has been altered (forgery localization via

























































































(c) (3, 7) (d) (8, 8)
Figure 5.11: Example DCT histograms of different subbands of an anti-forensic JPEG
image FJ shown in Figure 5.10-(d). No noticeable comb-like DCT quantization artifacts
appear in the histograms.
analysis of double JPEG compression artifacts). In the following, we show how our JPEG
anti-forensic method can be used to deceive three state-of-the-art image forensic algorithms
[PF08, BP12a, BP12b] that take advantage of double JPEG compression artifacts.
In this section, single JPEG compressed images are only JPEG compressed with quality
factor QF2, while double JPEG compressed images are firstly JPEG compressed with quality
factor QF1 and JPEG compressed again with quality factor QF2. Image cropping or content
modification may occur between the two compressions. For anti-forensic testing, the JPEG
anti-forensic methods in [Sta+10a, Sta+10b, SL11, VTT11, SS11] and the proposed JPEG
anti-forensic methods in both Chapter 4 and this chapter are applied on the JPEG image after
the first compression with QF1. Then the anti-forensic JPEG image is unchanged, cropped
by a random grid shift, or partly altered. Finally the resulting image is JPEG compressed
again with QF2 to create anti-forensic double JPEG compressed image.
We conduct large-scale tests on UCID corpus [SS04], while following the experimental
90 Chapter 5. JPEG Anti-Forensics with Perceptual DCT Histogram Smoothing
settings in the original papers of double JPEG detectors [PF08, BP12a, BP12b]. Every dataset
contains double JPEG compressed images first with QF1 and then with QF2 between which
there might be JPEG anti-forensics applied, cropping, or partial image replacement according
to different scenarios. In Section 5.4.1 and Section 5.4.2, each dataset also includes single JPEG
compressed images with QF2. In order to avoid tedious repetition later, we hereby explain
the naming rule of the image datasets we will use in this section. Unless otherwise stated, the
dataset created from UCIDTE or UCIDTest100 (see Section 2.3.1 for more descriptions about
the datasets) is written in bold letters. The end of the name of the dataset ‘-R’ indicates
which kind of (or no) JPEG anti-forensics is applied to the single JPEG compressed image
with QF1 before further processing. It can the followings:
• ‘-T’: no JPEG anti-forensics is applied;
• ‘-S’: Stamm et al.’s dithering based JPEG anti-forensic method [Sta+10a, SL11] is ap-
plied;
• ‘-SS’: Stamm et al.’s dithering [Sta+10a, SL11] and median filtering based JPEG anti-
forensic method [Sta+10b, SL11] is applied;
• ‘-V’: Valenzise et al.’s perceptual dithering based JPEG anti-forensic method [VTT11]
is applied;
• ‘-Su’: Sutthiwan and Shi’s SAZ attack [SS11] is applied;
• ‘-F0’: our previously proposed TV-based anti-forensic method in Chapter 4 is applied;
• ‘-F’: the proposed four-step JPEG anti-forensic method in this chapter is applied.
5.4.1 Hiding Traces of Aligned Double JPEG Compression
In [PF08], Pevný and Fridrich proposed a method using the SVM with feature vectors formed
by DCT histograms in the low-frequency subbands to classify single and double JPEG com-
pressed images. For constructing the feature vector, they consider 9 low-frequency AC sub-
bands, and for each of them a 16-bin histogram is computed. The 144-dimensional feature
vectors are then fed to an SVM.
In order to train the SVM-based A-DJPG (Aligned Double JPEG) compression detector
[PF08], each image in UCIDTR is firstly JPEG compressed with the primary quality factor
QF1 and then compressed again with the secondary quality factor QF2 6= QF1 to create the
A-DJPG compressed images. Here, QF1 ∈ {50, 56, 63, 69, 81, 88, 94}, and QF2 = 75, following
[PF08]. The single JPEG compressed images are created by JPEG compressing the original
uncompressed images with QF2. Then we have 7× 500 + 500 = 4000 images for training the
detector, using the LIBSVM [CL11].
Each UCIDTE image is firstly JPEG compressed with QF1, and then compressed again
with QF2 to create the A-DJPG compressed images. During the two JPEG compressions,
5.4. Hiding Traces of Double JPEG Compression Artifacts 91
anti-forensic operations may occur. Meanwhile, each UCIDTE image is JPEG compressed
once with QF2 for creating the single JPEG compressed image. For forensic testing, we create
7 datasets each of which has 4000 images as well. The name of the dataset follows the pattern
A-DJPG-R.
The ROC curves in Figure 5.12 show that the proposed method successfully masks the
presence of double JPEG compression artifacts. The AUC value of the A-DJPG compression
detector [PF08] is decreased to 0.4832 for A-DJPG-F from 0.9274 for the training dataset
and 0.9152 for A-DJPG-T. Other state-of-the-art JPEG anti-forensic methods [Sta+10a,
Sta+10b, VTT11, SS11] as well as the one proposed in Chapter 4 achieve similar anti-forensic
performance, however with higher image quality loss than the proposed method in this chapter,
as reported in Table 5.6. Among different anti-forensic double JPEG compressed images, our































Figure 5.12: ROC curves achieved on A-DJPG-R against the SVM-based A-DJPG com-
pression detector [PF08]. Results are obtained by testing on UCIDTE dataset and training
on UCIDTR dataset. All the JPEG anti-forensic methods in consideration are able to move
the ROC curves close to the random guess line.
Table 5.6: Image quality (with the uncompressed image as the reference) comparison of
(anti-forensic) double JPEG compressed images created from UCIDTE for different datasets
A-DJPG-R. A-DJPG-F achieves the best image quality among different anti-forensic
double JPEG compressed images in comparison.
-T -S -SS -V -Su -F0 -F
PSNR 35.0916 32.8974 30.4112 32.8090 31.0414 34.1906 34.4417
SSIM 0.9879 0.9690 0.9463 0.9762 0.9664 0.9800 0.9821
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5.4.2 Hiding Traces of Non-Aligned Double JPEG Compression
Bianchi and Piva [BP12a] analyzed the statistical change in the DCT coefficients of the DC
component, after a JPEG image is compressed again with a non-aligned 8× 8 grid. A simple
but powerful threshold detector is constructed [BP12a], which is based on measuring the
non-uniformity of a suitably defined integer periodicity map of the DC coefficients.
We compress each UCIDTE image with QF1, then the JPEG image is cropped
with a random shift (i, j) 6= (0, 0), with 0 ≤ i, j ≤ 7. At last the cropped im-
age is JPEG compressed again with QF2 to create the NA-DJPG (Non-Aligned Dou-
ble JPEG) compressed image. Meanwhile each UCIDTE image is JPEG compressed
once with QF2 for creating the single JPEG compressed image. Anti-forensic oper-
ation may occur after the first JPEG compression with QF1. For forensic testing,
we create 7 datasets whose names follow the pattern NA-DJPG-R. Here, as sug-
gested in [BP12a], QF1 ∈ {50, 53, 56, 59, 63, 66, 69, 72, 75, 78, 81, 84, 88, 91, 94} and QF2 ∈
{50, 53, 56, 59, 63, 66, 69, 72, 75, 78, 81, 84, 88, 91, 94, 97}, yielding in total 15 × 16 = 240 dif-
ferent quality factor combinations for creating NA-DJPG compressed images. Therefore, we



















Figure 5.13: Average AUC value of the NA-DJPG compression detector [BP12a] as a
function of QF2, when tested on NA-DJPG-R, created from UCIDTE. The improvement
of forensic undetectability of NA-DJPG-F over NA-DJPG-F0 shows the necessity of
conducting the DCT histogram smoothing.
For each quality factor pair (QF1, QF2), the single JPEG compressed images together
with their corresponding (anti-forensic) double JPEG compressed images are tested using the
NA-DJPG detector [BP12a]. Then the AUC value can be computed for different kinds of
images. Figure 5.13 shows the average AUC value over quality factor QF1, under a fixed value
of QF2. We can see that FJSq [Sta+10a, SL11], FJSqSb [Sta+10b, SL11], both of which have
DCT histograms explicitly smoothed, keep a good forensic undetectability against this NA-
DJPG detector. Although our previous JPEG anti-forensic method described in Chapter 4
can successfully fool many existing JPEG forensic detectors (as shown in Figure 4.6 and
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Table 5.4), the gaps in the DCT domain are not well filled (an example can be seen in
Figure 4.10-(b)), which might be exposed by the NA-DJPG compression detector [BP12a].
Similarly, anti-forensic double JPEG compressed images created from FJSu [SS11] can also be
detected, to some extent, by the NA-DJPG compression detector [BP12a], especially when
QF2 is high. By contrast, with the application of the proposed JPEG anti-forensic method,
the AUC of the NA-DJPG detector [BP12a] is successfully kept close to 0.5 (random guess).
This proves the necessity of an explicit DCT histogram smoothing for JPEG anti-forensics
and the effectiveness of the proposed perceptual histogram smoothing method, because no
integer periodicity can be detected by the NA-DJPG detector in the DCT histogram of our
anti-forensic double JPEG compressed images.
Besides a good forensic undetectability, the proposed anti-forensic method is able to create
anti-forensic NA-DJPG compressed images with the highest image quality among all 6 kinds
of anti-forensic images (see results in Table 5.7).
Table 5.7: Image quality (with the uncompressed image as the reference) comparison of
(anti-forensic) double JPEG compressed images created from UCIDTE for different datasets
NA-DJPG-R.NA-DJPG-F achieves the best image quality among different anti-forensic
double JPEG compressed images in comparison.
-T -S -SS -V -Su -F0 -F
PSNR 34.6098 32.7958 30.2825 32.4824 30.9379 33.8345 34.0929
SSIM 0.9319 0.8650 0.8487 0.8864 0.8898 0.9168 0.9222
5.4.3 Fooling JPEG Artifacts Based Image Forgery Localization
Bianchi and Piva [BP12b] derived a likelihood-map indicating the probability for each 8 × 8
block of being double JPEG compressed, under the hypothesis of the presence of A-DJPG or
NA-DJPG compression artifacts in the tampered image.
We conduct the test on the 100 images in the UCIDTest100 dataset. Following [BP12b],
we first compress each UCIDTest100 image with QF1; the resulting image is partly replaced
using the original uncompressed image, and then compressed again with QF2. After the
primary JPEG compression, image cropping and/or anti-forensics may occur. In total, 7×6 =
42 datasets are created considering 7 kinds of images and 6 different scenarios. We name
the dataset as LOC-E -DJPG-K/L-R, where the italic letters may change to represent
different scenarios. E can be ‘A’, or ‘NA’. ‘NA’ indicates that before the second compression
the image is cropped by a random shift (i, j) 6= (0, 0), 0 ≤ i, j ≤ 7; whereas ‘A’ means
there is no image cropping happening. K/L indicates how much portion of the image has
undergone double JPEG compression, which also implies how much portion of the image
has been replaced by the original uncompressed image before the second JPEG compression.
When K/L is ‘1/2’, it indicates the left half of the image is replaced using the original
image; when K/L is ‘15/16’, the central 1/16 portion of the image is replaced; when K/L
is ‘1/16’, the whole image except its central 1/16 portion is replaced. In all datasets, QF1
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and QF2 are taken from {50, 56, 63, 69, 75, 81, 88, 94} and {50, 56, 63, 69, 75, 81, 88, 94, 100},
respectively. Therefore each dataset has 8× 9× 100 = 7200 images.
Figure 5.14 shows the average AUC value over all possible QF1 (under a fixed value of
QF2) achieved by the detector [BP12b] for the different scenarios and different kinds of images.
Note that the results shown here are computed from the standard map instead of the simplified
map (see [BP12b] for details). The blue curves demonstrate the effectiveness of the detector
when no JPEG anti-forensics is applied after the first compression. With the help of JPEG
anti-forensics, the forgery localization detector [BP12b] can be well fooled. Our anti-forensic
double JPEG compressed image again achieves the best image visual quality among all kinds
of anti-forensic images (see Tables 5.8-5.13).
Table 5.8: Image quality (with the uncompressed image as the reference) comparison
of (anti-forensic) double JPEG compressed images created from UCIDTest100 for differ-
ent datasets LOC-A-DJPG-15/16-R. LOC-A-DJPG-15/16-F achieves the best image
quality among different anti-forensic double JPEG compressed images in comparison.
-T -S -SS -V -Su -F0 -F
PSNR 35.5248 33.5597 30.8639 33.4702 31.5678 34.5200 34.8080
SSIM 0.9875 0.9744 0.9528 0.9786 0.9703 0.9798 0.9819
Table 5.9: Image quality (with the uncompressed image as the reference) comparison
of (anti-forensic) double JPEG compressed images created from UCIDTest100 for different
datasets LOC-NA-DJPG-15/16-R. LOC-NA-DJPG-15/16-F achieves the best image
quality among different anti-forensic double JPEG compressed images in comparison.
-T -S -SS -V -Su -F0 -F
PSNR 35.1211 33.1837 30.8331 32.9189 31.4694 34.3396 34.5884
SSIM 0.9395 0.8776 0.8726 0.8972 0.9067 0.9265 0.9308
Table 5.10: Image quality (with the uncompressed image as the reference) comparison
of (anti-forensic) double JPEG compressed images created from UCIDTest100 for different
datasets LOC-A-DJPG-1/2-R. LOC-A-DJPG-1/2-F achieves the best image quality
among different anti-forensic double JPEG compressed images in comparison.
-T -S -SS -V -Su -F0 -F
PSNR 36.3810 34.7737 32.7724 34.7288 33.2466 35.6653 35.8817
SSIM 0.9897 0.9829 0.9713 0.9852 0.9799 0.9855 0.9866
5.5 Summary
In this chapter, we propose a novel perceptual DCT histogram smoothing method to improve
the TV-based deblocking based JPEG anti-forensic method described in Chapter 4. The


























































































































Figure 5.14: Average AUC value as a function of QF2 of the forgery localization detec-
tor [BP12b], when tested on LOC-E-DJPG-K/L-R, created from UCIDTest100. The
black curves with triangles indicating AUC values around 0.5, prove the effectiveness of
the proposed four-step JPEG anti-forensic method in masking double JPEG compression
artifacts.
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Table 5.11: Image quality (with the uncompressed image as the reference) comparison
of (anti-forensic) double JPEG compressed images created from UCIDTest100 for differ-
ent datasets LOC-NA-DJPG-1/2-R. LOC-NA-DJPG-1/2-F achieves the best image
quality among different anti-forensic double JPEG compressed images in comparison.
-T -S -SS -V -Su -F0 -F
PSNR 36.1007 34.5186 32.7271 34.3632 33.1516 35.5217 35.7151
SSIM 0.9492 0.9169 0.9146 0.9272 0.9313 0.9423 0.9447
Table 5.12: Image quality (with the uncompressed image as the reference) comparison
of (anti-forensic) double JPEG compressed images created from UCIDTest100 for different
datasets LOC-A-DJPG-1/16-R. LOC-A-DJPG-1/16-F achieves the best image quality
among different anti-forensic double JPEG compressed images in comparison.
-T -S -SS -V -Su -F0 -F
PSNR 38.1497 37.4751 36.5211 37.3986 36.8277 37.8649 37.9576
SSIM 0.9919 0.9913 0.9894 0.9915 0.9905 0.9914 0.9915
Table 5.13: Image quality (with the uncompressed image as the reference) comparison
of (anti-forensic) double JPEG compressed images created from UCIDTest100 for different
datasets LOC-NA-DJPG-1/16-R. LOC-NA-DJPG-1/16-F achieves the best image
quality among different anti-forensic double JPEG compressed images in comparison.
-T -S -SS -V -Su -F0 -F
PSNR 38.0669 37.4034 36.4870 37.3130 36.7781 37.8137 37.9028
SSIM 0.9597 0.9564 0.9547 0.9574 0.9571 0.9588 0.9591
in the spatial domain and in the DCT domain. The resulting anti-forensic JPEG image is
able to fool JPEG compression detectors and achieve a better image visual quality than state-
of-the-art JPEG anti-forensic methods and the method proposed in Chapter 4. From the
results against the NA-DJPG detector [BP12a], the necessity of histogram smoothing can be
seen, as the anti-forensic double JPEG compressed image in NA-DJPG-F0 created using
the method in Chapter 4 can be to some extent detected when QF2 is relatively high (see
Figure 5.13). This problem is successfully tackled by the explicit DCT histogram smoothing
procedure proposed in Section 5.2.2.
Indeed, the proposed four-step JPEG anti-forensic method is heuristic, but effective. It
is an interesting but very difficult problem to design a single-step attack to remove JPEG
artifacts, as existing detectors work in both spatial and DCT domains. Furthermore, we have
to consider the visual quality of the processed image. As known, SSIM is non-convex, which
makes it hard to optimize. In order to drag the processed image out from the detection regions
of multiple detectors working in different domains, and at the same time to keep a high image
quality under the evaluation of both PSNR and SSIM metrics, in each of the four steps we
consider a different optimization problem. Moreover, similar to Stamm et al.’s anti-forensic
JPEG image creation process [Sta+10a, Sta+10b, SL11], the JPEG artifacts in the spatial
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domain and the DCT domain are considered alternatively. With a local modification to the
image considering multiple metrics, we are able to create anti-forensic JPEG images with a
good tradeoff between the forensic undetectability and the image quality.
In Chapters 4-5, the proposed JPEG anti-forensic methods are inspired by the TV-based
JPEG image post-processing [ADF05]. The TV can be considered as a simple but effective
image prior. Besides, in the proposed TV-based JPEG deblocking framework, there is no
likelihood term considering the JPEG compression process as in the MAP-based JPEG post-
processing methods [RS05, SC07]. In the literature of image restoration, there exist more
sophisticated image prior models [RS05, SC07, ZW11] than the TV, and spatial-domain com-
pression noise model for JPEG compression [RS05]. In Chapter 6, still following the research
line of designing image anti-forensics leveraging on image restoration, we will propose an-
other JPEG anti-forensic method using a more advanced image prior than the TV and with
a likelihood term modeling the JPEG compression process.
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5.A Appendix: The p.m.f. of the Dithering Signal Using the
Laplacian Model
Here, we only consider AC components of the image. The probability density function (p.d.f.)
of the distribution of the dithering signal N is denoted as P (N = n|Y = y). P can be easily
computed (see Eqs. (5.5)-(5.7)) according to the sign of the quantized DCT coefficient Y .
Here, the p.m.f. of the rounded dithering signal are calculated with domain defined as the
integer set {−⌊Qr,c2 ⌋,−⌊Qr,c2 ⌋+ 1, · · · , ⌊Qr,c2 ⌋}. Eqs. (5.12)-(5.13) below are the p.m.f. of the
rounded dithering signal for quantization bin 0 when Qr,c is an odd number and an even
number, respectively. For quantization bin b 6= 0, the p.m.f. of the rounded dithering signal
are listed in Eqs. (5.14)-(5.17) according to the sign and the parity of b.






1− e−λ/2) if n = 0
−c0λ−1e−λ(n+1/2)
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1− e−λ) if n = −⌊Qr,c2 ⌋, · · · ,−1
0 otherwise,
(5.12)






1− e−λ/2) if n = 0
−c0λ−1e−λQr,c/2
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1− eλ/2) if n = −Qr,c2 , Qr,c2
−c0λ−1e−λ(n+1/2)
(




1− e−λ) if n = −Qr,c2 + 1, · · · ,−1
0 otherwise,
(5.13)




1− eλ) if n = −⌊Qr,c2 ⌋, · · · , ⌊Qr,c2 ⌋
0 otherwise,
(5.14)






1− e−λ/2) if n = −Qr,c2
−c1λ−1e−λQr,c/2
(
1− eλ/2) if n = Qr,c2
−c1λ−1e−λ(n+1/2)
(
1− eλ) if n = −Qr,c2 + 1, · · · , Qr,c2 − 1
0 otherwise,
(5.15)





1− e−λ) if n = −⌊Qr,c2 ⌋, · · · , ⌊Qr,c2 ⌋
0 otherwise,
(5.16)













1− e−λ) if n = −Qr,c2 + 1, · · · , Qr,c2 − 1
0 otherwise.
(5.17)
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5.B Appendix: The Constraints Used for Modeling the DCT
Coefficients
In Section 5.2.2.2, for building the adaptive local dithering signal model for AC components,
we combine the Laplacian model and the uniform model together. A key point to establish the
adaptive local model for the dithering signal is that we try to find an appropriate parameter
λb of the Laplacian model for each quantization bin b. If we cannot find a valid value for
λb, the uniform model is used instead for the current and following quantization bin(s). The
parameter λb is derived by solving a constrained weighted least-squares fitting problem (see




b . In Section 5.2.2.2, we show how to search
for the bound λ+b (λ
−
b is set as 10
−3) for quantization bin 0 when Qr,c is an odd number, using
a numerical method. Here we explain how to search for the two bounds in other cases.
In the quantization bin 0 when Qr,c is an even number
The empirical observation tells us that in the distribution of DCT coefficients of AC com-
ponent, the probability of DCT coefficient decreases when the coefficient magnitude increases.
Now we consider the quantization bin 0 when Qr,c is an even number.
quantization bin
Figure 5.15: For the quantization bin 0, the probability of DCT coefficient falling in the
leftmost (or rightmost) integer bin should be no smaller than either that in the rightmost
integer bin of quantization bin −1 or that in the leftmost integer bin of quantization bin 1.
As illustrated in Figure 5.15, the probability of DCT coefficient falling in the leftmost (or
rightmost) integer bin should be no smaller than either that in the rightmost integer bin of
quantization bin −1 or that in the leftmost integer bin of quantization bin 1. For the moment,
the neighboring quantization bins −1 and 1 are assumed to follow a uniform distribution.
Similarly to the case in the quantization bin 0 when Qr,c is an odd number, we still set
100 Chapter 5. JPEG Anti-Forensics with Perceptual DCT Histogram Smoothing
λ−b = 10
−3, whereas λ+b can be found by solving:
λ+b = arg max
10−3≤λ≤1
λ,











2 |Y = 0
)








using a numerical method. Note thatMb (b = B−r,c, B
−
r,c+1, · · · , B+r,c) denotes the approximate
probability that the DCT coefficient falls in quantization bin b.
In the quantization bin b > 0
As illustrated in Figures 5.16-(a) and -(b), we consider a quantization bin b > 0, when
Qr,c is an odd number and an even number, respectively. The probability of DCT coefficient
falling in the leftmost integer bin of quantization bin b should be no bigger than that in the
rightmost integer bin of quantization bin b−1. Meanwhile, the probability of DCT coefficient
falling in the rightmost integer bin of quantization bin b should be no smaller than that in
the leftmost integer bin of quantization bin b + 1. As the building of the dithering signal
model is an iterative procedure, the distribution of the dithering signal N in the quantization
bin b − 1 has already been estimated in the last iteration. Hence, P om(N = n|Y = b − 1) or
P em(N = n|Y = b− 1) is known. Moreover, for the quantization bin b+ 1, its dithering signal
is assumed to follow a uniform distribution for the moment. Therefore, when Qr,c is an odd
number, the constraints that λ−b and λ
+
b can be respectively found by solving:








N = −⌊Qr,c2 ⌋|Y = b
)
×Mb ≤ P om
(





N = ⌊Qr,c2 ⌋|Y = b
)
×Mb ≥ Mb+1Qr,c ,
(5.19)
and








N = −⌊Qr,c2 ⌋|Y = b
)
×Mb ≤ P om(N = ⌊Qr,c2 ⌋|Y = b− 1)×Mb−1
P om
(
N = ⌊Qr,c2 ⌋|Y = b
)
×Mb ≥ Mb+1Qr,c .
(5.20)
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quantization bin
(a) Qr,c is an odd number
quantization bin
(b) Qr,c is an even number
Figure 5.16: For the quantization bin b > 0, the probability of DCT coefficient falling in
the leftmost integer bin should be no bigger than that in the rightmost integer bin of the
neighboring quantization bin b − 1, meanwhile the probability of coefficients falling in the
rightmost integer bin of quantization bin b should be no smaller than that in the leftmost
integer bin of quantization bin b+ 1.
Similarly, λ−b and λ
+
b are respectively defined as:








N = −Qr,c2 + 1|Y = b
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×Mb ≤ P em
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2 − 1|Y = b
)




2 |Y = b
)
×Mb + Mb+12Qr,c ,
(5.21)
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and








N = −Qr,c2 + 1|Y = b
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×Mb ≤ P em
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2 − 1|Y = b
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2 |Y = b
)
×Mb + Mb+12Qr,c ,
(5.22)
when Qr,c is an even number.
In other words, using a numerical method, λ−b and λ
+
b are found respectively as the smallest
and largest number in the interval [10−3, λb−1] satisfying certain constraints. Note that λb−1
is estimated from the last iteration. If λ−b and λ
+
b cannot be found, the uniform model will be
adopted for the current and following quantization bin(s).
In the quantization bin b < 0
For the quantization bin b < 0, the procedure of building the dithering signal model is
very similar to that for quantization bin b > 0. For the sake of simplicity, we do not present
the details here, but only give the equations for searching λ−b and λ
+
b , that are:













N = ⌊Qr,c2 ⌋|Y = b
)
×Mb ≤ P om(N = −⌊Qr,c2 ⌋|Y = b+ 1)×Mb+1,
(5.23)
and
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when Qr,c is an odd number, or:
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×Mb ≥ P em
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and








N = −Qr,c2 + 1|Y = b
)
×Mb ≥ P em
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when Qr,c is an even number.
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I
n this chapter, we first propose a JPEG image quality enhancement method under the
Expected Patch Log Likelihood (EPLL) framework. The rich GMM is used as the im-
age prior model. From the quality enhanced JPEG image and based on calibration, a new,
non-parametric method to DCT histogram smoothing is proposed without any histogram sta-
tistical model. For JPEG anti-forensic purposes, we further propose to optimize an objective
function considering both anti-forensic terms and a natural image statistical model. We also
provide discussions and experimental comparisons with the state-of-the-art JPEG anti-forensic
methods as well as our two JPEG anti-forensic methods respectively proposed in Chapters 4
and 5.
A paper describing the proposed methods was published in an international conference
[Fan+13b]. In the future, we plan to extend this work and probably share the relevant source
code freely online.
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6.1 Introduction and Motivation
In Chapters 4 and 5, we propose JPEG anti-forensic methods based on TV, which enjoys
its popularity in various image restoration applications such as denoising, deblurring and
inpainting. In image restoration, the MAP (or one of its variants, or approximate MAP)
estimate, which consists of a likelihood term and an image prior, is often used [ZW11]. In
the proposed TV-based JPEG deblocking framework described in Chapter 4, the TV can be
taken as a simple but effective image prior; however, there is no likelihood term considering
the JPEG compression process.
We have seen the effectiveness of introducing the TV from image restoration to JPEG anti-
forensics in Chapters 4 and 5. A natural follow-up work of JPEG anti-forensics is to study
the JPEG compression process and consider more sophisticated image prior models. By using
image restoration techniques, we expect to improve the visual quality of the JPEG image.
At the same time, the spatial-domain blocking artifacts and the DCT-domain quantization
artifacts should be to some extent mitigated, though they may still be detectable by forensic
detectors. The image restoration step not only helps us to obtain a good visual quality of the
processed JPEG image, but also reduces the cost of removing the JPEG artifacts which have
been partly removed during the restoration process. The following step goes to the integration
of anti-forensic strategies/terms to further bring the forensic feature output of the anti-forensic
JPEG image into the normal range of the original image. During this step, we may have to
sacrifice some image quality of the processed image, for anti-forensic purposes. However, we
hope the previous image restoration step will guarantee us a good visual quality of the final
anti-forensic JPEG image.
According to the above idea of leveraging on image restoration concepts/methods to design
JPEG anti-forensics, in this chapter, we design another JPEG anti-forensic method as follows:
• We firstly study the JPEG compression process and approximate it as a spatial-domain
compression noise addition process, following the common practice in JPEG post-
processing for quality enhancement purposes [RS05, SC07]. The 0-mean multivariate
Gaussian distribution is used to model the compression noise. We obtain the covariance
matrix by performing a learning procedure on original and JPEG images. As to the im-
age prior, we use the rich GMM model under the EPLL framework [ZW11]. Therefore,
an approximate MAP estimate is formed to seek the quality enhanced JPEG image.
• Unlike Stamm et al.’s dithering based DCT histogram smoothing [Sta+10a, SL11] or
the perceptual DCT histogram smoothing described in Chapter 5, we propose a non-
parametric DCT histogram smoothing method based on calibration [FGH02].
• At last, an image fidelity term, the EPLL term with the GMM model, and some JPEG
anti-forensic terms inspired by forensic detectors are formulated together as a minimiza-
tion problem. This is for the consideration of both the forensic undetectability and the
visual quality of the processed image. The anti-forensic JPEG image is generated by
solving this optimization problem.
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The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 6.2 briefly reviews related
work on JPEG image post-processing for quality enhancement purposes, and thereafter pro-
poses a new JPEG image quality enhancement method under the EPLL framework with the
GMM as the image prior model. The proposed non-parametric DCT histogram smoothing
method based on calibration is described in Section 6.3. Section 6.4 presents the optimization
problem of removing the introduced unnatural spatial-domain noise during DCT histogram
smoothing, as well as fooling existing JPEG forensic detectors. We provide some discussions
and summarize this chapter in Section 6.5.
6.2 JPEG Image Quality Enhancement
6.2.1 Prior Art
The restoration of JPEG image can be formulated as estimating an image xˆ given the JPEG
image y and its corresponding quantization table Q, using the prior information of natural
uncompressed images and with the knowledge of JPEG compression process. In other words,
given a JPEG compressed image y (pixel values in vectorized form), the objective is to obtain
a restored image xˆ, which is the most likely to be the original uncompressed image. A common
practice in image restoration is the adoption of an MAP criterion to seek the solution:
xˆ = arg max
x
p(x|y) = arg max
x
p(y|x)p(x), (6.1)
where p(y|x) is the likelihood term describing the distortion caused by JPEG compression,
and p(x) is a prior term representing natural image statistics. The maximization problem in
Eq. (6.1) is equivalent to the following minimization problem which is derived by taking the
negative log function of the cost function in Eq. (6.1):
xˆ = arg min
x
{−log p(y|x)− log p(x)} . (6.2)
JPEG compression can be modeled as a process to add spatial-domain compression noise
nq to the original uncompressed image, then y = x+nq. A common assumption is to treat nq
as a random quantity; meanwhile nq and x are considered to be independent [RS05, SC07].
Then we have:
p(y|x) = p(x+ nq|x) = p(nq|x) = p(nq). (6.3)
For the compression noise model p(nq), a 0-mean Gaussian model with covariance matrix Cq,
is used in [RS05, SC07]. The (r, c)-th entry of Cq can be expressed by the corresponding
entry in quantization matrix Q as Cqr,c = (Qr,c)2/12 [RS05], under the assumption that
the quantization noise in the DCT domain is uniformly distributed within the corresponding
quantization bin. Sun and Cham [SC07] experimentally demonstrate that the Cq calculated
in this way outperforms the actual covariance matrix calculated using the original and JPEG
images in terms of the image quality of the post-processed JPEG image. This somewhat
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strange result may be due to the strong assumption made in Eq. (6.3) that nq and x are
independent [SC07]. As to the image prior model p(x), Robertson and Stevenson [RS05] use
the Huber-Markov Random Field (HMRF). Sun and Cham [SC07] use a higher order Markov
random field based on the Fields of Experts (FoE) framework which is able to achieve a higher
visual quality of the processed JPEG image than the HMRF model.
In [ZW11], Zoran and Weiss propose a novel image restoration framework which has ex-
cellent performance in various applications such as denoising, deblurring, and inpainting.
Compared with the traditional MAP-based image restoration framework, the new idea is to
maximize the EPLL meanwhile considering the image fidelity with respect to the observed
degraded image y. In other words, the objective is to find xˆ in which every patch is likely
under the patch prior. Therefore, the minimization problem is formulated as:









where Pi is a matrix extracting the i-th overlapping patch of size s× s from the image. The
above cost function has a similar form to an MAP estimate which has a likelihood term and
an image prior term. The difference here is that the EPLL sums over the log probabilities of
all overlapping patches, other than the log probability of a full image. As to the image prior,
Zoran and Weiss [ZW11] use the finite GMM model with J mixture components giving the
log probability of a given patch Pix as follows:











(Pix− µj)T (Cj)−1(Pix− µj)
)}
. (6.5)
For the j-th mixture component, wj , µj and Cj are the mixing weight, the mean and covari-
ance matrix of the corresponding Gaussian distribution, respectively. These parameters can
be learned using the Expectation Maximization (EM) algorithm on a set of patches extracted
from original natural images.
6.2.2 Proposed Method
In our work, we follow Zoran and Weiss’ [ZW11] EPLL framework with GMM as the image
prior model. We choose the patch size of 8 × 8, the same as that of JPEG blocks. The
main motivation of choosing this patch-wise prior is to facilitate and speed up the learning
and restoration processes, compared with [RS05, SC07]. We still use the 0-mean multivariate
Gaussian [RS05] to model the spatial-domain compression noise nq, which is assumed to be
independent with the original image x. The difference is that for a better quality of the
recovered image we need to take into account all the overlapping patches instead of the non-
overlapping JPEG blocks. Therefore, we consider 8 × 8 = 64 kinds of overlapping patches
according to their relative position with respect to JPEG blocks. The minimization problem
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is then formulated as:
















where Sk is the k-th set of matrices which extract patches having the same relative positions
with respect to JPEG blocks, and Ck is the covariance matrix for modeling the compression
noise of the k-th group of patches. Besides, log p(Piu) is derived by replacing Pix in Eq. (6.5)
by Piu. The optimization of Eq. (6.6) can be solved using an approximate MAP estimation
procedure giving a Wiener filter solution (for more details, please refer to [ZW11]). At last,
a QCS projection is used to assure that the DCT coefficient of the processed image is within
the same quantization bin as that of the JPEG image. If a DCT coefficient goes outside its
original quantization bin, it will be modified to the boundary value of the quantization bin.
Practically, we learn a GMM prior with 200 mixture components from 338 × 6000 =
2028000 randomly sampled 8 × 8 patches on UCIDLearn dataset (see Section 2.3.1 for more
descriptions about the datasets). For JPEG blocks, Robertson and Stevenson [RS05] propose
to calculate the covariance matrix Cq (i.e., one of the Ck in Eq. (6.6)) from the quantization
table Q. Sun and Cham [SC07] also experimentally prove its superiority over the actual
compression noise covariance matrix. In the proposed optimization problem in Eq. (6.6),
we need to consider 63 more kinds of 8 × 8 patches besides the JPEG blocks. In these
patches, pixels across neighboring JPEG blocks are present in the same patch. Correlations of
spatial-domain compression noise across different JPEG blocks may be difficult to calculate.
Therefore, for each quality factor q, we propose to learn the 64 covariance matrices Ck on
UCIDLearn dataset. More specifically, given a JPEG compression quality factor q, we JPEG
compress all the images from UCIDLearn dataset, the actual compression noise is obtained
by subtracting the JPEG image by its corresponding original image. The compression noise
is thereafter used for learning the 64 covariance matrices Ck. The learning of the GMM prior
as well as the covariance matrices is performed on the 338 images from UCIDLearn dataset
using the EM algorithm with unoptimized Matlab code14.
Table 6.1 lists the PSNR results for 4 classical images and 3 quantization tables Q1, Q2 and
Q3, provided by [SC07], for very low bit-rate compression. The original uncompressed image
is used as the reference for calculating the PSNR values. We can see that the proposed method
is very competitive in terms of PSNR gain. In our JPEG anti-forensic work, we consider the
quality factors in {50, 51, · · · , 95}, whose corresponding quantization matrices produce much
higher bit-rate compression than Q1, Q2 and Q3 used in [SC07]. In practice, we found that
the PSNR gain of the proposed JPEG post-processing method is slightly lower than that of
Sun and Cham’s [SC07] method using these quality factors. However, the proposed method
only requires one step of approximate MAP estimation, which is practically around ten times
faster than [SC07] using the conjugate gradient descent. As an intermediate result of our anti-
forensic JPEG image creation (to be described later), the PSNR gain is already satisfying.
We denote the processed JPEG image using the proposed quality enhancement method as IˆJ .
14Downloaded from: http://www.mathworks.com/matlabcentral/fileexchange/26184-em-algorithm-
for-gaussian-mixture-model.
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From the figures listed in Table 6.5, we can see that IˆJ achieves a PSNR gain of 0.7931 dB
and an SSIM gain of 0.0008 than the JPEG image J on average, on UCIDTest dataset.
Table 6.1: PSNR (using the original image as the reference) results for 4 classical test
images and 3 different quantization tables provided in [SC07]15.
JPEG image FoE-based [SC07] Proposed
Lena
Q1 30.71 31.95 32.06
Q2 30.08 31.44 31.48
Q3 27.45 28.83 28.94
Peppers
Q1 30.72 32.04 32.09
Q2 30.17 31.61 31.59
Q3 27.66 29.35 29.40
Barbara
Q1 25.95 26.65 26.94
Q2 25.60 26.31 26.56
Q3 24.05 24.86 25.00
Baboon
Q1 24.32 24.77 24.84
Q2 24.14 24.62 24.68
Q3 22.14 22.61 22.61
After the image quality enhancement processing of J , IˆJ has already partly recovered
the lost information during JPEG compression, however the DCT-domain information has
not been very well recovered. A sample DCT histogram of IˆJ , which still has the comb-like
quantization artifacts, is shown in Figure 6.2-(b). A natural following step goes to the DCT
histogram smoothing. Other than using the global Laplacian model in [Sta+10a, SL11] or the
local Laplacian model in Chapter 5, a new, non-parametric approach based on calibration is
proposed without the consideration of any statistical model in Section 6.3.
6.3 Non-Parametric DCT Histogram Smoothing
In Section 5.2.2.1, we have discussed the disadvantages of using the Laplacian distribution
to model the DCT coefficients in AC subbands, which is the basic assumption of Stamm et
al.’s [Sta+10a, SL11] dithering based JPEG anti-forensic method. For natural uncompressed
images, the DCT histograms for AC components usually have a much higher peak than the
Laplacian distribution. This point can also be reflected by the big kurtosis value of AC
components, which is often larger than 6 (kurtosis of the Laplacian distribution).
Besides, during the creation of Stamm et al.’s [Sta+10a, SL11] anti-forensic JPEG image
FJSq , the dithering signal is generated depending on the estimated Laplacian parameter using
15Note that in this table the PSNR results of Sun and Cham’s method are slightly different from the values
listed in [SC07]. It is because we rounded the pixel values to integers within [0, 255] before calculating the
PSNR value, while in [SC07] the PSNR is computed on floating-point “pixel values”.
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the MLE [PR99]. The dithering process is thereafter conducted by adding the signal to the
quantized DCT coefficient randomly without any consideration of the local information of the
image in the spatial domain. This constitutes another disadvantage of the method that would
lead to a poor visual quality of FJSq [VTT11]. An example can be seen in Figure 6.1-(b),
comparing with -(a).
(a) J (b) FJSq [Sta+10a, SL11]
(c) FˆJbq (d) FˆJc
Figure 6.1: Comparison of DCT-domain quantization noise stacked by the spatial-domain
location and by the 64 DCT frequencies. Results are obtained from a UCID image and its
JPEG compressed version with quality factor 50. For a better visibility of the noise images,
we have taken logarithm of the noise and afterwards carried out a normalization.
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In Chapter 5, the proposed perceptual DCT histogram smoothing method considers an
adaptive local dithering method which combines the Laplacian distribution and the uniform
distribution. The DCT histogram mapping using the Hungarian algorithm explicitly considers
the visual quality loss due to the DCT coefficient modification. Therefore, we can see that
Fˆbq outperforms FSq [Sta+10a, SL11] in terms of both image quality (see Table 5.4) and KL
divergence (see Table 5.2), with the original image I as the reference. Moreover, an example
of the DCT-domain quantization noise of Fˆbq can be found in Figure 6.1-(c). It can be seen
that the spatial-domain local information of the image is to some extent correctly reflected in
the DCT-domain quantization noise distribution.
Both of the DCT histogram smoothing methods for generating FSq [Sta+10a, SL11] and
Fˆbq rely on a statistical model for the DCT coefficients. In this chapter, we aim to find a
new, non-parametric approach to DCT histogram smoothing. We wish to be able to estimate
the DCT-domain quantization noise, from the restored JPEG image IˆJ . To this end, we get
inspired by the so-called calibration method which was initially used in steganalysis [FGH02].
Before presenting the algorithm, we hereby provide a brief introduction of the calibration
method. It was introduced by Fridrich et al. [FGH02] for steganalysis purposes to estimate
the DCT histogram of the cover-image from the stego-image. It is also used by Lai and Böhme
[LB11] for JPEG forensic purposes. The main idea is to break the JPEG block structure by
cropping the first 4 pixels of the JPEG image both horizontally and vertically. The calibrated
image shares some DCT-domain statistical similarities with the original uncompressed image.
Therefore, we expect to estimate the DCT-domain quantization noise by comparing the cal-
ibrated image and its JPEG compressed version. Based on the above analysis, we propose
a new, non-parametric DCT histogram smoothing method based on relaxed calibration as
described in Algorithm 6.1.
Algorithm 6.1 Non-parametric DCT histogram smoothing procedure.
Require: JPEG image J with quality factor q
1: Recover IˆJ from J by solving the optimization problem in Eq. (6.6).
2: Crop IˆJ by 1 pixel16 both horizontally and vertically to obtain Iˆc.
3: JPEG compress Iˆc with quality factor q to obtain Jˆc.
4: Subtract the DCT coefficients of Iˆc by those of Jˆc, so as to estimate the DCT quantization
noise Nˆq.
5: Add Nˆq to IˆJ in the DCT domain, so as to create FˆJc with smoothed DCT histograms.
6: return: FˆJc
An example of DCT quantization noise of FˆJc , which is generated by the proposed cali-
bration based DCT histogram smoothing method, can be found in Figure 6.1-(d). It can be
seen that the proposed method can also to some extent reproduce the DCT-domain quantiza-
tion noise which is more or less related to the local spatial-domain information of the image.
On UCIDTest dataset, we compute the KL divergence value between I and FJSq , and that
between I and FˆJc for all DCT subbands. The difference between these two KL divergence
16Here we only crop the image by 1 pixel instead of 4 pixels as in classical image calibration, it is empirically
determined in order to attain higher image quality for FˆJc , the output of Algorithm 6.1.
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values is reported in Table 6.2. In Stamm et al.’s [Sta+10a, SL11] DCT histogram smoothing
method, the subband where all the DCT coefficients are quantized to 0 is untouched. For a
fair comparison for FJSq , these subbands were not counted in the comparison. From Table 6.2,
we can see that FˆJc performs consistently better than FJSq in AC components. As shown in
Figure 6.1-(b) and in the beginning of this section, we analyze that the quality degradation
of FJSq is due to the randomness of adding dithering signal without any consideration of the
image spatial-domain information. By comparing the results shown in Table 6.5 and those in
Table 5.4, we can see that not only FˆJc achieves a lower KL divergence value, but also the
average PSNR and SSIM of FˆJc have gains of 1.91 dB and 0.0120, respectively, compared with
FJSq [Sta+10a, SL11].
Table 6.2: The difference of the KL divergence between I and FJSq [Sta+10a, SL11], and
that between I and FˆJc for all 64 DCT subbands. The average difference value over all
subbands is 0.0439 with standard deviation 0.0214. For a fair comparison for FJSq , the
subbands, whose DCT coefficients are all quantized to 0 in the JPEG image J , are not
counted. Results are obtained on UCIDTest dataset.
r
c 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
1 -0.0060 0.0065 0.0190 0.0369 0.0549 0.0728 0.0796 0.0474
2 0.0069 0.0227 0.0324 0.0381 0.0437 0.0719 0.0564 0.0117
3 0.0289 0.0298 0.0364 0.0416 0.0526 0.0636 0.0604 0.0081
4 0.0300 0.0351 0.0399 0.0388 0.0514 0.0796 0.0579 0.0040
5 0.0436 0.0412 0.0495 0.0571 0.0573 0.0865 0.0687 0.0161
6 0.0508 0.0469 0.0575 0.0503 0.0568 0.0728 0.0564 0.0319
7 0.0806 0.0629 0.0633 0.0630 0.0585 0.0613 0.0590 0.0415
8 0.0598 0.0401 0.0314 0.0243 0.0231 0.0138 0.0140 0.0186
Besides the comparison with Stamm et al.’s dithering based DCT histogram smoothing
method [Sta+10a, SL11], we also would like to compare the proposed calibration based DCT
histogram smoothing method proposed in this section with our other perceptual DCT his-
togram smoothing method proposed in Section 5.2.2 in the following17.
From Table 6.3, we can see that the JPEG quality enhancement method proposed in
Section 6.2 indeed has advantages in visual quality over the processed image FˆJb using TV-
based JPEG deblocking method (see Section 5.2.1). Yet, in the DCT domain, FˆJb is able to
recover more information than IˆJ (see the KL divergence difference in Table 6.3). Comparison
of example DCT histograms can also be seen in Figures 6.2-(a) and -(b). The remaining DCT-
domain quantization artifacts in FˆJb are less obvious than those in IˆJ .
With another step of DCT histogram smoothing considering the perceptual quality loss
due to the DCT coefficient modification (see Section 5.2.2), FˆJbq is able to achieve smoothed
DCT histogram without much visual quality sacrifice. On the other hand, though IˆJ has an
17Our research work published in [Fan+13a] (also see Chapter 4) and in [Fan+13b] (also see this chapter)
was conducted almost in parallel. The work published in [Fan+14] (also see Chapter 5) was carried out later.
The comparison presented in this chapter among the three methods is new, and not in any published papers.
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Table 6.3: The 2nd and 3rd columns respectively list the mean (µkl) and standard deviation
(σkl) of the difference of the KL divergence of the DCT histogram between different images.
The 4th and 5th columns report the mean (µmse) and standard deviation (σmse) of difference
of the MSE of the unnormalized DCT histogram between different image pairs. All the 64
subbands are considered, no matter whether the DCT coefficients are all quantized to 0 in
the JPEG image J . The 6th and 7th columns show the PSNR and SSIM difference. All
evaluation metrics are calculated using the original image I as the reference. The anti-
forensic JPEG image is expected to have low KL divergence and MSE values of the DCT
histogram and high PSNR and SSIM values. Results are obtained on UCIDTest dataset.
µkl σkl µmse σmse PSNR SSIM
FˆJb vs. IˆJ -0.4368 0.1481 -17863.56 15711.74 -1.1525 -0.0036
FˆJbq vs. FˆJc -0.0239 0.0431 -2195.72 2686.60 0.6717 -0.0004
FJ0 vs. FJ1 -0.0041 0.0328 584.18 980.70 0.2246 0.0011


















































































Figure 6.2: Example (2, 2) subband DCT histograms of FˆJb , IˆJ , FˆJbq and FˆJc . The corre-
sponding JPEG image J is compressed with quality factor 50 from a UCID image.
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even higher visual quality than the JPEG image J , extra noise is later introduced in FˆJc , by
adding the estimated DCT-domain quantization noise estimated based on calibration directly
back to IˆJ . This results in that FˆJc achieves a lower image quality than FˆJbq. On the DCT
histogram recovery side, FˆJbq is able to achieve a lower KL divergence value than FˆJc on average
over all 64 DCT subbands. However, Table 6.4 shows that in fact FˆJc performs better than
FˆJbq in the low-frequency DCT subbands. Though FˆJc does not outperform FˆJbq in general, we
can conclude that the very simple slight cropping helps Iˆc get a quite good estimation of the
original DCT histogram of I, especially in the low-frequency DCT subbands.
Table 6.4: The difference of the KL divergence between I and FˆJbq, and that between I and
FˆJc for all 64 DCT subbands. The average difference value over all subbands is -0.0239 with
standard deviation 0.0431. All the subbands are considered, no matter whether the DCT
coefficients are all quantized to 0 in the JPEG image J . Results are obtained on UCIDTest
dataset.
r
c 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
1 -0.0081 -0.0001 0.0096 0.0121 0.0075 0.0126 0.0171 -0.0265
2 0.0037 0.0081 0.0127 0.0025 -0.0013 0.0201 0.0056 -0.0393
3 0.0171 0.0120 0.0098 -0.0036 -0.0062 -0.0050 -0.0099 -0.0663
4 0.0133 0.0046 -0.0013 -0.0110 -0.0194 -0.0086 -0.0097 -0.0708
5 0.0106 0.0022 -0.0037 -0.0159 -0.0291 -0.0237 -0.0591 -0.1173
6 0.0090 0.0114 -0.0104 -0.0179 -0.0323 -0.0253 -0.0692 -0.1229
7 0.0353 0.0223 -0.0124 -0.0079 -0.0660 -0.0690 -0.0936 -0.1067
8 -0.0050 -0.0332 -0.0730 -0.0720 -0.1385 -0.1372 -0.1235 -0.0357
In all, the perceptual DCT histogram smoothing after TV-based JPEG deblocking pro-
posed in Section 5.2.2 outperforms the proposed calibration based DCT histogram smoothing
method proposed in this section, in both overall DCT histogram recovery and visual quality
of the processed image. However, also as discussed in Section 5.3.3, the perceptual DCT
histogram smoothing method proposed in Section 5.2.2 is the bottleneck of the computation
cost of the proposed JPEG anti-forensic method in Chapter 5. As to the calibration based
DCT histogram smoothing method, it is much less computationally demanding for cropping,
JPEG compression and computing/adding the DCT-domain quantization noise.
Furthermore, some possible improvements over the method proposed in this section are as
follows. In order to decrease the KL divergence values in the high-frequency DCT subbands
for FˆJc , we could conduct a “clever cropping” for the calibration. For example, the quantization
noise of different subbands can be estimated by cropping different “optimal” numbers of pixels
in the calibration. Moreover, the image quality of FˆJc could also be improved by conducting
a similar procedure to the DCT mapping described in Section 5.2.2.3 in the perceptual DCT
histogram smoothing method. A hybrid method combining the calibration based and the
perceptual DCT histogram smoothing methods is likely to further push the performance of
JPEG anti-forensics towards a better DCT histogram recovery as well as a higher image quality
of the anti-forensic JPEG image, compared with the proposed methods in this thesis.
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6.4 Proposed JPEG Anti-Forensics
As analyzed in Section 6.3, we are aware that the DCT-domain quantization noise estimation
based on calibration cannot be very accurate. The injection of Nˆq must have introduced some
extra unnatural spatial-domain noise to IˆJ . In this section, we will focus on the denoising on
FˆJc as well as JPEG anti-forensics against the detectors. For convenience, the spatial-domain
noise present in FˆJc is assumed to be additive white Gaussian noise, with standard deviation
σn. The forensic detectors in consideration are KF [FD03], KV [Val+11] and KL [LB11]18.
We still follow Zoran and Weiss’ [ZW11] EPLL based image restoration framework, yet
adding some terms for JPEG anti-forensic purposes. The minimization problem we propose
to solve is formulated as follows:


















where λ, α, β and γ are regularization parameters, uc is the calibrated image obtained by
cropping u by c pixels in both horizontal and vertical directions [FGH02, LB11], and {zi} is
a set of auxiliary variables facilitating the optimization [ZW11].
Now we explain the different terms in Eq. (6.7) in order. The first term is for the image
fidelity control, which expects the obtained image is still close to the given JPEG image. The
second term is designed for KV [Val+11], and ι(·) computes the TV of the image (the ℓ1 norm
of the spatial first-order derivatives). We wish the image would have low TV, in other words
not very noisy. The third term is for KL [LB11], and νk(·) returns the variance of the k-th
high-frequency subband (defined in [LB11]) of the image, while σˆ2k is the estimated variance
of the original image from the k-th high-frequency DCT subband of FˆJc . As the JPEG block
size is 8 × 8, basically we have 7 ways to crop the image along the diagonal direction by c
(c = 1, · · · , 7) pixel(s) in both horizontal and vertical directions. Following the main idea
of KL, 6 other detectors can be built using the similar way by comparing the variances of
high-frequency subbands between the image and its calibrated version. If the image and all
its 7 calibrated versions have close variances to the estimated one in all the high-frequency
subbands, KL and the other 6 potential detectors described above can be fooled. The last
term is the image prior term which expects every patch is likely under the prior, because of
18The JPEG anti-forensic method presented in this chapter was published in a conference paper [Fan+13b]
in 2013. At that time, in literature KF , KV and KL are the scalar-based forensic detectors specifically
considered in the state-of-the-art JPEG anti-forensics [Sta+10a, Sta+10b, SL11] and forensics [Val+11, LB11]
to counter JPEG anti-forensics. We think it is possible to integrate more anti-forensic terms into the cost
function in Eq. (6.7) to further improve the forensic undetectability of the anti-forensic JPEG image against
more detectors. We will leave it as a future study. Different from [Fan+13b], in this section, we test the
anti-forensic JPEG image against all the 8 scalar-based JPEG forensic detectors listed in Table 3.1, though
some of them were not considered in [Fan+13b]. The test of the proposed anti-forensic JPEG image in this
chapter against the two SVM-based detectors used in Chapter 5 and some possible improvement will also be
left as a future work.
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which the outputs of KF [FD03] can be largely decreased.
The optimization problem can be solved using the “Half Quadratic Splitting” [ZW11] (see
Section 2.4.3 for more details) and it consists of two sub-problems:
• z sub-problem, solving z given u — This is solved using the approximate MAP estima-
tion, given the parameter γ which is related to the noise standard deviation σn [ZW11].
The main objective of this sub-problem is to remove the introduced extra unnatural
noise in FˆJc , through the regularization by the natural image statistical model.
• u sub-problem, solving u given z — This can be solved using the subgradient method
(see Section 2.4.1 for more details). JPEG anti-forensics is mainly carried out in this
sub-problem, while keeping the image still close to y.
For solving Eq. (6.7), we do 3 iterations and the parameter setting is: λ = s
2
10σ2n







, γ = 1
σ2n
[1, 8, 32], and σn is empirically set as−0.1q+13 according to the quality factor
q of J . For each iteration of constant γ value, z and x sub-problems are solved alternatively
once for either problem. In practice, we found that the output of KL [LB11] is not easy to be
further decreased into the normal range. Moreover, images tend to be over-smoothed as KQF
[FD03] detects many ‘3’ entries (see Section 4.2.1 for more explanation and analysis on this).
We tackle this problem by adding a slight amount of white Gaussian noise in the middle of
solving the x sub-problem during the last iteration. We set λ = 0, α = 0.01 and β = 1 to
emphasize on decreasing theKL output. The added noise is mostly suppressed during the later
subgradient iterations but can successfully reduce the occurrences of ‘3’ in the quantization


































Figure 6.3: ROC curves achieved by FJ1 against scalar-based JPEG forensic detectors.
Results are obtained on UCIDTest dataset.
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Table 6.5: From the 2nd to the 8th columns, the AUC values for different kinds of images
against scalar-based JPEG forensic detectors are listed; the image quality (with I as the









J 0.9991 1.0000 0.9996 0.9976 0.9811 0.9860 0.8840 37.0999 0.9919
FJSqSb 0.3783 0.0806 0.6288 0.8337 0.5338 0.6309 0.4854 30.4591 0.9509
IˆJ 0.9997 0.9982 0.9528 0.7851 0.9698 0.9878 0.8779 37.8930 0.9927
FˆJc 0.9994 0.8147 0.5949 0.7383 0.9868 0.9868 0.8944 35.3209 0.9876
FJ1 0.5522 0.7291 0.3594 0.739419 0.5272 0.7750 0.5787 35.2568 0.9832
FJ0 0.6756 0.6046 0.5194 0.6210 0.4490 0.6772 0.5880 35.4814 0.9843
FJ 0.5398 0.6425 0.4598 0.6159 0.4344 0.5894 0.5317 35.9855 0.9866
Let FJ1 denote the anti-forensic image created using the proposed method described in
this chapter. Figure 6.3 shows the ROC curves of FJ1 against 7 scalar-based JPEG forensic
detectors listed in Table 3.1. Table 6.5 reports the AUC values and average PSNR and SSIM
values of different (anti-forensic/post-processed) JPEG images. We also calculated the AUC
values of FJ1 against the above mentioned 6 potential detectors which are built in a similar
way as KL [LB11], the average AUC value is 0.4456 with the standard deviation 0.0872.
Compared with the state-of-the-art anti-forensic JPEG images [Sta+10a, Sta+10b, SL11,
VTT11, SS11] (see Table 5.4 for AUC, PSNR and SSIM values, and see Figures 4.2 for ROC
curves), our anti-forensic JPEG image FJ1 achieves a better tradeoff between undetectability
against existing JPEG forensic detectors and the visual quality of processed images. Take the
comparison with FSqSb [Sta+10a, Sta+10b, SL11] as an example, not only a slightly better
overall forensic undetectability is achieved, but also FJ1 has a PSNR gain of 4.80 dB and an
SSIM gain of 0.0323.
Figure 6.4 shows example results of (anti-forensic) JPEG images compared with the origi-
nal image. As demonstrated in Figure 6.4-(d), FJ1 is able to keep more details such as textures
and edges than FSqSb [Sta+10a, Sta+10b, SL11] exampled in -(c) (please refer to the elec-
tronic version for a better visibility). Even though the quantization table estimation based
detector KQF [FD03] was proven not very reliable in Section 4.2.1, we still tested it on FJ1 on
UCIDTest dataset. Among all the anti-forensic JPEG images, 94.50% of them are classified
as never compressed by KQF . We also examine the shape of the DCT histogram, and some
example results are shown in Figure 6.5, in which no noticeable artifacts can be observed.
The last two rows of Table 6.3 show the DCT histogram recovery and image quality
comparison of FJ1 , FJ0 , and FJ . It can be seen that both FJ0 and FJ outperform FJ1 .
19In our published paper [Fan+13b], the KV detector is another version presented in Valenzise et al.’s work
[Val+11], other than the version (in Valenzise et al.’s improved work in [VTT13]) used in this thesis. In that
setting, there is a lag parameter (see [Val+11] for details) set as 5 for the re-compression quality factors for KV .
This specific setting is for the consideration that the quality factors in use in [Fan+13b] are integer multiples
of 5. These setting changes result in the relatively high AUC value shown here for FJ1 against KV [VTT13].
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(a) I (b) J
(c) FSqSb (d) FJ1
Figure 6.4: Example results (close-up images) of FJ1 compared with I, J , and FSqSb
[Sta+10a, Sta+10b, SL11], where J is compressed with quality factor 50.
However, we know that the DCT histogram is not well smoothed in FJ0 (an example can be
seen in Figure 4.10-(b)). Yet, its average KL divergence has an even lower value than that
of FJ1 whose DCT histogram is explicitly smoothed by the proposed calibration based DCT
histogram smoothing method described in Section 6.3. This may be explained by the fact
that the smoothness of the DCT histogram is not always conveyed by the KL divergence.
Therefore, we also calculate the MSE (see Eq. (2.5) for the version on images, the calculation
on histograms is similar) between the unnormalized DCT histogram of the processed JPEG
image and that of its corresponding original image. The mean and standard deviation of the
difference of these MSE values are reported in the 4th and the 5th columns of Table 6.3. Under
this evaluation metric, FJ1 outperforms FJ0 .
Generally speaking, compared with FJ0 generated by our JPEG anti-forensic method in
Chapter 4 and FJ generated by our JPEG anti-forensic method in Chapter 5, the anti-forensic
JPEG image FJ1 created in this chapter does not outperform them in terms of forensic unde-
tectability and visual quality of the processed image (see Tables 6.3 and 6.5 for the comparison,














































































Figure 6.5: Example DCT histograms of different subbands of an anti-forensic JPEG image
FJ1 shown in Figure 6.4-(d). No noticeable comb-like DCT quantization artifacts appear in
the histograms.
ROC curves can also be compared in Figure 4.6-(c), Figure 5.8-(b) and Figure 6.3). Intuitively,
this is to some extent out of our expectation. We expected that the more sophisticated image
prior model would be able to push the performance of the resulting anti-forensic JPEG image
towards a higher image quality than the TV-based method while still keeping a good foren-
sic undetectability. However, these results are understandable and may be explained by the
following reasons:
• In fact, the ability of the EPLL framework with the GMM as the image prior for JPEG
image quality enhancement is proven by experiments on 4 classical test images (see
Table 6.1) and a large-scale test on UCIDTest dataset (see Table 6.5). However, as shown
in Figure 6.2-(b) compared with -(a) produced by the TV-based JPEG deblocking, the
DCT coefficient modification in IˆJ is relatively minor. In order to remove the remaining
comb-like DCT-domain quantization artifacts, the cost will be more expensive. In other
words, more image quality may need to be sacrificed. On the other hand, IˆJ is our only
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kind of (intermediate) anti-forensic JPEG image in this thesis that has a higher visual
quality than the JPEG image. Further improvement would be possible to create from
IˆJ the anti-forensic JPEG image with even higher quality than the JPEG image, if the
following anti-forensic steps are more carefully designed.
• As shown in Figure 6.1-(d), the calibration is able to help IˆJ get a quite good estimation
of the DCT-domain quantization noise with some spatial-domain coherence. The process
is very fast, however the estimation is still quite crude. This leads to main image
degradation (see the PSNR value change from the 4nd row to the 5th row in Table 6.5)
during the creation of the proposed anti-forensic JPEG image FJ1 .
• Regarding the forensic undetectability, FJ1 has less good anti-forensic performance in
blocking artifacts or spatial-domain unnatural noise examination than FJ0 and FJ . This
may be explained by the fact that there is an explicit TV-based deblocking term (see
Eq. (4.6) and Figure 4.3) in the creation of FJ0 and FJ , which is not used in Eq. (6.7).
6.5 Summary
By using the MAP-based image restoration, calibration and a prior of natural image statistics,
we create anti-forensic JPEG image FJ1 which outperforms the state-of-the-art anti-forensic
JPEG images [Sta+10a, Sta+10b, SL11, VTT11, SS11] with a higher image quality as well as a
slightly better forensic undetectability against existing forensic detectors. Moreover, the DCT
histogram is explicitly smoothed by the proposed calibration based DCT-domain quantization
noise estimation to better approximate the original one.
However, the proposed method based on a sophisticated image prior model does not out-
perform our previous JPEG anti-forensic methods proposed in Chapters 4 and 5. The possible
reasons are provided in the end of Section 6.4. As a preliminary JPEG anti-forensics work
leveraging on more sophisticated image prior model than the TV, the performance of the
proposed method in this chapter may be further improved by a more accurate DCT-domain
quantization noise estimation and the integration of more anti-forensic terms in Eq. (6.7).
Some ideas of possible improvement are provided at the end of Sections 6.3 and 6.4. One
ambitious but challenging objective is to create anti-forensic JPEG images with even higher
visual quality than the JPEG image, where a good image prior model would be indispensable.
From Chapter 4, Chapter 5 and this chapter, we have seen the superiority of anti-forensic
methods designed based on concepts/methods from image restoration over the methods based
on noise injection and simple image processing. This draws our interest to work on other
image anti-forensic problems following the same research line. During our study of JPEG anti-
forensics, we are aware that Stamm et al. [Sta+10b, SL11] propose to use median filtering to
remove the spatial-domain blocking artifacts from a JPEG image. Moreover, median filtering is
also used for image resampling anti-forensic purposes in [KR08]. The median filtering traces
present in one image, not only expose that the image is median filtered, but also indicate
other image processing operations may have been applied. Therefore, it is important to study
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median filtering on the anti-forensic side. This work will be conducted in Chapter 7, by still
following our research line of leveraging on image restoration to design image anti-forensics.
Chapter 7
Median Filtered Image Quality
Enhancement and Anti-Forensics via
Variational Deconvolution
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T
his chapter proposes an image variational deconvolution framework for both quality en-
hancement and anti-forensics of the median filtered image (i.e., MF image for short).
The proposed optimization-based framework consists of a convolution term, a fidelity term
with respect to the MF image, and a prior term. The first term is for the approximation of
the median filtering process, using a convolution kernel. The second fidelity term keeps the
processed image to some extent still close to the MF image, retaining some denoising or other
image processing artifacts hiding effects. Using the generalized Gaussian as the distribution
model, the last image prior term regularizes the pixel value derivative of the obtained image
so that its distribution resembles that of the original image. The proposed method can serve
as an MF image quality enhancement technique, whose efficacy is validated by experiments
conducted on MF images which have been previously “salt & pepper” noised. Using another
parameter setting and with an additional pixel value perturbation procedure, the proposed
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method outperforms the state-of-the-art median filtering anti-forensic methods, with a bet-
ter forensic undetectability against existing detectors as well as a higher visual quality of
the processed image. Furthermore, the feasibility of concealing image resampling traces and
JPEG blocking artifacts is demonstrated by experiments, using the proposed median filtering
anti-forensic method.
A paper describing this work has been accepted for publication in an international journal
[Fan+15]. The Matlab code of the method is freely shared online and can be downloaded from:
http://www.gipsa-lab.grenoble-inp.fr/~wei.fan/documents/AFMF-TIFS15.tar.gz.
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7.1 Introduction and Motivation
In Chapters 4, 5 and 6, we have seen the feasibility of employing some concepts/methods from
image restoration meanwhile integrating some extra anti-forensic terms/strategies to devise
JPEG anti-forensics with better performance than the state-of-the-art methods. In this chap-
ter, we still follow this research line and study another image anti-forensic problem, that is,
median filtering anti-forensics. Our choice to study median filtering is because of its link to
JPEG anti-forensics, which is one of our two main research topics in this thesis. In [Sta+10b,
SL11], Stamm et al.’s proposed to use median filtering for removing the JPEG blocking ar-
tifacts in the spatial domain after the DCT histogram of the JPEG image is smoothed by a
dithering operation [Sta+10a, SL11]. Despite of the effectiveness of median filtering in the
JPEG blocking artifacts removing task, the resulting anti-forensic JPEG image has not been
examined by median filtering forensic detectors yet [BK13]. This partially motivates us to
conduct the study of median filtering anti-forensics.
The median filter, a well-known local image operator, is frequently adopted for image de-
noising or smoothing purposes. Median filtering has the reputation of good edge preserving
ability, and does not introduce new pixel values to the processed image. However, median fil-
tering also has the shortcoming to degrade the image quality, causing undesired image blurring.
Besides, image anti-forensic researchers pointed out the destructive nature of median filtering
to other image processing footprints, e.g., disguising JPEG blocking artifacts [Sta+10b, SL11]
as described earlier, and hiding traces of image resampling [KR08]. Therefore, the presence of
median filtering traces, not only suggests the image has been previously median filtered, but
also implies the possibility that other image processing operations may have been applied to
the image.
Similar to our JPEG anti-forensic work presented in Chapter 6, we would like to first
consider image restoration of MF images, via solving an ill-posed inverse problem. More
specifically, the specific inverse problem of median filtering can be treated as a blind decon-
volution problem. The word “blind ” means that we do not have complete knowledge about
the convolution kernel used for the filtering. In general, for image deconvolution, the MAP
estimation (or one of its variants) is often employed. For the non-blind deconvolution problem,
the convolution kernel is known and the use of a good image prior is essential for the problem
solving [KF09, KTF11]. As to the blind deconvolution, it is a popular way to perform the
kernel estimation first and thereafter solve the problem using non-blind methods [Lev+09,
KTF11]. Yet, the median filtering deconvolution is an even more difficult task, since the ker-
nel is not only unknown but also spatially heterogeneous. As a first trial to solve this difficult
problem, in this chapter we simplify it to be a tractable blind deconvolution problem with an
approximated spatially homogeneous kernel.
In this chapter, we investigate into the median filtering process and the pixel value differ-
ence statistical change caused by median filtering. Thereafter, we choose a proper convolution
kernel by experimentally studying several spatially homogeneous convolution kernels. As to
the image prior, we use the generalized Gaussian distribution to model the pixel value dif-
ference whose statistics have a notable change after the image is median filtered. By using a
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proper convolution kernel and a good image prior, we form an image variational devolution
framework to solve the inverse problem of median filtering. The achievement of the proposed
framework is two-fold: (i) improving the visual quality of MF images (with a certain parame-
ter setting) as an image quality enhancement method, and (ii) fooling existing median filtering
forensic detectors (with another parameter setting and an additional pixel value perturbation
procedure) for anti-forensic purposes.
The remainder of the thesis is organized as follows. Section 7.2 analyzes the median filtering
process and image derivative statistical change due to median filtering. The proposed method
is described in Section 7.3, where experimental results of MF image quality enhancement
and anti-forensics are also presented, with comparisons with the state-of-the-art anti-forensic
methods. In Section 7.4, the proposed median filtering anti-forensic method is proven to be
practical in the application of image resampling and JPEG blocking anti-forensics, again with
experimental comparisons with the state-of-the-art methods. Finally, a summary is given in
Section 7.5.
7.2 Analysis of Median Filtering and Its Impact on Image
Statistics
7.2.1 Median Filtering Process
According to Eq. (3.11) (basics of median filtering can be found in Section 3.2.1), for each
local window, the median filter outputs the median value inside the filter window. During the
median filtering process, no new pixel values are generated. For the considered 3× 3 window,











 , with ψkk = 1 and ψki = 0 for ∀i 6= k,
i, k ∈ {1, 2, · · · , 9}, (7.1)
which can come in 9 shapes. Nevertheless, for a specific pixel neighborhood, the form of Ψk
in use is completely dependent on the order statistics of the original pixels compassed by the
filter window. Yet, this piece of information is permanently lost during the median filtering
process.
Median filtering is a spatially heterogeneous process. For each pixel xi of the original
image x, there are s2 possible masks (i.e., the convolution kernel matrices in Eq. (7.1)) in
choose, during the median filtering process. For an N -pixel image, the space of possible mask
combinations is enormous – there are (s2)N possibilities (with a small window size 3×3, and a
very small image with size 10×10, there are 2.7×1095 possibilities). It appears not practical to
consider all the (s2)N possible mask combinations for modeling the median filtering process. In
order to simplify this model, we propose, as a first trial, to use a single mask and approximate
the median filtering process as a spatially homogeneous image convolution procedure. A key
issue here concerns a properly defined convolution kernel, and we postpone the relevant study
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and discussion to Section 7.3.2, where 6 different kinds of spatially homogeneous kernels are
experimentally compared.
Based on the above analysis, Section 7.3.1 will further formulate the median filtering
process approximation as the first term in Eq. (7.4). Indeed, the modeling may appear to be
oversimplified, which however makes the problem easy to solve and in practice yields good
results (see Sections 7.3.3 and 7.3.4). It is an interesting yet difficult open research problem
to estimate the spatially heterogeneous convolution kernel for median filtering, and we leave
it for a future study.
7.2.2 Observations of Pixel Value Difference Distribution
Kirchner and Fridrich [KF10] built the forensic measures KK and KˆK (see Eqs. (3.12)-(3.13)
in Section 3.2.2) based on the first-order pixel value difference histogram. The SPAM feature
[PBF10] is based on the analysis of the first-order pixel value difference images, and was ini-
tially designed for measuring the effects of ±1 steganography. It also performed excellently
in distinguishing MF images from the original [KF10]. The feature proposed by Cao et al.
[Cao+10] was built by measuring the first-order pixel value difference image in the textured
areas. Yuan [Yua11] did not directly use the pixel value difference for constructing the feature.
However, the MFF feature measures local pixel dependency artifacts, where the pixel value
difference statistics can contribute as an important one. Also, Chen et al. [CN11] studied the
pixel neighbor correlation, using a linear prediction model. Furthermore, in [Che+12, CNH13],
Chen et al. explicitly pointed out that their median filtering forensic method works in the
image pixel value difference domain. Kang et al. [PK12, Kan+12, Kan+13] did not work on
the image pixel value difference domain directly, but on the median filter residual. Neverthe-
less, they studied the residual correlation in a certain neighborhood, using the Markov chains
[PK12] or the autoregressive model [Kan+12, Kan+13]. Concerning Zhang et al.’s [Zha+14]
median filtering discriminating feature, it was built on the first-order image derivatives.
From the above analysis, we can see that existing median filtering forensic methods [KF10,
PBF10, Cao+10, Yua11, CN11, Che+12, CNH13, PK12, Kan+12, Kan+13, Zha+14] either
directly analyze the pixel value difference of the image, or study the image statistical change
after median filtering in a highly related way. This motivates us to conduct study in the
pixel value difference domain as well, via constructing histograms. More precisely, given an
image u, we convolve it using a derivative filter, e.g., the first-order horizontal one f1 =
[1,−1] to obtain the pixel value difference, and then construct its histogram with integers
{−255,−254, · · · , 255} as bin centers. For the sake of brevity, we use the matrix multiplication
F1u to denote the pixel value difference extraction from the image u using the filter f1. The
first-order horizontal pixel value difference histogram of an example MFTE (see Section 2.3.2
for the datasets we use for median filtered image quality enhancement and forensic testing)
image is shown in Figure 7.1-(a).
In order to properly model the pixel value difference, we adopt the 0-mean two-parameter
generalized Gaussian distribution, which enjoys its popularity in natural image statistics
































Figure 7.1: First-order horizontal pixel value difference histograms of an example MFTE
image and its MF version. The sample variance and sample kurtosis of the pixel value
differences are respectively: (a), σˆ2 = 36.2568, κˆ = 27.4651; (b), σˆ2 = 29.8866, κˆ = 36.6555.
The red curve in (a) is its fitted p.m.f. curve, using the generalized Gaussian distribution
with estimated parameters αˆ = 0.4797, and βˆ = 0.4860. The squared fitting error is 0.0047.







where α (> 0) is the scale parameter, β (> 0) is the shape parameter, and Γ(·) is the Gamma









Therefore, the estimated parameters αˆ and βˆ can be obtained from the sample variance and
kurtosis, by solving the above two equations, using a numerical method [BS99].
The red curve in Figure 7.1-(a) shows the fitted p.m.f. for the pixel value difference
histogram, which well describes its shape. The average squared fitting error on MFTE dataset
is 0.0107, which also indicates that the generalized Gaussian distribution is a good model in
terms of goodness-of-fit. As a counterpart of Figure 7.1-(a), -(b) presents the first-order
horizontal pixel value difference histogram for the median filtered version of the example
original MFTE image. We also calculate the average variance and kurtosis of the p.m.f. of
F1u on MFTE dataset, for the original images and the MF images, respectively. For F1x, the
average variance is 129.2823, and the average kurtosis is 22.8263. Whereas for MF images,
the average variance of F1y is 80.5936 and its average kurtosis is 40.0911, which are notably
lower and higher than those of the original images, respectively. Indeed, the median filter is
known to have image smoothing effects, leading to (nearly) constant pixel values in a certain
neighborhood. This will lead to a remarkably high peak at bin 0 of the derivative histogram
after median filtering, e.g., Figure 7.1-(b), which is embodied by the high kurtosis and low
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variance of the p.m.f. of F1y.
The above analysis shows that the generalized Gaussian distribution is a suitable model
for the derivative histogram of original images in terms of goodness-of-fit, indicating that it
can serve as a good image prior. Section 7.3.1 will further formulate the image prior term in
Eq. (7.4), which regularizes the image derivative distribution to bring down the high peak of
MF image derivative histograms. This regularization is important for median filtering anti-
forensics, since existing forensic methods all either directly or in a highly related way analyze
the pixel value difference statistical change after median filtering. Besides, we will also discuss
the parameter estimation of the generalized Gaussian distribution used as the image prior in
Section 7.3.1.
7.3 Proposed Image Variational Deconvolution Framework
7.3.1 Problem Formulation
As discussed in Section 7.1, we propose to treat the MF image quality enhancement and
anti-forensics as an ill-posed image restoration problem based on energy minimization. Based
on the analysis in Section 7.2, and to some extent inspired by [KF09], we hereby propose to
minimize the following cost function:

















where the first term approximates the median filtering process, and the second term is the
image fidelity term with respect to the MF image y, while the last one is the image prior
term. It is an image variational deconvolution problem, where λ is a parameter balancing the
different energy terms, Ku is the matrix multiplication form of the image convolution using
kernel k, ω (< 1) is a small positive parameter balancing the first two terms more or less
related to the image quality (the setting of k and ω is to be further discussed in Section 7.3.2),
J is the number of derivative filters in use, and Fju is the matrix multiplication form for
calculating the j-th type of image derivatives.
The analysis in Section 7.2.1 leads to the formation of the first term in Eq. (7.4), that is
‖Ku− y‖22, approximating the median filtering process using image convolution. It can also
be considered as an image quality term, because by using this term, we hope in some sense
that the processed image x˜ is close to the original image x, as the filtered version of x˜ should
be close to the MF image y.
In order to keep some median filtering effects (e.g., denoising, and hiding traces for other
image processing operations), the second term ‖u− y‖22 is designed for the image fidelity
with respect to the MF image (the strength is controlled by the small positive parameter ω),
hoping that the processed image is still to some extent close to the MF image. The setting of
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the parameter ω will be further discussed in Section 7.3.2, according to different processing
purposes of MF images.
The last term in Eq. (7.4) is the image prior term, modeling the image derivative using
the 0-mean two-parameter generalized Gaussian distribution, based on the analysis in Sec-
tion 7.2.2. It is derived by maximizing the log-likelihood of Eq. (7.2), replacing d by Fju, α
by αj , and β by βj , respectively. The effect of this image prior is to regularize the distribution
of the derivatives of the obtained image, so that it resembles that of the original image. In this
thesis, in total we consider J = 4 derivative filters. Besides the filter F1 defined earlier, here
F2, F3, and F4 respectively correspond to the derivative filters f2 = [1,−1]T , f3 = [1, 0,−1],
and f4 = [1, 0,−1]T . Theoretically, additional image derivative filters can be added into this
framework, however leading to a high computation cost but minor impact on the final results.
Moreover, it is of more importance to recover these four image derivative histograms than
others constructed by filters where pixels in subtraction are more widely apart.
A key issue of the image prior concerns the two parameters αj and βj of the derivative
distribution of the original image. However, we cannot get access to the original image in our
task. As shown in Section 7.2.2, the two parameters are directly related to the variance and
kurtosis of the observed data. We therefore propose to use the linear regression for estimating




























m (m = 1, 2, · · · ,M + 1) are the linear regression coefficients. With cσ
2
and cκ,
the derivative variance and kurtosis of the original image can be estimated from the MF
image and its median filtered versions. In practice, the estimation accuracy improves when
M increases. In this thesis, we set M = 5, which gives us satisfying results. From the 107
images of MFPE dataset, cσ
2
and cκ are obtained. The accuracy of the proposed linear
prediction based estimation is quite satisfactory, for example, the mean absolute percentage
error is around 10% for the variance estimated on the MFTE dataset.
Indeed, our image variational deconvolution based problem formulation (i.e., Eq. (7.4))
shares some similarities with Krishnan and Fergus’ [KF09] non-blind image deconvolution
problem, or other image deconvolution problems in the image restoration literature. However,
the two have some important differences. Firstly, the proposed problem is not a strict MAP
estimate as Krishnan and Fergus’ [KF09] which is composed of a prior term and a likelihood
term. Our cost function in Eq. (7.4) is more complex, in particular having an additional
fidelity term with respect to the MF image. Secondly, a more sophisticated image prior is
employed in our problem other than the hyper-Laplacian model for the two first-order image
derivatives used in [KF09]. The 0-mean two-parameter generalized Gaussian model has the
capability to better describe the image derivative distribution than the one-parameter hyper-
Laplacian model [KF09]. Thirdly, the two generalized Gaussian parameters are adaptively
adjusted (estimated) according to each given image, which is also different from the one fixed
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hyper-Laplacian parameter used in [KF09]. Finally, an in-depth motivation behind our image
prior modeling image derivatives is based on the specific median filtering inverse problem,
where the neighboring pixel relation is prominently different before and after median filtering.
Accordingly, two additional filters are adopted in the proposed image variational deconvolution
framework.
The optimization of the cost function in Eq. (7.4) is not trivial. Practically, it can be solved
by using the widely used “Half Quadratic Splitting” (see Section 2.4.3 for more descriptions)
[KF09, ZW11] and the split Bregman method (see Section 2.4.4 for more descriptions) [GO09,
Cha09, KTF11]. After introducing a set of auxiliary variables {wj}Jj=1 and using the “Half














∥∥Fju− αjwj∥∥22 + ∥∥wj∥∥βjβj
) . (7.6)
where γ is a regularization parameter.
We apply the Bregman iteration to Eq. (7.6). Thereafter, the split Bregman method solves































where {bj}Jj=1 are the Bregman variables, and (bj)(0) = 0.
The minimization problem in Eq. (7.7) can be solved by alternating between the following
two sub-problems:





, in a similar way as [KF09].
• u sub-problem, solving u given w. This quadratic problem has a closed-form solution,
which can be obtained by taking the derivative of the problem with respect to u and
then setting it to 0.
In practice, we run 20 Bregman iterations, during each of which, w sub-problem and u
sub-problem are respectively solved once. For a 512× 512 MFTE image median filtered with
window size 3 × 3, it requires around 5 seconds to process the image, using Matlab R2012b
on a PC with 16G RAM and 2.80GHz CPU.
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7.3.2 Kernel Selection and Parameter Settings
For a given MF image to be processed, in order to solve the proposed variational deconvolution
problem (see Eq. (7.7)), there are several parameters that we can adjust: the convolution kernel
k, ω, λ, and γ.
As discussed in Section 7.2.1, we propose to use a spatially homogeneous convolution kernel
k to approximate the median filtering process. For natural images, inside the s × s window,
the block center pixel appears more frequently to hold the median value. This is observed
and extracted by Yuan [Yua11] as a feature for detecting median filtering in images. Here,
we calculate the empirical distribution of the block median, namely Yuan’s [Yua11] fDBM
feature vector (see Section 3.2.2.3), and use the normalized version as a convolution kernel
(denoted as the DBM kernel). In this thesis, the DBM kernel for s = 3 is estimated from the
107 original images in MFPE dataset as:
ΨDBM =





Besides, we also study the widely used average kernel (AVE) and Gaussian kernel with stan-
dard deviation 0.5 (GAU):
ΨAV E =











We can see that the AVE and GAU kernels are blind to the median filtering process, while
the DBM kernel tries to integrate some information of this process. The order statistics in
the filter window varies according to the image content itself. We therefore adopt the blind
convolution kernel estimation in [KTF11] for an adaptive kernel adjustment according to the
given image. For the sake of brevity, we use DBME, AVEE, and GAUE for referring to
the estimated kernels using the DBM, AVE, and GAU kernels as the initialization guess of
the blind kernel estimation algorithm [KTF11], respectively. Note that for the same given
image, the kernel estimation algorithm of [KTF11] may return different kernel matrices for
DBME, AVEE, and GAUE. This is because the kernel estimation [KTF11] solves a complex
optimization problem whose output is sensitive to the initialization guess.
Moreover, the parameter ω is to balance the first two terms in Eq. (7.4). Obviously, the
higher the value of ω is, the more the minimization of the proposed cost function will favor
images close to the MF image. Furthermore, λ and γ are also parameters we can tune.
For determining the convolution kernel and ω value, we conduct the test on MFTE100
dataset using different (λ, γ) combinations and choose the most favorable one for either MF im-
7.3. Proposed Image Variational Deconvolution Framework 133
age quality enhancement or anti-forensic purposes. Here, we consider λ ∈ {1000, 2000, 3000},
and γ = {300, 900, 1500}. A more fine-grained parameter grid search of (λ, γ) will be carried
out in Sections 7.3.3 and 7.3.4, after finding a proper setting for the convolution kernel and
the ω value.
In order to facilitate the parameter choosing for MF image quality enhancement, Figure 7.2
shows the highest average oPSNR20 value achieved when fixing the type of kernel and the value
of ω, and varying the (λ, γ) setting. When ω = 0, the DBM kernel is able to achieve the highest
oPSNR value, indicating it is the best one for median filtering process approximation among
all the 6 types of convolution kernels in consideration. This result is expected because each
element in the DBM kernel is proportional to the probability of a pixel at a given position to
be the block median, while the AVE and GAU kernels are blind to the median filtering process.
Yet, as discussed in Section 7.2.1, it is indeed oversimplified using a single convolution filter
to approximate the spatially heterogeneous median filtering process. We find it is very useful
to introduce the ‖u− y‖22 term (with ω > 0) into the proposed framework of Eq. (7.4), so
as to reduce the median filtering process approximation errors. From Figure 7.2, we can see
that for the three best performing kernels DBM, AVE, and AVEE, an ω value in the interval
of [0.3, 0.5] can effectively improve the oPSNR value of the processed MF image on MFTE
dataset. Considering ω ∈ {0, 0.05, 0.1, 0.2, · · · , 1} and different kernels, the highest average
oPSNR value is achieved with ω = 0.4 and the AVE kernel. This setting will be adopted for
MF image quality enhancement.
As to median filtering anti-forensics, the value of ω needs to be small, so that the processed
image is not too close to the MF image retaining too many median filtering artifacts. We study
several different values around 0.1, and observe that different ω settings have minor impact on
the final results. When ω = 0.1, the AVE and AVEE kernels outperform the other 4 kernels in
terms of anti-forensic performance. Take into account the image quality, the AVEE kernel is
able to achieve slightly higher oPSNR, oSSIM, and mSSIM values, and 0.4585 dB of mPSNR
gain on average, compared with the AVE kernel. For a better tradeoff between the forensic
undetectability and image quality of the anti-forensic MF images, we choose the AVEE kernel
with ω = 0.1 as the final setting.
7.3.3 Median Filtered Image Quality Enhancement
As suggested in Section 7.3.2, we use the AVE kernel and ω = 0.4 for MF image quality
enhancement. The average oPSNR and oSSIM values can be seen in Figure 7.3, for different
(λ, γ) combinations, where λ ∈ {1000, 1500, · · · , 3000} and γ ∈ {200, 300, · · · , 1000}. Com-
pared with the average oPSNR value 36.8114 dB and the average oSSIM value 0.9823 for
20For evaluating the image quality, the well-known PSNR and structural similarity (SSIM) [Wan+04] metrics
are used. In this thesis, we calculate the image quality metric values of the given image, using both the original
image and the MF image as the references, under different circumstances. For the sake of clarity and to avoid
confusion, we hereafter use “oPSNR” and “oSSIM” to specifically refer to the two mentioned image metrics
using the original image as the reference, whereas “mPSNR” and “mSSIM” are for those when the MF image
serves as the reference. Note that, these notations only apply in this chapter. Besides, “PSNR” and “SSIM”
still generically mean the two image quality metrics.

















Figure 7.2: The average oPSNR value (obtained on MFTE100 dataset) for different con-
volution kernels and ω values. Each point in the figure corresponds to the (λ, γ) setting
which achieves the highest average oPSNR value, when fixing a convolution kernel and the
ω value.
MF images, an evident image quality improvement of the processed images can be observed.
In consideration of both PSNR and SSIM metrics, we choose λ = 3000 and γ = 200 as the
final parameter setting, which can achieve 37.9343 dB of average oPSNR value and 0.9898 of





































Figure 7.3: The average oPSNR and oSSIM values for processed MF images by the pro-
posed quality enhancement method using the AVE kernel with ω = 0.4, for different param-
eter combinations (λ, γ). The average oPSNR and oSSIM values for MF images are: 36.8114
dB, and 0.9823, respectively. Results are obtained on MFTE100 dataset.
Table 7.1 reports the image quality improvement of processing the median filtered “salt &
pepper” noised image, using the proposed method. With experimental results obtained from
1000 MFTE images, it can be seen that when the noise density is below 7%, both the oPSNR
and the oSSIM values are well improved. Though the average oPSNR value is slightly lower
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than that of the MF image when the noise density is 7%, we can still see some oSSIM value
increase. In Figure 7.4, example results from an MFTE image are compared, for the original
image, the “salt & pepper” noised image, the median filtered noised image, and the processed
quality enhanced image using the proposed method. It can be seen that the median filter is
indeed powerful for noise removal. Yet, image blurring is also introduced, especially in the
image textured regions. The proposed method can help recover part of the information lost
during the median filtering process, with a higher image quality achieved than the MF image.
Table 7.1: The average oPSNR and oSSIM values for “salt & pepper” noised, median
filtered, and quality enhanced images, respectively. The noise density varies from 1% to 7%.
Results are obtained on MFTE dataset.
Noised Median filtered Quality enhanced
1%
oPSNR 25.1365 37.1336 38.0723
oSSIM 0.8308 0.9827 0.9892
2%
oPSNR 22.1257 36.9719 37.8236
oSSIM 0.7185 0.9822 0.9885
3%
oPSNR 20.3642 36.7957 37.5155
oSSIM 0.6388 0.9818 0.9876
4%
oPSNR 19.1161 36.6114 37.2058
oSSIM 0.5793 0.9813 0.9867
5%
oPSNR 18.1466 36.4031 36.7914
oSSIM 0.5327 0.9807 0.9850
6%
oPSNR 17.3540 36.1758 36.2933
oSSIM 0.4948 0.9801 0.9828
7%
oPSNR 16.6851 35.8924 35.7542
oSSIM 0.4632 0.9793 0.9803
7.3.4 Anti-Forensics against Median Filtering Detection
For each forensic testing scenario, the same number of positive samples ((anti-forensic) MF
images) and negative samples (original images) are mixed for classification. Then, we can draw
the ROC curve, each point of which corresponds to a classification strategy by the detector.
Thereafter, an AUC value can be calculated to quantitatively evaluate the detector’s forensic
performance (or the forensic undetectability performance of the anti-forensic image).
We consider the median filtering forensic detectors listed in Table 3.3, and use the state-of-
the-art anti-forensic MF images listed in Table 3.4 for comparison. For the sake of conciseness,
we also use notations for referring to the processed MF images using the methods proposed
in this chapter. With the application of median filtering with s = 3 to the original image I,
the MF image M is generated, from which the following images are created:
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(a) Original (b) Noised
(c) Median filtered (d) Quality enhanced
Figure 7.4: Example results (close-up images) of an MFTE image. The original image (a)
is contaminated by some “salt & pepper” noise of density 3% to generate (b), which is then
median filtered to obtain (c), which is afterwards processed for quality enhancement using
the proposed method to create (d). Their oPSNR and oSSIM values are: (b) 20.8403 dB,
0.9009; (c) 25.1402 dB, 0.9343; (d) 26.5970 dB, 0.9636, respectively.
• Mp, with the application of the MF image quality enhancement method proposed in
Section 7.3.3 to the MF image M;
• M¯, with the application of the proposed pixel value perturbation (to be described in
Section 7.3.4.1) to the MF image M;
• F ′M , with the application of the proposed anti-forensic method in Section 7.3.1 (with
parameters properly tuned) to the MF image M;
• FM , with the application of the proposed anti-forensic method in Section 7.3.1 (with
parameters properly tuned) to the perturbed MF image M¯.
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7.3.4.1 Pixel Value Perturbation
From Table 7.2, it can be seen that the anti-forensic performance of the processed MF image
Mp using the proposed quality enhancement method in Section 7.3.3 has been improved,
compared to that of M. It implies the possibility of using the proposed framework described
in Section 7.3.1 for anti-forensic MF image creation. However, in practice, it needs more image
quality sacrifice for a further forensic undetectability improvement by pure image variational
deconvolution. This motivates us to firstly perform some pixel value perturbation on the MF
image before further processing.
Table 7.2: From the 2nd to the 5th rows, the average PSNR and SSIM values are reported.
The following 4 rows show the AUC values of different kinds of images against the 4 scalar-
based detectors [KF10, Cao+10, Yua11]. The average KL divergence values of the pixel value
difference histograms between the original images and the (quality enhanced) (anti-forensic)
MF images are listed in the last 4 rows. Results are obtained on MFTE dataset.
M Mp FMW FMD F ′M FM
Image quality
oPSNR 37.2847 38.2953 33.6033 33.4272 37.5526 37.5184
oSSIM 0.9831 0.9896 0.9552 0.9714 0.9902 0.9901
mPSNR − 43.2040 37.5618 36.4076 38.9635 38.8653
mSSIM − 0.9956 0.9713 0.9871 0.9899 0.9898
Anti-forensic
performance
KK 0.9722 0.7839 0.4592 0.5347 0.6633 0.5595
KˆK 0.9824 0.8375 0.6586 0.4635 0.6762 0.5061
KC 0.9938 0.8213 0.6668 0.7479 0.6690 0.6490
KY 0.9984 0.7922 0.3336 0.6518 0.6216 0.5886
KL divergence
f1 0.1632 0.0990 0.1148 0.0547 0.0571 0.0484
f2 0.1611 0.0949 0.1338 0.0563 0.0534 0.0449
f3 0.0775 0.0525 0.0619 0.0383 0.0314 0.0272
f4 0.0753 0.0495 0.0689 0.0389 0.0278 0.0238
The median filter is known to smooth the image, in a way creating (nearly) constant pixel
values in a certain neighborhood. This can be easily detected, by analyzing the first-order
pixel value difference, e.g., by detectors KK [KF10], KˆK [KF10], and KC [Cao+10]. Through
a careful analysis of the above mentioned detectors, we can see that their outputs are highly
related to the 0-valued first-order pixel value difference, especially in textured regions of the
image. Based on the above analysis and consideration, we propose to firstly perform some
minor pixel value perturbation to the MF image as the following.
In the horizontal direction, let us consider three adjacent pixels denoted as a triple
(yi+1,yi+2,yi+3). If yi+1 = yi+2 = yi+3, there will be two horizontal first-order pixel value
differences being 0, that are yi+2 − yi+1 and yi+3 − yi+2. This will directly contribute to the
h0 in Eq. (3.12), leading to a high detector output of KK which may classify the given image
as median filtered. A simple but efficient adjustment is to modify the central pixel yi+2 to
yi+2 ± 1. This effectively modifies the first-order statistics with a minor impact on the image
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quality. Similarly, we can also apply some modifications to adjacent pixel pair (yi+1,yi+2)
when yi+1 = yi+2. Based on the above analysis, we propose the following MF image pixel
value perturbation before it is further processed for anti-forensic purposes, in the horizontal
direction followed by that in the vertical direction:
1. In the currently achieved image, find all the adjacent pixel triples (yi+1,yi+2,yi+3),
where yi+1 = yi+2 = yi+3. Substitute yi+2 randomly with yi+2 + 1 or yi+2 − 1,
meanwhile make sure yi+1 and yi+3 will not be touched in the subsequent modification.
2. From the updated image, find all the adjacent pixel pairs (yi+1,yi+2), where yi+1 =
yi+2. Choose between yi+1 and yi+2 with a higher local variance, update the value of
the selected pixel by randomly incrementing or decrementing it by 1, meanwhile make
sure the other pixel is not altered. In order to avoid excessive modification to the first-
order pixel value difference histogram, only 30% of the equal-valued pixel pairs, with
the highest local variances, are processed.
7.3.4.2 Parameter Settings
The proposed median filtering anti-forensic method is to process the MF image obtained after
the pixel value perturbation M¯, via solving the image variational deconvolution problem in
Eq. (7.4). According to Section 7.3.2, we set ω = 0.1 and use the AVEE kernel for median
filtering anti-forensics. A parameter grid search is conducted to find a proper (λ, γ) combina-
tion, where λ ∈ {1000, 1500, · · · , 3000} and γ ∈ {300, 400, · · · , 800}. The goal is to look for a
setting which leads to a good tradeoff between forensic undetectability and image quality for
the created anti-forensic MF images.
With experiments carried out on MFTE100 dataset, Figures 7.5 and 7.6 report the varia-
tion trend of the forensic undetectability and the image quality, for different settings of (λ, γ).
In the existing median filtering anti-forensic work [FB12, WSL13, DN+13], the image quality
metrics are all calculated using the MF image as the reference. However, in various appli-
cations, such as denoising, hiding traces of JPEG blocking artifacts, the goal is to bring the
processed image as close as possible to the original image. In this thesis, we therefore consider
both the original image and the MF image as the references for image quality evaluation. Note
that, in order to get a quick overview of the anti-forensic performance of the anti-forensic MF
image, for now only the scalar-based detectors (KK [KF10], KˆK [KF10], KC [Cao+10], and
KY [Yua11]) are considered. As to the SVM-based detectors, the forensic undetectability of
the proposed method will be reported later.
From Figure 7.5, it can be seen that the image quality improves when λ decreases or γ
increases. Yet, when the value of γ is too big, the oSSIM metric suffers from some declines, and
this decrease goes faster for smaller λ values. Concerning the AUC metric, it is contradictory
with the image quality for detectorsKC andKY as shown in Figure 7.6. The AUC for Kirchner
and Fridrich’s detectors KK and KˆK does have a low value when the image quality is high.
However, note that the closer to 0.5 the AUC value is, the better forensic undetectability the









































































Figure 7.5: The average image quality evaluation metric values, for anti-forensic MF
images FM using the AVEE kernel with ω = 0.1, for different parameter combinations
(λ, γ). Results are obtained on MFTE100 dataset.
forgery achieves. A very low AUC value does not mean a better anti-forensic performance,
since one can flip the classification strategy to gain a high AUC value for the detector. Among
all the scalar-based median filtering detectors in consideration, it can be seen that detector
KC is the one relatively hard to be fooled. Using it as a baseline, we choose the parameter
setting with which the AUC value for KC is around 0.65 and the image quality is high. In
the end, λ = 1500 and γ = 500 are used as the final parameter setting for the median filtering
anti-forensic task.
Figure 7.7-(c) is an example anti-forensic MF image FM created using the proposed median
filtering anti-forensic method. With comparison to the MF image shown in Figure 7.7-(b), we
can see that the image quality has been improved and the image blurring has been mitigated.
Besides, Figure 7.7-(d) illustrates the ground-truth difference image between the original image
and the MF image. Figure 7.7-(e) shows the difference image of our anti-forensic MF image
with respect to the MF image. The two difference images -(d) and -(e) are rather visually
similar. It can also be seen that the proposed method, to some extent, is able to reproduce




































































Figure 7.6: The anti-forensic performance against scalar-based detectors KK [KF10], KˆK
[KF10], KC [Cao+10], and KY [Yua11], for anti-forensic MF images FM using the AVEE
kernel with ω = 0.1, for different parameter combinations (λ, γ). Results are obtained on
MFTE100 dataset.
the noise-like pattern of the median filtering difference, especially in the textured areas.
Even without the pixel value perturbation, another version of our anti-forensic MF image
F ′M is also capable of creating similar noise-like pattern in the difference image with respect
to the MF image shown in Figure 7.7-(e). We refrain from showing the corresponding result
due to the fact that it is hard to check the difference between |F ′M −M| and |FM −M| by
human naked eyes. This can also be inferred from the very small image quality metric value
differences between F ′M and FM (see Table 7.2). However, the median filtering anti-forensic
performance of FM is visibly improved compared with that of F ′M . We are aware that the
proposed pixel value perturbation strategy for generating M¯ is well designed for regularizing
the first-order pixel value differences 0 and ±1. Nevertheless, it can be seen that the pixel
value perturbation has very minor impact on the image quality, but is able to achieve better
forensic undetectability, especially for the specifically targeted detectors KK and KˆK [KF10].
Besides, the proposed pixel value perturbation is also capable of dragging the processed image
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(a) I (b) M (c) FM
(d) |I −M| (e) |FM −M|
Figure 7.7: Example results (close-up images) of an MFTE image. For a better visibility
of the difference images shown in (d) and (e), we have taken logarithm of the pixel value
differences and afterwards carried out a normalization.
out from the detection regions of other detectors to some extent (see results for KC [Cao+10]
and KY [Yua11] in Table 7.2). Moreover, the merit of the proposed pixel value perturbation
can be found in the further pixel value difference histogram restoration capability (see the KL
divergence results in Table 7.2).
Dang-Nguyen et al. [DN+13] have shown the superiority of their anti-forensic method
over Fontani and Barni’s [FB12]. We therefore refrain from the comparison with Fontani and
Barni’s pioneer method [FB12]. For a fairer comparison with the other two state-of-the-art
median filtering anti-forensic methods [WSL13, DN+13], we tune certain parameter(s) of their
algorithms on the new forensic dataset MFTE, and choose the setting having a good tradeoff
between forensic undetectability and image quality. Figure 7.8 shows the image quality and
anti-forensic performance variations with respect to a threshold parameter T (see [DN+13]
for details) of Dang-Nguyen et al.’s [DN+13] method. We choose T = 2 as the final setting,
which is in accord with Dang-Nguyen et al.’s choice, though a different image dataset is in
use. A similar strategy is applied for the parameter setting of Wu et al.’s method. For the
sake of brevity, the results are not shown here. Specifically, the threshold for the noise is 3,
the correction factor is 0.1, and the block size is 7× 7 (see [WSL13] for details).
















































Figure 7.8: Anti-forensic performance against the scalar-based detectors [KF10, Cao+10,
Yua11] and image quality of FMD [DN+13], with respect to different settings of the parameter
T . Results are obtained on MFTE100 dataset.
7.3.4.3 Performance Evaluation and Comparison
Table 7.2 reports the performance comparison of different kinds of (quality enhanced) (anti-
forensic) MF images. ROC curves of anti-forensic MF images against the four scalar-based
detectors [KF10, Cao+10, Yua11] are shown in Figure 7.9: among all the existing median
filtering anti-forensic methods, ours is able to bring the ROC curves the closest to the random
guess. Besides a better overall anti-forensic performance against existing scalar-based median
filtering detectors, our anti-forensic MF image FM also outperforms Wu et al.’s FMW [WSL13]
and Dang-Nguyen et al.’s FMD [DN+13] in terms of image quality. Moreover, it is worth
noticing that our anti-forensic MF image FM also achieves even higher average oPSNR and
oSSIM values than the MF image M on MFTE dataset. It means that the proposed median
filtering anti-forensic method is not only able to disguise the median filtering traces, but is
also capable of improving the visual quality of the MF image at the same time.





















































































































Figure 7.9: ROC curves of the MF image M, Wu et al.’s anti-forensic MF image FMW
[WSL13], Dang-Nguyen et al.’s anti-forensic MF image FMD [DN+13], and our anti-forensic
MF image FM , against the four scalar-based median filtering detectors KK [KF10], KˆK
[KF10], KC [Cao+10], and KY [Yua11]. Results are obtained on MFTE dataset.
Existing median filtering forensic work either explicitly or implicitly analyzes the pixel
value difference. Therefore, besides the forensic undetectability and image quality, it is also
important to recover the pixel value difference statistics for median filtering anti-forensics.
This can be quantitatively evaluated, via the KL divergence (see Section 2.2.3 for more de-
scriptions) between the derivative histogram of the original image and that of the image under
examination. A smaller value of KL divergence means a better resemblance between the two
compared histograms. We consider four derivative filters f1, f2, f3, and f4. For each image
under investigation, each type of derivative histogram is constructed and compared with that
of the original image using the KL divergence. The average KL divergence values between
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the original image and different kinds of images for different kinds of derivative histograms
are reported in the last four rows of Table 7.2. It can be seen that the proposed method has
the ability to bring the pixel value difference histogram closer to that of the original image
than the two state-of-the-art methods [WSL13, DN+13]. This proves the pixel value differ-
ence statistics restoration capability of the image prior we use in the proposed optimization
problem. It is also an interesting point that the proposed pixel value perturbation strategy is
capable of bringing the derivative histogram of the anti-forensic MF image FM even closer to
that of the original image than the other version of our anti-forensic MF image F ′M .
Concerning the SVM-based detectors, we follow the testing strategy described in Sec-
tion 2.2.1.2. For a given original image, a square central part of the image is re-
placed by the (anti-forensic) MF image with a replacement rate around the values in
{0.05, 0.1, 0.15, 0.2, 0.3, 0.4, 0.5, 0.6, 0.8, 1} to create the image forgery. The processed images
together with the original images are put together for forensic training/testing. The training is
carried out using LIBSVM [CL11] with a Gaussian kernel on dataset MFTR. The parameters
of the SVM classifier is obtained using a five-fold cross validation with the multiplicative grid
suggested in [PBF10]. The testing is carried out on dataset MFTE. Thereafter, for each image
replacement rate, each kind of (anti-forensic) MF image, and each kind of SVM-based median
filtering forensic detector, a ROC curve can be plotted and an AUC value can be calculated.
The AUC curve as a function of the replacement rate is plotted in Figure 7.10 by different
kinds of images and different kinds of SVM-based detectors.
The effectiveness of existing SVM-based median filtering forensic detectors [PBF10, Yua11,
CNH13, Kan+13, Zha+14] in discriminating (anti-forensic) MF images from the original im-
ages can be evaluated when the replacement rate is 1. From Figure 7.10, it can be seen that
they all perform excellently, and are able to achieve AUC values around 1, namely perfect
classification. Except for detector KS10AR [Kan+13], our anti-forensic MF image FM achieves
the best forensic undetectability against the considered SVM-based detectors among all kinds
of (anti-forensic) MF images. Moreover, the performance of our forgery FM is quite stable,
yielding AUC values almost at the same level for the same replacement rate for different SVM-
based detectors. When the replacement rate is about 0.1, our anti-forensic MF image FM is
able to achieve AUC values lower than 0.65 for all considered SVM-based detectors. In this
case, we can safely replace a 162×162 block in a 512×512 MFTE image. We remain reserved
on whether our anti-forensic MF image is able to pass off as never median filtered, since it
can be detected by machine learning based forensic methods, when the replacement rate is
relatively high. However, it can still find many applications in various anti-forensic scenarios,
e.g., image splicing and tampering with relatively low replacement rate.






















































































Figure 7.10: The AUC value as a function of image replacement rate for different kinds of
(anti-forensic) MF images, when tested using the SVM-based detectors. Results are obtained
on MFTE dataset, with detectors trained on MFTR dataset.
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7.4 Applications: Disguising Footprints of Both Median Fil-
tering and Targeted Image Operation of Median Filtering
Processing
Median filtering is chosen by many forgers to disguise footprints left by certain image pro-
cessing operations, e.g., image resampling [KR08], and JPEG compression [SL11]. Median
filtering anti-forensics further tries to remove the footprints caused by the filtering itself. It is
important that median filtering anti-forensics does not impair the trace removal effects of the
filtering initially applied, while keeping a high quality of the processed image.
7.4.1 Hiding Traces of Image Resampling
It is a very likely scenario for a forger, e.g., during a composite image forgery creation, to use
the scaling operation. Thus, image resampling is often involved in creating fake images. On the
forensic investigation side, Popescu and Farid [PF05] proposed a powerful resampling forensic
detector (denoted as KP ), by examining the periodic correlations between pixel neighbors.
Standing on the image resampling anti-forensic side, Kirchner and Röhme [KR08] developed
a technique which was able to fool KP [PF05], via attacks based on median filtering and
geometric distortion.
As in [PF05], we use bicubic interpolation for image resampling, and the factors in use are
randomly selected from {0.7, 0.8, 0.9, 1.1, 1.2}. The 3× 3 median filtering alone (without geo-
metric distortion applied) works well under these scaling factors, for resampling anti-forensic
purposes [KR08].
For the sake of conciseness, we create different anti-forensic images from the resampled
image R as follows:
• Rm, median filtered with window size s = 3;
• Rw, with the application of Wu et al.’s [WSL13] median filtering anti-forensic method
to Rm;
• Rd, with the application of Dang-Nguyen et al.’s [DN+13] median filtering anti-forensic
method to Rm;
• Rf , with the application of the proposed median filtering anti-forensic method to Rm.
Table 7.3 reports the image quality and forensic undetectability against Popescu and
Farid’s resampling forensic detector [PF05] and the scalar-based median filtering detectors
[KF10, Cao+10, Yua11], for different kinds of anti-forensic MF images created from the re-
sampled image R. Moreover, the 5 SVM-based median filtering detectors are also tested,
following the experimental setup described in Section 2.2.1.2. Figure 7.11 plots the achieved
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AUC values by different kinds of images, against different SVM-based median filtering forensic
detectors at different replacement rates.
Table 7.3: From the 2nd to the 5th rows, the average PSNR and SSIM values are reported
for different kinds of images in the resampling traces hiding application. The last 5 rows
show the AUC values of different kinds of images against the resampling detector [PF05] and
the 4 scalar-based median filtering detectors [KF10, Cao+10, Yua11]. Results are obtained
on MFTE dataset.
R Rm Rw Rd Rf
Image quality
rPSNR − 37.9091 33.7600 33.3101 37.2413
rSSIM − 0.9749 0.9391 0.9711 0.9894
mrPSNR 37.9091 − 37.5393 36.3006 38.8262
mrSSIM 0.9749 − 0.9618 0.9870 0.9896
Anti-forensic
performance
KP 0.8643 0.6818 0.9834 0.5001 0.6495
KK 0.3775 0.9672 0.4289 0.5129 0.5364
KˆK 0.2792 0.9782 0.6113 0.4422 0.4599
KC 0.4834 0.9929 0.6511 0.7356 0.6386
KY 0.5096 0.9984 0.3212 0.6424 0.5876
Since the resampling changes the pixel locations, it is not straightforward to calculate the
image quality metric values with the original image as the reference. Hence, the resampled
image (for “rPSNR” and “rSSIM”) and the median filtered resampled image (for “mrPSNR” and
“mrSSIM”) are used as the references. Table 7.3 shows the superiority of the proposed method
in keeping a good image quality. Our forgery Rf achieves 4.34 dB of rPSNR enhancement and
0.0443 of rSSIM gain compared with Rw, and 4.53 dB of rPSNR improvement and 0.0219 of
rSSIM increase compared with Rd. Using the image quality evaluation metrics mrPSNR and
mrSSIM, our forgery Rf also outperforms Rw [WSL13] and Rd [DN+13]. Moreover, both the
average rPSNR and rSSIM values of Rf are even higher than the median filtered image Rm.
Concerning Popescu and Farid’s resampling detector KP [PF05], it can be seen that both
Dang-Nguyen et al.’s [DN+13] and the proposed median filtering anti-forensic methods can
even reinforce the anti-forensic ability of median filtering in hiding resampling traces. This
is reflected by the even lower AUC values of detector KP , compared with that of Rm (see
Table 7.3). However, our forgery can achieve a better overall forensic undetectability against
the median filtering detectors than Rd [DN+13] (see results in Table 7.3 and Figure 7.11).
Wu et al.’s forgery Rw can be well detected by KP . Recall that their method is based on
the noise attack to the pixel value difference. In their approach, the given image is divided
into non-overlapping blocks, each of which has an anchor point as the reference of the noise
attack to alter the pixel value differences. This block-wise pixel modification may invoke
the appearance of new periodicity of pixel neighbor correlation, which consequently can be
detected by KP . A randomized anchor point selection may be a possible improvement to this
approach, which however is beyond the scope of this thesis.






















































































Figure 7.11: The AUC value as a function of image replacement rate for different kinds
of images, when tested using the SVM-based median filtering forensic detectors, in the
resampling traces hiding application. Results are obtained on MFTE dataset, with detectors
trained on MFTR dataset.
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7.4.2 Removing JPEG Blocking Artifacts
We have studied JPEG anti-forensics in Chapters 4-6. As known, two kinds of artifacts present
in JPEG images, i.e., the DCT-domain quantization artifacts and the spatial-domain blocking
artifacts, which are often utilized for JPEG forensic purposes. The consistent discontinuities
across 8 × 8 block borders, i.e., the JPEG blocking artifacts, can be detected by detectors
KF [FD03], K1U and K
2
U (see Table 3.1). In one state-of-the-art JPEG anti-forensic method
[Sta+10a, Sta+10b, SL11], Stamm and Liu separated the task of disguising the JPEG foot-
prints into two steps: adding a dithering signal to smooth the DCT histogram followed by
a median filtering based JPEG blocking artifact removal procedure. During the second step,
they proposed a JPEG deblocking process consisting of a median filtering and a small-energy
0-mean white Gaussian noise addition (see Section 3.1.5 for more descriptions).
In order to purely study the footprint concealing capability of median filtering, here we
apply the median filtering directly to JPEG images without the noise attack. The JPEG
compression quality factors in use are randomly selected from {85, 86, · · · , 95}. We find that
for JPEG images with quality factors in this set, the median filtering alone can perform very
well in concealing JPEG blocking artifacts.
We use the following notations to refer to different anti-forensic images created from the
JPEG image J :
• Jm, median filtered with s = 3;
• J w, with the application of Wu et al.’s [WSL13] median filtering anti-forensic method
to Jm;
• J d, with the application of Dang-Nguyen et al.’s [DN+13] median filtering anti-forensic
method to Jm;
• J f , with the application of the proposed median filtering anti-forensic method to Jm.
The average image quality and anti-forensic performance against JPEG blocking detectors
and scalar-based median filtering detectors are reported in Table 7.4. At different replacement
rates, the AUC values achieved by different anti-forensic images tested against 5 SVM-based
median filtering detectors are shown in Figure 7.12. Note that “mjPSNR” and “mjSSIM”
respectively stand for the PSNR and SSIM metrics, when the median filtered JPEG image
is used as the reference. It can be seen that our forgery FM is able to achieve a better
overall forensic undetectability against the median filtering detectors than J w [WSL13], and
J d [DN+13]. As to JPEG blocking artifacts hiding, all the three kinds of anti-forensic MF
images are able to even further decrease the AUC values of detectors KF [FD03], K1U , and K
2
U
[Fan+13a]. However, the price for J w and J d is an evident image degradation: an oPSNR
loss of 3.58 dB and 3.78 dB compared to Jm on average, respectively. As to our forgery J f ,
not only a good overall forensic undetectability is guaranteed, but also an oPSNR gain of 0.15
dB and a slight oSSIM increase are achieved, compared with Jm. Moreover, the mjPSNR and
150 Chapter 7. Median Filtered Image Quality Enhancement and Anti-Forensics
mjSSIM values achieved by our forgery J f are also both higher than those of J w [WSL13]
and J d [DN+13].
Table 7.4: From the 2nd to the 5th rows, the average PSNR and SSIM values are reported
for different kinds of images in the JPEG blocking artifacts removing application. The last
7 rows show the AUC values of different kinds of images against JPEG blocking detectors
[FD03] and the 4 scalar-based median filtering detectors [KF10, Cao+10, Yua11]. Results
are obtained on MFTE dataset.
J Jm J w J d J f
Image quality
oPSNR 42.9742 37.0888 33.5111 33.3101 37.2413
oSSIM 0.9975 0.9830 0.9549 0.9711 0.9894
mjPSNR 37.6087 − 37.4983 36.3006 38.8262
mjSSIM 0.9838 − 0.9710 0.9870 0.9896
Anti-forensic
performance
KF 0.9930 0.6128 0.6321 0.4945 0.6003
K1U 0.9871 0.7151 0.5709 0.6255 0.5168
K2U 0.8937 0.5288 0.5363 0.5274 0.4754
KK 0.3895 0.9659 0.4109 0.5035 0.5137
KˆK 0.2699 0.9786 0.6061 0.4256 0.4489
KC 0.3990 0.9924 0.6369 0.7230 0.6244
KY 0.4985 0.9986 0.3225 0.6489 0.5976
7.5 Summary
In this chapter, we continue the research line of leveraging on image restoration to design
median filtering anti-forensic method, similar to what we did in JPEG anti-forensics in Chap-
ters 4-6. More specifically, we have proposed an image variational deconvolution framework,
which can serve as an MF image quality enhancement method as well as an MF image anti-
forensic approach. Indeed, a single convolution filter is used to approximate the spatially
heterogeneous median filter. It may appear to be somewhat irrational but makes the problem
solvable, and in practice yields good results. The image prior adopts the generalized Gaussian
distribution to model image derivatives. It is a simple yet especially suitable prior for MF
image quality enhancement and anti-forensics. The median filter largely alters the statistics
in the pixel value difference domain, whereas the proposed prior is able to well regularize the
pixel value difference histogram, which is proven in experiments by a low KL divergence value
with respect to the histogram of the original image.
For anti-forensic purposes, a pixel value perturbation strategy is proposed to process the
MF image in advance, with a very minor impact on the visual quality of the final forgery.
Experimental results show that our anti-forensic MF image outperforms the state-of-the-art
anti-forensic MF images in terms of forensic undetectability, with an even higher image quality













































































Figure 7.12: The AUC value as a function of image replacement rate for different kinds
of images, when tested using the SVM-based median filtering forensic detectors, in the
JPEG blocking artifacts removing application. Results are obtained on MFTE dataset,
with detectors trained on MFTR dataset.
filtering anti-forensic method is effective in applications of disguising image resampling traces




8.1 Summary of Contributions
In this thesis, we have presented our research work on image anti-forensics to JPEG com-
pression and median filtering. During our study of image anti-forensics concerning image
coding/processing, we notice that it to some extent shares some similarities with image restora-
tion. Both of them aim to recover the information lost during the image degradation to the
utmost. However, besides image quality, image anti-forensics has an additional indispensable
goal, i.e., good forensic undetectability of the anti-forensic image against forensic detectors.
To this end, we introduce some advanced concepts/methods from image restoration to de-
sign new anti-forensic methods, meanwhile integrating some anti-forensic strategies/terms.
Experimental results demonstrate that the proposed anti-forensic methods outperform the
state-of-the-art methods in creating anti-forensic images with better forensic undetectability
against existing forensic detectors as well as a higher visual quality of the processed image.
Though image restoration itself is not our main research topic in this thesis, we also pro-
pose two image quality enhancement methods for JPEG compression and median filtering,
respectively. They serve as the preliminary step of the proposed anti-forensic methods, but
are also proven to have good performance in terms of PSNR and SSIM gains compared with
the JPEG/MF image.
The contributions of this thesis are summarized as follows.
Proposing a new research line of designing image anti-forensics via image restora-
tion: After conducting the literature review, we find that it is a common way to use simple
image processing for hiding traces left by a targeted operation to design image anti-forensics.
For example, median filtering is used for JPEG anti-forensics to remove blocking artifacts.
Noise injection is used to hide traces of median filtering. These methods can be effective in
attacking targeted forensic detectors, however can also be detected by more advanced detec-
tors. Moreover, the resulting anti-forensic image suffers from a low visual quality, which may
spontaneously cause the doubt upon its authenticity. In this thesis, we propose a new research
line of designing image anti-forensics leveraging on advanced concepts/methods from image
restoration. Given a degraded image processed by an irreversible image processing operation,
e.g., JPEG compression and median filtering, the objective of image anti-forensics is to hide
the relevant image processing traces meanwhile maintaining a good image quality of the anti-
forensic image. Based on the similarities between image anti-forensics and image restoration,
the introduced optimization framework/terms from image restoration help to partly remove
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the traces, while keeping a good (sometimes even higher) image quality compared with the
given degraded image. Good anti-forensic performance of the image is achieved by adding
anti-forensic terms to the optimization framework or using additional anti-forensic strategies.
We follow this research line throughout this thesis for JPEG anti-forensics as well as median
filtering anti-forensics. Its superiority over state-of-the-art anti-forensic methods is well proven
by experimental results, with a better forensic undetectability and a higher image quality of
the processed image. To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to conduct image anti-
forensics following this research direction. We also hope this new research line would be useful
in more image anti-forensic problems when image coding/processing is involved, e.g., image
resampling, contrast enhancement, etc.
JPEG anti-forensics using TV-based deblocking: We have proposed a JPEG anti-
forensic method using the TV-based deblocking method. This is implemented by optimizing
a constrained TV-based minimization problem with a TV term and a TV-based blocking
measurement term. Meanwhile, the visual quality of the processed image is controlled by a
modified QCS projection. Moreover, the powerful calibration based detector is defeated by
minimizing a cost function close to the calibration based JPEG forensic feature. This method
has good performance in spatial-domain JPEG blocking artifacts removal. Besides, the DCT-
domain quantization artifacts are also largely mitigated, to the extent that the anti-forensic
JPEG image is able to pass off as never compressed under the examination of quantization
artifacts detectors.
Improved JPEG anti-forensics with perceptual DCT histogram smoothing: Indeed,
the previously proposed TV-based JPEG deblocking method is able to achieve good foren-
sic undetectability against all existing JPEG forensic detectors including the ones examining
quantization artifacts. However, the DCT histogram is still not always well smoothed espe-
cially in the mid-frequency subbands. This weakness is not exposed by existing JPEG forensic
detectors, yet may be detected by potential, more advanced forensic algorithms. In order to
tackle this problem, we have proposed a four-step improved JPEG anti-forensic method with
perceptual DCT histogram smoothing. With the help of the partly recovered DCT coefficients
after the TV-based deblocking, an adaptive local dithering method is proposed by combining
the Laplacian distribution and the uniform distribution. DCT coefficients are modified by
solving a simplified assignment problem which minimizes the SSIM loss in the spatial do-
main. A mild second-round TV-based deblocking and de-calibration are performed to further
improve the forensic undetectability with a very minor image quality loss.
JPEG image quality enhancement and anti-forensics using a sophisticated image
prior model: We have proposed another JPEG anti-forensic method based on a sophisticated
image prior model, which are described by steps in the following.
• JPEG image quality enhancement with a sophisticated image prior model : The effective-
ness of using TV in JPEG anti-forensics motivates us to seek more sophisticated image
prior models, with the hope to further push the performance of JPEG anti-forensics.
To this end, we use the EPLL framework with the GMM as the image prior model
for overlapping image patches. The spatial-domain compression noise is modeled using
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the multivariate 0-mean Gaussian model, for which 64 kinds of covariance matrices are
learned for each quality factor. Therefore, a JPEG image quality enhancement method
has been proposed by minimizing the cost function considering the above two terms.
The quality enhanced JPEG image can be obtained by solving an optimization prob-
lem using one step of approximate MAP estimation. This method achieves good image
quality gain for JPEG images, especially for very low bit-rate compression.
• Calibration based non-parametric DCT histogram smoothing : Compared with our pre-
viously proposed perceptual DCT histogram smoothing method, we also have proposed
another calibration based DCT histogram smoothing procedure without using any statis-
tical model. Based on the translation invariance of image statistics and the effectiveness
of calibration, the DCT-domain quantization noise can be estimated by slightly cropping
the quality enhanced JPEG image and recompressing the calibrated image. The DCT
histogram is smoothed by adding the estimated DCT-domain quantization noise back to
the quality enhanced JPEG image. This new, non-parametric DCT histogram smooth-
ing method does not achieve a better overall performance but has better performance
in the low-frequency DCT subbands than the perceptual DCT histogram smoothing
method. Moreover, the former has a much lower computation cost than the latter.
• Forensic undetectability is considered by minimizing a cost function with an image fi-
delity term, an EPLL-based image prior term, and several anti-forensic terms inspired
from existing forensic algorithms.
To recapitulate, the proposed quality enhancement method is proven by experiments on 4
classical test images and on UCIDTest dataset to improve the visual quality of the JPEG
image. Indeed, the proposed anti-forensic method needs improvement, however still outper-
forms Stamm et al.’s method [Sta+10a, Sta+10b, SL11] in terms of forensic undetectability
and visual quality of the processed image.
Median filtered image quality enhancement and anti-forensics via variational de-
convolution: We have proposed an MAP-based image variational deconvolution framework
for both median filtered image quality enhancement and anti-forensics. The median filtering
process is approximated using a convolution kernel. Besides, we also hope the processed MF
image is still to some extent close to the MF image, retaining some median filtering effects
such as denoising or artifacts hiding for other image operations. As to the image prior, the
generalized Gaussian distribution is used to model the pixel value difference whose statistics
changes largely after the image is median filtered. Based on the above consideration, the
proposed minimization cost function is formed by a convolution term, a fidelity term with
respect to the MF image, and a prior term. The quality enhanced MF image can be obtained
by solving the proposed minimization problem, with good visual quality gain compared to
the MF image. With another parameter setting and an additional pixel value perturbation
procedure, the anti-forensic MF image is also generated. It is able to achieve a better forensic
undetectability against existing median filtering forensic detectors and a higher image quality,
compared with the state-of-the-art anti-forensic MF images.
In summary, the main characteristic/novelty of this thesis is to introduce advanced
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concepts/methods from image restoration to design image anti-forensics, when image cod-
ing/processing is involved. More specifically, we have designed JPEG anti-forensics and me-
dian filtering anti-forensics, leveraging on the following elements from image restoration: the
TV, the EPLL framework with GMM as the prior model for overlapping image patches, the
MAP-based image deconvolution framework. For a given specific image anti-forensic problem,
some anti-forensic terms/strategies are integrated for defeating existing detectors. For JPEG
compression, a TV-based blocking measurement term is used for JPEG deblocking purposes.
Moreover, two DCT histogram smoothing methods are also proposed to remove DCT-domain
quantization artifacts: a perceptual DCT histogram smoothing procedure conducted by build-
ing an adaptive local dithering model and solving a simplified assignment problem, and a
non-parametric DCT histogram smoothing method based on calibration. Some anti-forensic
terms inspired from existing forensic algorithms are also integrated into the MAP-based opti-
mization framework, for fooling relevant forensic detectors. As to median filtering, the image
prior model is specifically chosen to regularize the image pixel value differences, which are ei-
ther explicitly or implicitly examined in existing forensic algorithms. Moreover, a pixel value
perturbation procedure is also proposed to further improve the forensic undetectability with
very minor visual quality loss of the processed image.
8.2 Perspectives
In the short term, the perspectives of this thesis include the performance improvement of
anti-forensics, and applying the research line of leveraging on image restoration to design
algorithms to solve other suitable image anti-forensic problems. Please see the following for
more detailed descriptions.
Improvement of JPEG anti-forensics to generate the anti-forensic image with an
even higher quality than the JPEG image: In Chapters 4-5, the TV is employed from
image restoration to JPEG anti-forensics. The TV can be considered as a simple but ef-
fective image prior. Chapter 6 presents the natural follow-up work on JPEG anti-forensics,
where a more sophisticated image prior model than the TV is used. However, the new JPEG
anti-forensic method does not outperform the ones based on the TV. Analysis and possible
underlying reasons are provided in the end of Sections 6.3 and 6.4. However, we can still
see the effectiveness of the proposed JPEG quality enhancement method based on the EPLL
framework with the GMM as the image prior model. A challenging but very interesting JPEG
anti-forensic problem is whether we are able to create anti-forensic JPEG image with an even
higher visual quality than the JPEG image. A possible research direction could be the combi-
nation of the JPEG image quality enhancement, the TV-based deblocking, and the perceptual
smoothing of DCT histogram. In fact, a similar goal has already been achieved in Chapter 7
for median filtering anti-forensics: the anti-forensic MF image is created with an even higher
visual quality than the MF image on MFTE dataset.
Development of other image anti-forensic methods leveraging on image restora-
tion: In this thesis, we choose to work on JPEG compression and median filtering anti-
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forensics. In image processing, there are various other image operations whose anti-forensics
may also be formulated as ill-posed inverse problems. For example, image resampling anti-
forensics may share some similarities with superresolution [PPK03]. Image contrast enhance-
ment anti-forensics may be related to the estimation of pixel brightness transform [ZL14]. Ide-
ally, a good performance of the anti-forensic method can be achieved if these concepts/methods
from image restoration are well combined with some anti-forensic terms/strategies.
In the long term, one of the ultimate goals of image forensics and anti-forensics is to
develop universal methods without targeting at a specific (set of) anti-forensic methods or
forensic algorithms. This is to avoid the endless cat-and-mouse chasing between forensics and
anti-forensics. Though the research work of image (anti-)forensics has been going on for over a
decade, there are very few universal methods. Probably the only universal image anti-forensic
method is the one proposed by Barni et al. [BFT12]. However, they also make the assumption
that the forensic detectors examine the first-order statistics only. We are aware that the
proposed anti-forensic methods all belong to the “targeted” category according to Böhme and
Kirchner’s [BK13] classification of image anti-forensics (see Section 2.1.5). However, we believe
the proposed anti-forensic methods have the potential to be further generalized for developing
universal image anti-forensics.
Universal image anti-forensics: In Chapters 6-7, the MAP-based optimization problems
are proposed to perform JPEG anti-forensics and median filtering anti-forensics, respectively.
The universality of the variational image restoration framework can be seen through these
two problems. When it concerns image coding/processing, the objective of anti-forensics is to
create anti-forensic images that are as “natural” as possible. To this end, the “natural” image
generation problem can be formulated as an image restoration problem and use statistical
methods, such as MAP estimate, to obtain an image that appears never processed. Under
this framework, a good enough image prior model is indispensable. Moreover, the likelihood
term, describing the image degradation process caused by a certain image operation, should
vary according to different anti-forensic problems. The “universality” here is that the anti-
forensic framework is generic, which can be used to hide the traces left by various image
processing operations.
Besides, some other open research problems closely related to this thesis are listed as
follows:
• Is it possible to design a single step attack for JPEG anti-forensics, considering multiple
forensic detectors working in different domains?
• How can we estimate the spatially heterogeneous convolution kernel for median filtering?
• Is it possible to create anti-forensic image, so that it as a whole can pass off as never
processed by machine learning based forensic detectors trained on the original images
and anti-forensic images?
These questions also point out a few interesting future research directions in the vast domain
of image anti-forensics. Moreover, concerning the close link between digital images and digital
158 Chapter 8. Conclusions
videos, the proposed image anti-forensic methods to JPEG compression and median filtering
may also contribute to video anti-forensics.
In this thesis, we conduct the study on JPEG anti-forensics and median filtering anti-
forensics following the research line of leveraging on image restoration. These two specific
image anti-forensic problems just constitute a small fraction of image anti-forensics. We are
also aware that this newly formed research line may be only applied to image anti-forensic
problems, where image coding/processing is involved. For other image anti-forensic problems,
e.g., attacking physically based or geometric-based [Far09a] forensic algorithms, this research
line may be invalid. For example, in our lighting-based image anti-forensic work [Fan+12], a
very different research line is followed.
In conclusion, for image anti-forensic problems involving image coding/processing, we
believe that natural image statistics is essential in creating the anti-forensic image with
good forensic undetectability as well as a high visual quality. To this end, some ad-
vanced concepts/methods from image restoration are introduced to combine with anti-forensic
terms/strategies in this thesis for JPEG anti-forensics and median filtering anti-forensics.
From our image anti-forensic research work conducted following this research line, we can
catch a glimpse of the enormous potential of natural image statistics in image anti-forensics,
image forensics and image restoration. Böhme and Kirchner [BK13] also point out the im-
portance of natural image statistical model in the battle between forensics and anti-forensics.
Therefore, despite of much room for improvement, we hope that our work can serve as a good
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A.1 Introduction
A.1.1 Pouvez-vous croire vos yeux ?
Voir c’est croire.
Une image vaut mille mots.
(a) Originale (b) Modifiée21
Figure A.1: (a) L’original : La Jeune Fille à la Perle, Vermeer (ca. 1665), et (b) la version
falsifiée dans laquelle les écouteurs, un produit de la technologie moderne, ont été intégrés
numériquement par l’utilisateur bigchopper du site Worth1000.
On a coutume de dire que voir c’est croire, ou qu’une image vaut mille mots. C’est peut-
être pourquoi l’image est l’un des médias les plus couramment utilisés sur Internet. Selon
le rapport annuel Mary Meeker sur les tendances d’Internet [Mar], plus de 1,8 milliards de
photos sont téléchargées et partagées sur Internet chaque jour ! Les images numériques sont
littéralement omniprésentes, et on leur fait souvent aveuglément confiance. Cependant, cette
confiance est constamment remise en cause par le développement de caméras à haute définition
et de logiciels de retouche puissants. Dans la figure A.1-(b), La Jeune Fille à la Perle, peint
21Cette image était téléchargée depuis : http://www.worth1000.com/entries/740270/girl-with-the-
beats.
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par Johannes Vermeer au XVIIèmes., le personnage semble apprécier la musique provenant
d’écouteurs pourtant commercialisés au XXIèmes.
Aujourd’hui encore plus qu’hier, nous avons besoin de voir plus profondément qu’avec nos
yeux pour démêler le vrai du faux dans une image.
Créer de fausses images visuellement plausibles est devenu de moins en moins difficile,
et notre confiance dans les images numériques est progressivement érodée par le développe-
ment des technologies modernes de l’information car des images falsifiées, pouvant facilement
tromper les yeux humains, apparaissent de plus en plus fréquemment. Malheureusement, ce
n’est pas toujours dans un but aussi innocent que le pur amusement visiblement ressenti par
l’auteur de la figure A.1-(b). La falsification d’image peut aussi et surtout être malveillante,
tant dans la sphère publique que dans la vie privée – et la frontière toujours plus floue entre
les deux souligne l’acuité du problème. Fourandsix Technologies, Inc. maintient une galerie
d’images22, qui recense les faux les plus notables travers l’Histoire. Parmi ces faux, certains
étaient assez dommageables pour causer de sévères pertes financières, ou même impacter néga-
tivement l’ensemble de la société.
Le doute qui devrait toujours légitimement entacher les images numériques a donné
naissance à la criminalistique, qui essaye de rétablir une certaine confiance dans les im-
ages numériques. Les objectifs principaux de la criminalistique sont d’analyser une image
numérique de manière à détecter si elle est authentique ou non, d’identifier son origine, de
retracer l’histoire des traitements qu’elle a subis, ou de révéler les détails cachés invisibles pour
des yeux humains [Fou].
Au cours de la dernière décennie, les chercheurs ont proposé différentes techniques en
criminalistique d’image. Dans un premier temps, le tatouage fragile d’image était le choix le
plus populaire pour l’authentification d’image. Dans la littérature, le tatouage fragile est en
effet considéré comme relevant de la criminalistique active [Con11]. Le tatouage intègre les
informations d’authentification dans l’image quand elle est capturée ou avant sa transmission.
Par la suite, l’image peut être authentifiée si le filigrane extrait correspond à celui embarqué.
L’image sera considérée comme fausse si l’extraction de filigrane échoue ou si l’information
extraite ne correspond pas à celle qui avait été insérée. Dans ce scénario, un dispositif spé-
cial d’acquisition d’image est nécessaire. De fait, l’idée de la caméra de confiance, équipée
d’un système de tatouage, a été proposée dès 1993 [Fri93]. Cependant, son déploiement dans
l’industrie a rencontré de nombreuses difficultés, qui restent actuellement encore à résoudre.
Tout d’abord, il est apparemment difficile pour les différents fabricants d’appareils de prise
de vue de parvenir à un accord sur un protocole standard commun. Par ailleurs, les con-
sommateurs peuvent trouver qu’il est inacceptable de diminuer la qualité visuelle de l’image
par l’insertion d’un filigrane. En outre, si le système de tatouage à l’intérieur de la caméra
devait un jour être piraté, il deviendrait obsolète du jour au lendemain sans possibilité aisée
d’assurer une quelconque rétro-compatibilité avec une nouvelle version corrigeant la faille de
sécurité. Un exemple de tentative de réalisation de ce type de caméra dans l’industrie est
l’Aigo V80PLUS [Aig], commercialisée par Beijing Huaqi Digital Information Technology Co.,
22Disponible à la page http://www.fourandsix.com/photo-tampering-history/.
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Ltd en 2005. Dans cet appareil, un système de filigrane numérique est inclus, qui insère les in-
formations d’authentification dans l’image au moment de l’enregistrement. Pourtant, l’usage
de la caméra de confiance reste marginal, en raison des préoccupations décrites précédemment.
Conscient des limites de la criminalistique active, les chercheurs tournent progressive-
ment leur attention vers la criminalistique passive [Far09a, Con11]. En comparaison avec
l’authentification d’image par tatouage fragile, la criminalistique passive vise à évaluer de
manière aveugle l’authenticité d’une image donnée, sans aucune autre information a priori
(comme peut par exemple l’être un filigrane). L’hypothèse ici est que si l’on peut facilement
créer de fausses images sans laisser de traces visuelles, la falsification d’image perturbera par
contre très probablement les propriétés statistiques intrinsèques de l’image authentique. Par
conséquent, nous choisissons de détecter une manipulation d’image en examinant l’incohérence
ou la déviation de statistiques sous-jacentes d’une image. Dans la littérature, la “ criminal-
istique passive ” est souvent appelée “ criminalistique ”. Dans la suite de ce document, nous
omettrons également l’épithète pour des raisons de concision. De la même manière, nous
omettrons souvent le fait qu’il s’agisse ici systématiquement de criminalistique d’image, les
éventuelles exceptions seront rendues évidentes par le contexte.
La criminalistique en imagerie numérique est devenue un sujet de recherche important au
cours des dernières années. La figure A.2 montre le nombre annuel de publications depuis 2000
de l’IEEE [Iee] sur le sujet. Dans cette figure, la barre grise représente les publications avec le
mot-clé “ criminalistique ”, alors que la barre hâchurée en gris clair se rapporte aux publications
avec les mots-clés “ criminalistique ” et “ image ”. Si la criminalistique en général a reçu une
attention croissante dans la dernière décennie, sa spécialisation pour l’image représente à elle
seule environ 40% du total.
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Figure A.2: Nombre annuel de publications de l’IEEE dont mots-clés incluent “ criminal-
istique ” (la barre grise), et à la fois “ criminalistique ” et “ image ” (la barre hâchurée en
gris clair).
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A.1.2 Anti-criminalistique en images numériques
Les deux faces d’une même pièce.
De même que la cryptographie (resp. la stéganographie) trouve son pendant nécessaire
avec la cryptanalyse (resp. la stéganalyse), le “mauvais génie” de la criminalistique est l’anti-
criminalistique. L’anti-criminalistique consiste donc en l’étude des limites des méthodes
criminalistiques, dans le but ultime de contribuer à leur amélioration [BK13]. À ce titre, cet
exercice est primordial et doit guider toute analyse du problème. L’objectif assigné à l’anti-
criminalistique est alors d’effectuer un traitement sur l’image falsifiée, spécifiquement destiné
à atténuer les traces laissées par la falsification de sorte qu’elle ne sera plus détectée par les
méthodes criminalistiques.
Le développement de la criminalistique en est encore à son stade précoce, et l’anti-
criminalistique est un sujet encore plus récent [KB07]. Dans la littérature, les publications
sur la criminalistique sont d’ailleurs beaucoup plus nombreuses que celles relevant de l’anti-
criminalistique. En outre, les méthodes anti-criminalistiques actuelles utilisent souvent des
traitements simples pour dissimuler les traces laissées par une opération usuelle participant
de la falsification, par exemple en utilisant un filtrage ad-hoc pour dissimuler les artefacts de
compression JPEG [SL11], ou encore en ajoutant du bruit pour masquer ceux induits plus
généralement par une opération de filtrage linéaire sur l’image [WSL13]. Il se trouve que ce
type de méthodes anti-criminalistique peut réussir à tromper les détecteurs criminalistiques
ad-hoc, mais elles peuvent être détectées par des détecteurs plus avancés. Par ailleurs, l’image
anti-criminalistique créée par ces méthodes souffre souvent d’une qualité médiocre. C’est une
question centrale, car une image de faible qualité (par exemple, une image floue/bruitée) peut
spontanément éveiller les soupçons sur son authenticité.
En résumé, l’anti-criminalistique d’image a un double objectif: assurer une bonne in-
détectabilité criminalistique, ainsi qu’une haute qualité d’image [KR08]. Si ces deux buts
devenaient antagonistes, le contexte de ce travail imposerait naturellement de privilégier
l’indétectabilité sur la qualité.
A.1.3 Objectifs et contributions
Dans cette thèse, nous nous plaçons du côté de l’anti-criminalistique, et nous nous concentrons
sur la compression JPEG et le filtrage médian. À partir d’une image compressée en JPEG
ou filtrée par le filtre médian, si nous pouvons réussir à créer une image qui ressemble à
celle non traitée, alors ce sera une tâche relativement facile que de falsifier l’histoire des
traitements d’une image, ou même de changer la sémantique portée par l’image. À cette
fin, nous employons certains aspects de la restauration d’image, en même temps que nous
leur intégrons certains termes/stratégies spécifiquement dédiés à l’anti-criminalistique. De
cette façon, nous espérons créer des images anti-criminalistiques avec un bon équilibre entre
l’indétectabilité criminalistique et la qualité de l’image falsifiée.
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A.1.3.1 Compression JPEG et filtrage médian
Tout d’abord, nous choisissons de mener nos recherches sur l’anti-criminalistique de compres-
sion JPEG, parce que le format JPEG est probablement le format d’image le plus commun
en usage aujourd’hui sur Internet, et à ce titre souvent étudié dans de nombreux scénarios en
criminalistique. Selon des statistiques sur l’utilisation des formats d’image sur Internet, au 8
décembre en 2014, le format JPEG était le plus utilisé, avec une utilisation de 68.7%, tous
sites confondus [W3t].
Figure A.3: Illustration de créer une image composite en JPEG. Ici, q1, q2 et q3 sont trois
probablement différents facteurs de qualité JPEG.
Pour illustrer l’intérêt d’étudier l’anti-criminalistique JPEG, nous nous appuyons sur le
scénario suivant, illustré dans la figure A.3 : afin de faire croire que quelqu’un a participé à un
certain événement, le faussaire créera très probablement une image composite avec la scène
et la victime à partir de deux images JPEG avec différents facteurs de qualité23. L’image
composite est enfin compressée en JPEG une dernière fois, avec un autre facteur de qualité
JPEG, pour publication. Une modification habilement effectuée peut ne laisser aucune trace
visible aux yeux humains, mais l’image falsifiée pourrait être confondue par la détection de
différents artefacts de double compression JPEG présents dans les différentes zones de l’image
composite [BP12b].
23Le facteur de qualité JPEG est un nombre entier entre 1 et 100. Plus le facteur de qualité JPEG est élevé,
meilleure est la qualité de l’image, et plus la taille du fichier JPEG est grande.
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D’une manière générale, l’objectif de l’anti-criminalistique JPEG est de supprimer toute
trace éventuelle de compression JPEG, de sorte que l’image JPEG anti-criminalistique a l’air
d’une image originale et non compressée. C’est typiquement ce que ferait un faussaire réelle-
ment habile, pour dissimuler au mieux son forfait, juste avant la dernière étape de compression
avant publication [SL11].
Dans des travaux récents d’anti-criminalistique (sur la compression JPEG [SL11] ainsi que
sur le rééchantillonnage [KR08]), le filtre médian est utilisé pour masquer efficacement les
différentes de traitements effectués sur l’image. Cependant, le filtrage médian, vu comme un
débruitage d’image et un opérateur de lissage, laisse des traces dans l’image. Elles peuvent
être détectées par des méthodes criminalistiques de filtrage médian. La présence de traces
de filtrage médian, non seulement donne à penser que l’image a été préalablement filtrée
par le filtre médian, mais aussi implique la possibilité que d’autres opérations de traitement
d’image ont pu être appliquées à l’image. Par conséquent, il est primordial d’étudier l’anti-
criminalistique du filtrage médian, qui constitue ainsi le second sujet de recherche de cette
thèse.
A.1.3.2 Anti-criminalistique d’image et restauration d’image
Dans une certaine mesure, l’anti-criminalistique d’image partage quelques similitudes avec
la restauration d’image. En codage ou traitement d’image, leur objectif à tous les deux
consiste à approcher au mieux les informations perdues pendant le processus de dégradation
d’image, souvent en résolvant un problème mal posé. Notons d’emblée que pour certains
scénarios anti-criminalistiques extrêmes (par exemple, la modification du processus physique
ou géométrique [Far09a] de génération de l’image), cette similitude ne tient plus. Néanmoins,
l’étude de ces scénarios nous semble relever davantage des effets spéciaux au cinéma, et nous
nous concentrons principalement sur la compression JPEG et le filtrage médian. Par rapport
à la restauration d’image (et à son seul objectif d’amélioration de la qualité de l’image), l’anti-
criminalistique d’image a un autre objectif, encore plus impérieux, i.e. : être indétectable par
la criminalistique.
Fondée sur des similitudes entre l’anti-criminalistique et la restauration d’images, cette
thèse vise à créer, à partir d’une image compressée en JPEG ou filtrée par le filtre médian,
une image “ naturelle ” qui semblera n’avoir jamais été traitée. À cette fin, l’estimateur
du MAP (ou une de ses variantes) sera employé. Nous chercherons donc la meilleure image
falsifiée, au double sens de l’indétectabilité et de la qualité, et cette recherche, comme il est
de mise pour une estimation du MAP dans le cas général, fera intervenir plusieurs méthodes
d’optimisation numérique.
A.1.3.3 Méthodologie
À la différence des méthodes anti-criminalistiques de l’état de l’art basées sur le traitement
d’image simple [SL11, WSL13], cette thèse propose une nouvelle piste de recherche pour
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falsifier des images. Nous proposons des méthodes anti-criminalistiques sophistiquées visant
la compression JPEG et le filtrage médian, en nous appuyant sur des concepts/outils avancés
de la restauration d’image, les statistiques d’image naturelle et l’optimisation numérique.
Les effets de bloc dans le domaine spatial et les artefacts de quantification dans le domaine
DCT sont deux indices bien connus d’une compression JPEG [FD03]. Dans cette thèse, les
méthodes suivantes sont développées pour l’anti-criminalistique JPEG :
• Tout d’abord, une minimisation contrainte basée sur la variation totale (TV) [ADF05]
est employée pour éliminer les effets de bloc de la compression JPEG. En outre, afin
d’assurer une haute qualité pour l’image falsifiée en bout de chaîne, une projection de
type QCS [RS05] est utilisé.
• Pour supprimer les artefacts de quantification dans le domaine DCT, une méthode de
lissage perceptuel de l’histogramme DCT est proposée, utilisant une loi de Laplace locale
et de l’information en partie récupérée dans le domaine DCT par le déblocage TV
précédemment proposé.
• Afin d’étudier l’impact d’un modèle d’image plus avancé que la TV sur l’anti-
criminalistique JPEG, nous considérons aussi une mixture de gaussiennes (GMM) pour
modéliser les patchs d’image [ZW11] allié à un terme de vraisemblance modélisant le
processus de compression JPEG [RS05]. Par ailleurs, nous proposons également une
nouvelle méthode non-paramétrique afin de lisser l’histogramme DCT, basée cette fois
sur le calibrage [FGH02].
Quant à l’anti-criminalistique du filtrage médian, cette thèse propose une déconvolution
variationnelle d’image, dans une certaine mesure inspiré par [KF09, KTF11]. La fonction de
coût de ce problème d’optimisation est composée d’un terme de convolution qui approche le
processus de filtrage médian, d’un terme de fidélité d’image qui conserve l’image traitée dans
une certaine mesure proche de l’image qui a subi le filtrage médian, et d’un terme d’a priori
basé sur une gaussienne généralisée qui régularise la dérivée de l’image obtenue.
Afin de valider l’efficacité des méthodes anti-criminalistiques proposées pour la compression
JPEG et le filtrage médian, nous effectuons des tests à grande échelle. Les méthodes que nous
proposons surpassent les méthodes anti-criminalistiques de l’état de l’art, à la fois au regard
de leur capacité à résister aux différents criminalistiques simultanément, et de la qualité de
l’image anti-criminalistique produite.
A.1.4 Organisation du résume
Le reste de ce résumé est organisé de la manière suivante :
La section A.2 introduit quelques notions de base sur la criminalistique et l’anti-
criminalistique d’image, y compris la classification, les métriques d’évaluation, les ensembles
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d’image utilisés dans les tests de cette thèse, et les méthodes d’optimisation numérique qui
seront utilisées en résolvant les problèmes proposés.
La section A.3 présente les méthodes criminalistiques/anti-criminalistiques dans l’état de
l’art sur la compression JPEG et le filtrage médian. Les méthodes de criminalistique con-
stituent les détecteurs cibles nous attaquerons, alors que les méthodes d’anti-criminalistique
constitueront nos concurrents pour les comparaisons expérimentales.
La section A.4 propose une méthode de déblocage de compression JPEG, en optimisant
un problème de minimisation contrainte basée sur la TV, dont la fonction de coût est composé
d’un terme de TV et d’un terme mesurant le blocage basé sur la TV. Outre un bon effet
de déblocage, l’image JPEG anti-criminalistique atteint également une relativement bonne
indétectabilité criminalistique, même contre les détecteurs examinant les artefacts de quan-
tification. Cependant, ces artefacts de quantification dans le domaine DCT existent, et ils
peuvent potentiellement être utilisés par d’autres détecteurs. Par conséquent, cette méthode
sera encore améliorée dans la section A.5.
La section A.5 décrit une méthode améliorée pour l’anti-criminalistique JPEG basée sur
le travail de la section A.4. Les artefacts de quantification restants dans le domaine DCT
après le processus de déblocage TV sont explicitement éliminés par une procédure de lissage
perceptuel de l’histogramme DCT.
La section A.6 présente une méthode visant à améliorer la qualité de l’image falsifiée, et qui
dans le cadre du MAP, utilise une GMM pour modéliser les patchs d’image. Afin de produire
l’image anti-criminalistique, un lissage de l’histogramme DCT est effectué en utilisant une
méthode non-paramétrique basée sur le calibrage.
La section A.7, cette fois dans le cadre de l’anti-criminalistique du filtrage médian, propose
une déconvolution variationnelle d’image qui modélise la différence de valeurs de pixels en
utilisant la loi gaussienne généralisée.
La section A.8 conclut cette thèse, en résumant les contributions et en proposant plusieurs
directions de recherche sur la criminalistique et l’anti-criminalistique d’image.
A.2 Préliminaires
A.2.1 Classification de la criminalistique et l’anti-criminalistique d’image
Dans la littérature, il existe différentes taxonomies en criminalistique et en anti-criminalistique
d’image [Far09a, RTD11, Piv13, SWL13, BK13]. Pour la criminalistique d’image, celle pro-
posée par Farid [Far09a] est probablement la plus reconnue. La criminalistique d’image fait
l’hypothèse que le processus de création de fausses images perturbe certains propriétés intrin-
sèques de scène/d’image (par exemple, les propriétés statistiques, physiques ou géométriques).
Dans ce contexte, Farid [Far09a] propose de diviser les différentes stratégie de criminalistique
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d’image suivant les cinq catégories suivantes :
• La criminalistique d’image à base de pixels analyse les anomalies causées par la falsifi-
cation au niveau du pixel. Les moyens de manipulation d’image fréquemment utilisés
sont, par exemple, le copier-coller, l’épissage, le rééchantillonnage, le filtrage médian,
etc. Afin de détecter chaque type d’opération sur l’image, de nombreuses méthodes
criminalistiques ont déjà été proposées.
• La criminalistique d’image basée sur le format détecte le changement statistique in-
troduit par une méthode de compression particulière. Les algorithmes populaires de
compression d’image incluent, par exemple, le JPEG basé sur la transformée DCT, le
SPIHT et le JPEG2000 basés sur la transformée en ondelettes, etc.
• La criminalistique d’image basée sur la caméra étudie les traces laissées par le dispositif
de capture de l’image [Far06]. Les méthodes criminalistiques dans cette catégorie sont
basées, par exemple, sur l’analyse de l’aberration chromatique, du CFA, du PRNU, etc.
• La criminalistique d’image basée sur la physique examine les anomalies de l’interaction
entre les différents objets d’une scène, la lumière et la caméra dans le monde physique
en 3 dimensions. Par exemple, les incohérences de directions de la lumière estimées à
partir de différents objets physiques peuvent être utilisées comme critères aux fins de
criminalistique.
• La criminalistique d’image basée sur la géométrie mesure les positions des objets
physiques par rapport à la caméra. Par exemple, la manipulation d’image peut être
détectée s’il existe des incohérences au point focal de l’image24.
Pour l’anti-criminalistique d’image, Böhme et Kirchner [BK13] ont divisé les techniques de
l’anti-criminalistiques d’image en deux grandes catégories, suivant les trois dimensions suiv-
antes :
• Robustesse versus sécurité. En toute généralité, les faussaires peuvent exploiter les faib-
lesses de robustesse ou de sécurité des méthodes criminalistiques. La robustesse en crim-
inalistique désigne la confiance que l’on a dans le diagnostic d’un traitement effectué sur
l’image, et la sécurité désigne la capacité à détecter comme telles des images falsifiées,
même si elles ont fait l’objet d’un traitement anti-criminalistique spécifique. En d’autres
termes, et en réfléchissant au pire des cas comme nous y oblige le principe de Kerckhoffs
en sécurité, la sécurité indique la capacité à résister à des attaques anti-criminalistiques.
• Attaques de post-traitement versus traitement intégrés. Les attaques dites de post-
traitement sont une étape de traitement supplémentaire et spécifique dans le processus
de falsification, afin qu’il ne reste plus de traces dans l’image qui puissent être détectées
par la criminalistique. Les attaques intégrées, de leur côté, interfèrent directement avec
le processus de falsification de l’image. Par définition, ces derniers ne sauraient être
évalués pertinemment sous l’angle de la robustesse.
24Le point focal est la projection du centre de la caméra sur le plan de l’image.
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• Attaques ciblées versus attaques universelles. Si une méthode anti-criminalistique ex-
ploite les faiblesses d’un outil criminalistique spécifique, elle est dite ciblée (ou ad-hoc).
Une méthode universelle essaiera quant à elle de créer une image falsifiée dont les pro-
priétés statistiques sont maintenues aussi plausibles que possible, de sorte que l’image
falsifiée reste indétectable, même si elle devait être examinée par des outils criminalis-
tiques encore inconnus aujourd’hui.
De la restauration d’image, cette thèse emprunte quelques méthodes d’estimation du MAP
(ou une de ses variantes) et intègre certains termes/stratégies anti-criminalistiques. Selon la
classification de Farid [Far09a], la criminalistique JPEG est basée sur le format, alors que la
criminalistique du filtrage médian est à base de pixels. Selon la classification de Böhme et
Kirchner [BK13], les méthodes anti-criminalistiques proposées à la fois pour la compression
JPEG et le filtrage médian sont des post-traitements de l’image à falsifier, sont ciblées, et
permettent d’analyser la sécurité des méthodes criminalistiques.
A.2.2 Métriques d’évaluation
A.2.2.1 Indétectabilité criminalistique
Comme indiqué dans la section A.1, l’anti-criminalistique d’image a un double objectif : une
bonne indétectabilité criminalistique et une haute qualité de l’image anti-criminalistique. La
détectabilité (pour le côté criminalistique) est une métrique qui n’a de sens qu’en rapport
avec l’indétectabilité (pour l’anti-criminalistique). Ces deux métriques sont souvent exprimées
par une courbe ROC, qui peut être générée en comparant les performances d’un détecteur
criminalistique avec la vérité terrain, sur un ensemble d’images conséquent. On considère
un ensemble de vraies images (des images originales, les échantillons négatifs) et de fausses
images (des images traitées, les échantillons positifs). Pour chaque stratégie de classification
du détecteur criminalistique, on peut calculer un taux de vrais positifs et un taux de faux
positifs. Chaque couple de ces deux taux constitue un point de la courbe ROC, dont un
exemple est présenté dans la figure A.4.
Pour une évaluation quantitative, nous utilisons la métrique AUC, en mesurant l’aire sous
la courbe ROC. La valeur AUC varie dans l’intervalle [0, 1]. Lorsque la valeur AUC est proche
de 1, cela signifie que la courbe ROC est proche du point de classification parfaite de l’espace
ROC, indiquant une bonne détectabilité criminalistique et une mauvaise indétectabilité crimi-
nalistique. Lorsque la valeur AUC est proche de 0.5, cela signifie que la courbe ROC est proche
de la ligne de classification aléatoire (à savoir la diagonale de l’espace ROC représentée par
la ligne pointillée en rouge dans la figure A.4), indiquant une bonne indétectabilité criminal-
istique et une mauvaise détectabilité criminalistique. Lorsque la valeur AUC est proche de 0,
cela ne veut pas dire que la détectabilité criminalistique du détecteur est faible, car il suffirait
d’inverser les résultats de classification pour tendre vers 1. En toute généralité, l’objectif de
l’anti-criminalistique d’image est d’amener la courbe ROC d’un détecteur criminalistique vers
la ligne de classification aléatoire. Dans ce cas, la valeur AUC est proche de 0.5.






















Figure A.4: Un exemple de la courbe ROC.
La validation d’un détecteur criminalistique nécessite deux ensembles d’images, des au-
thentiques et des fausses, en plus du détecteur à valider. Pour notre procédure de validation
criminalistique, nous utilisons un ensemble d’images originales (cf. la section A.2.3), sur cha-
cune desquelles on vient appliquer le traitement à détecter afin de produire l’ensemble des
positifs. Le test utilisera donc une quantité égale de positifs et de négatifs.
D’autre part, la caractéristique analysée par un détecteur criminalistique pour prendre sa
décision peut être soit un scalaire soit un vecteur, selon la méthode considérée. Lorsque la
caractéristique est un scalaire, on fera varier la valeur du seuil de décision afin de mesurer le
comportement global du détecteur, et lorsque la caractéristique est un vecteur, la littérature
retient souvent l’utilisation d’une machine à support vecteur (SVM).
Les détecteurs à base de SVM font l’hypothèse que la méthode anti-criminalistique à
détecter est connue, et que l’on est capable de créer une grande quantité de fausses images
pour l’entraînement du détecteur. Cela correspond à la configuration la plus accomoddante
pour la criminalistique, et au pire scénario pour l’anti-criminalistique. Dans la pratique, et
dans ce pire des scénarios, nous constatons également qu’il est très difficile de faire passer
une image traitée (compressée en JPEG ou filtrée par le filtre médian dans cette thèse) pour
une image originale lorsque le détecteur utilise un SVM. Actuellement, aucune méthode anti-
criminalistique d’image ne peut tromper les détecteurs puissants à base de SVM.
Inspiré par le scénario de création d’une image composite (illustré dans la figure A.3) et la
stéganographie, nous utilisons la configuration expérimentale suivante pour entraîner/tester
les détecteurs à base de SVM. Comme illustré dans la figure A.5, pour chaque image
originale, la partie centrale de l’image est remplacée par son image traitée correspon-
dante (compressée en JPEG ou filtrée par le filtre médian, et avec ou sans l’application
d’un traitement anti-criminalistique) avec un taux de remplacement prenant les valeurs
{0.05, 0.1, 0.15, 0.2, 0.3, 0.4, 0.5, 0.6, 0.8, 1} pour créer les images traitées. Pour chaque taux de
remplacement, les fausses images composites et les images originales sont ensuite mélangées en-
semble afin de entraîner/tester les détecteurs à base du SVM. Pour le côté anti-criminalistique,
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Figure A.5: Illustration de la création d’une fausse image composite afin d’entraîner/tester
un détecteur à base de SVM.
cette thèse considère essentiellement les résultats obtenus avec un taux de remplacement rel-
ativement faible. Nous restons réservés sur l’indétectabilité criminalistique d’un traitement
appliqué sur la totalité de la surface de l’image originale. Cependant, on peut déjà trouver de
nombreuses applications dans de nombreux scénarios anti-criminalistiques. Par exemple, une
image falsifiée peut être créée par le remplacement de la tête d’une personne dans la photo,
sans être détectée.
A.2.2.2 Qualité d’image
Les méthodes d’évaluation de la qualité d’image peuvent être groupées en deux catégories
: les métriques sans référence et celles avec référence, selon que l’image originale sans dé-
formation est connue ou non [WB06]. Dans les scénarios du monde réel, l’image originale
est habituellement inaccessible. Cependant, nous disposons souvent la vérité terrain dans
la recherche scientifique. Dans ce cas, l’évaluation de la qualité avec référence est possible.
Dans cette thèse, nous ne considérons que les images en niveau de gris 8 bits. Nous utilisons
deux métriques très connues avec référence pour évaluer la qualité d’image : le PSNR et le
SSIM [Wan+04]. L’image originale est utilisée pour calculer les valeurs PSNR et SSIM, afin
d’évaluer quantitativement la qualité de l’image anti-criminalistique. Plus ces deux valeurs
sont élevées, plus la qualité de l’image traitée est bonne.
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A.2.2.3 Comparaison d’histogrammes
Souvent, afin de créer l’image anti-criminalistique d’une image compressée en JPEG ou filtrée
par le filtre médian, nous sommes amenés à traiter des histogrammes : l’histogramme des
coefficients DCT pour la compression JPEG, et l’histogramme des différences de valeurs de
pixels pour le filtre médian. Afin d’évaluer la restauration de l’histogramme, nous adoptons
la divergence de Kullback-Leibler [KL51] pour mesurer la ressemblance entre l’histogramme
de l’image anti-criminalistique et celui de l’image originale. L’objectif du faussaire est de
diminuer cette valeur de divergence vers 0.
A.2.3 Ensembles d’images naturelles
Dans la littérature de l’anti-criminalistique de la compression JPEG [Sta+10a, Sta+10b,
VTT11, SS11], l’ensemble UCID [SS04] est le plus utilisé. Nous choisissons donc d’utiliser
cet ensemble d’images. Il contient au total 1338 images de taille 384× 512 et au format TIFF
qui n’ont jamais été compressées. Puis ces images en mode RGB sont transformées en niveau
de gris à l’aide de la fonction Matlab rgb2gray.
Pour différents usages lors du test de l’anti-criminalistique de la compression JPEG, les
ensembles suivants sont créés à partir de l’ensemble UCID :
• UCIDLearn, les 338 dernières images de l’ensemble UCID, pour apprendre un modèle
d’image et les matrices de covariance du bruit de compression JPEG dans la domaine
spatial.
• UCIDTest, les 1000 premières images de l’ensemble UCID, pour le test anti-
criminalistique en utilisant les détecteurs à base de caractéristique scalaire, et aussi
pour l’évaluation de la qualité de l’image traitée et de la restauration de l’histogramme
DCT.
– UCIDTR, 500 images choisies de façon aléatoire parmi les images UCIDTest, pour
tester les détecteurs à base de SVM.
– UCIDTE, les 500 autres images dans l’ensemble UCIDTest qui ne sont pas choisies
pour l’ensemble UCIDTR, pour entraîner les détecteurs à base de SVM.
– UCIDTest92, 92 images choisies de façon aléatoire dans l’ensemble UCIDTest, pour
régler les paramètres de la méthode proposée ou pour analyser rapidement la per-
formance de la méthode proposée.
– UCIDTest100, 100 images choisies de façon aléatoire de l’ensemble UCIDTest, pour
l’application anti-criminalistique de la double compression JPEG.
Pour le test criminalistique du filtrage médian, les ensembles d’images sont créés à partir
de 545 images25 de haute résolution et au format TIFF qui n’ont jamais été compressées, ni
25Ces images peuvent être téléchargées depuis : ftp://firewall.teleco.uvigo.es:27244/DS_01_UTFI.zip
et ftp://lesc.dinfo.unifi.it/pub/Public/JPEGloc/dataset/.
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échantillonnées, ni filtrées. Trois images de taille 512 × 512 sont extraites depuis le centre
de l’image de haute résolution, puis elles sont transformées en niveaux de gris à l’aide de la
fonction Matlab rgb2gray. Les images ainsi extraites qui n’ont pas de valeurs valides pour
les algorithmes criminalistiques du filtrage médian [KF10, Cao+10, Yua11] sont exclues. In
fine, nous avons au total 1607 images qui sont ensuite divisées en trois ensembles : le MFTR,
le MFTE et le MFPE. En résumé, les quatre ensembles d’images suivants sont utilisés dans
les tests criminalistiques dans notre travail sur le filtrage médian :
• MFTR, 500 images pour entraîner les détecteurs criminalistiques à base de SVM.
• MFTE, 1000 images pour le test criminalistique en utilisant les détecteurs basés sur la
criminalistique scalaire et ceux à base de SVM, et aussi pour l’évaluation de la qualité
de l’image traitée et de la restauration de l’histogramme des différences de valeurs de
pixels.
• MFPE, 107 images pour l’estimation des paramètres.
• MFTE100, 100 images choisies de façon aléatoire dans l’ensemble MFTE, pour régler
les paramètres de la méthode proposée.
A.2.4 Algorithmes pertinents d’optimisation
Pour toutes les méthodes anti-criminalistiques proposées dans cette thèse, plusieurs méthodes
d’optimisation numérique sont utilisées de manière à estimer l’image traitée “ la meilleure ”
dans un certain sens. Plus précisément, nous utiliserons la méthode de sous-gradient [BXM03],
l’algorithme des Hongrois [Kuh55], et le “ Half Quadratic Splitting ” [GY95] et la méthode
dite split Bregman [GO09].
La méthode de sous-gradient, itérative, résout un problème de minimisation convexe, selon
un sous-gradient de la solution actuelle [BXM03]. Une extension importante de la méthode
de sous-gradient est la méthode de sous-gradient projeté, qui permet de résoudre des prob-
lèmes d’optimisation sous contraintes. Nous utiliserons la méthode de sous-gradient dans les
sections A.4, A.5 et A.6. L’algorithme des Hongrois [Kuh55] est une méthode d’optimisation
discrète bien connue pour résoudre le problème d’affectation en temps polynomial, cubique.
Cette méthode sera utilisée pour résoudre un problème de mise en correspondance des co-
efficients DCT pour lisser perceptuellement l’histogramme DCT dans la section A.5. De
nombreux problèmes avec régularisation en traitement d’image sont difficiles car souvent non-
convexes. Le “ Half Quadratic Splitting ” et la méthode split Bregman ont donc été proposés
pour faciliter la résolution de ce type de problème d’optimisation complexe, en divisant le
problème initial en deux sous-problèmes plus simples [GY95, GO09]. Ces deux techniques
d’optimisation seront utilisées dans la sections A.6 et A.7.
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A.3 État de l’art en (anti-)criminalistique de compression









































Figure A.6: Exemples de les artefacts de la compression JPEG. Ici, l’image JPEG est
compressée de l’image “ Lena ” avec le facteur de qualité JPEG 10.
A.3.1 (Anti-)Criminalistique de compression JPEG
Après une compression JPEG, deux types bien connus d’artefacts apparaissent, trahissant
l’histoire de compression JPEG d’une image. Ce sont, respectivement, les effets de bloc dans
le domaine spatial, et les artefacts de quantification dans le domaine DCT [FD03]. Un ex-
emple d’effet de bloc peut être trouvé dans la figure A.6-(b), en comparant à -(a). Ceci est
principalement à cause de ce que la compression JPEG traite individuellement chaque bloc
de taille 8× 8. La présence d’effet de bloc est également liée à la base de la DCT [RS05]. Un
exemple des artefacts de quantification peut être trouvé dans la figure A.6-(d), en comparant
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à -(c). Ceci est à cause de ce que la quantification de compression JPEG est conduite dans le
domaine DCT. Afin de créer l’image anti-criminalistique d’une image compressée en JPEG, il
est important d’éliminer ces deux types d’artefacts JPEG.
Table A.1: Détecteurs criminalistiques de compression JPEG.
KQF Détecteur criminalistique basé sur l’estimation de la matrice
de quantification, proposé par Fan et De Queiroz [FD03] ;
KF Détecteur criminalistique basé sur l’analyse des effets de
bloc, proposé par Fan et De Queiroz [FD03] ;
KLuo Détecteur criminalistique JPEG proposé par Luo et al.
[LHQ10] ;
KQLuo Détecteur criminalistique basé sur l’estimation du pas de
quantification, proposé par Luo et al. [LHQ10] ;
KV Détecteur criminalistique basé sur la TV, proposé par
Valenzise et al. [Val+11, VTT13] ;
KL Détecteur criminalistique basé sur le calibrage, proposé par
Lai et Böhme [LB11] ;
K1U ,K
2
U Deux détecteurs proposés par nous et basés sur l’analyse des
effets de bloc ;
KS100Li Détecteur criminalistique basé sur une caractéristique en 100
dimensions qui exploite la corrélation inter- ou intra-bloc
[CS08], proposé par Li et al. [LLH12] ;
KS686P Détecteur criminalistique basé sur la caractéristique SPAM
en 686 dimensions, proposé par Pevný et al. [PBF10].
Table A.2: Notations pour l’image originale, compressée JPEG, et anti-criminalistique
dans l’état de l’art.
I L’image originale, qui n’a jamais été compressée ;
J L’image JPEG, composée à partir de l’image originale I ;
FJSq L’image anti-criminalistique, créée à partir de l’image JPEG J , par
un procédé de tramage, proposé par Stamm et al. [Sta+10a, SL11] ;
FJSqSb L’image anti-criminalistique, créée à partir de l’image FJSq , par un
procédé de déblocage basé sur le filtrage médian, proposé par Stamm
et al. [Sta+10b, SL11] ;
FJV L’image anti-criminalistique, créée à partir de l’image JPEG J , par
un procédé de tramage perceptif, proposé par Valenzise et al.
[VTT11] ;
FJSu L’image anti-criminalistique, créée à partir de l’image JPEG J , par
une attaque de SAZ, proposé par Sutthiwan et Shi [SS11].
Les détecteurs de compression JPEG utilisés dans cette thèse sont listés dans la table A.1.
Parmi tous les détecteurs de compression JPEG en considération, nous en introduisons un
nouveau : KpU (avec les paramètres p = 1, et p = 2) qui se fonde sur l’analyse des effets
176 Appendix A. Résumé en Français
de bloc. Les autres sont les détecteurs classiques dans la littérature de la criminalistique
en compression JPEG. Dans la table A.1, les huit premiers détecteurs sont basés sur des
caractéristiques scalaires, alors que les deux derniers utilisent un SVM. Les méthodes anti-
criminalistiques en JPEG de l’état de l’art sont listées dans la table A.2. Elles nous seront
utiles pour comparer les performances des méthodes que nous proposons.

























Figure A.7: Exemples de l’histogramme de différence de valeurs de pixels au premier ordre
de l’image originale et celui de l’image MF, respectivement.
Pour des raisons de concision, l’abréviation “ MFI ” désigne dans cette thèse l’image qui
a été filtrée par le filtre médian. La fenêtre du filtre médian peut avoir de nombreuses formes
et tailles différentes. Cette thèse utilise la fenêtre carrée de taille 3× 3, qui est aussi la valeur
retenue dans l’état de l’art [FB12, WSL13, DN+13]. Dans un certain voisinage de la MFI,
la probabilité que les valeurs de pixels proviennent des mêmes pixels de l’image originale est
élevée. Cet effet est connu sous le nom d’artefact dit de “ streaking ” [Bov87]. Les artefacts
streaking peuvent également se refléter dans la modification de la forme de l’histogramme des
différences des valeurs de pixels après filtrage médian. En comparant la figure A.7-(b) avec
-(a), on peut voir que le pic autour la classe 0 de différence de valeurs de pixels au premier
ordre devient plus haut après que l’image est filtrée par le filtre médian.
Dans cette thèse, les détecteurs de l’état de l’art relatifs au filtrage médian sont listés dans
la table A.3. Dans cette table, les quatre premiers détecteurs sont basés sur des caractéristiques
scalaires, alors que les cinq derniers utilisent un SVM. Les méthodes anti-criminalistiques de
l’état de l’art pour le filtre médian sont listées dans la table A.4. Elles seront utilisées pour la
comparaison expérimentale avec les nôtres.
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Table A.3: Détecteurs criminalistiques du filtrage médian.
KK Détecteur basé sur l’analyse de la différence de valeurs de
pixels au premier ordre, proposé par Kirchner et Fridrich
[KF10] ;
KˆK Version améliorée de KK [KF10] ;
KC Détecteur basé sur l’analyse de la différence des valeurs de
pixels au premier ordre, proposé par Cao et al. [Cao+10] ;
KY Détecteur basé sur une caractéristique fusionnée, proposé par
Yuan [Yua11] ;
KS686SPAM Détecteur criminalistique basé sur la caractéristique SPAM en
686 dimensions, proposé par Pevný et al. [PBF10];
KS44MFF Détecteur criminalistique basé sur la caractéristique MFF en
44 dimensions, proposé par Yuan [Yua11] ;
KS56GLF Détecteur criminalistique basé sur la caractéristique GLF en
56 dimensions, proposé par Chen et al. [Che+12, CNH13] ;
KS10AR Détecteur criminalistique basé sur la caractéristique MFRAR
en 10 dimensions, proposé par Kang et al. [Kan+12, Kan+13]
;
KS220LTP Détecteur criminalistique basé sur la caractéristique MFLTP
en 220 dimensions, proposé par Zhang et al. [Zha+14].
Table A.4: Notations pour l’image originale, filtrée médian, et anti-criminalistique dans
l’état de l’art.
I L’image originale ;
M L’image filtrée à partir de l’image originale I par le filtre médian,
aussi appelée MFI dans le texte ;
FMW L’image anti-criminalistique, créée à partir de la MFI M, par un
procédé de tramage, proposé par Wu et al. [Sta+10b, SL11] ;
FMD L’image anti-criminalistique, créée à partir de la MFI M, par une
injection de bruit, proposé par Dang-Nguyen et al. [DN+13].
A.4 Anti-criminalistique de compression JPEG basée sur la TV
A.4.1 Introduction et motivation
Afin de créer l’image anti-criminalistique d’une image JPEG, il faut supprimer les deux types
d’artefacts présents à la fois dans le domaine DCT et dans le domaine spatial. Dans la
pratique, nous trouvons qu’il est extrêmement difficile de mener une attaque en une seule
étape pour tromper plusieurs détecteurs criminalistiques qui travaillent dans deux différents
domaines, tout en conservant une haute qualité d’image anti-criminalistique. Par conséquent,
cette thèse supprime les artefacts JPEG alternativement dans le domaine DCT et dans le
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domaine spatial. Dans cette section, nous nous concentrons sur la suppression des effets
de bloc d’une image JPEG au niveau anti-criminalistique. Nous laissons la suppression des
artefacts de quantification dans le domaine DCT suppression pour la section A.5.
Suivant la piste de recherche décrite dans la section A.1.3.3 et visant à utiliser les concepts
de la restauration, cette section présente notre méthode pour supprimer les effets de bloc d’une
image JPEG (basée sur la régularisation de la TV). L’idée de régulariser de la TV (variation
totale) a été proposé par Rudin et al. [ROF92] en 1992. Depuis lors, elle a été largement
utilisée dans la restauration d’image, pour de nombreuses applications comme la réduction du
bruit, la déconvolution, l’inpainting, etc. Les effets de bloc conduisent à une valeur plutôt haute
de la TV. Par conséquent, le déblocage JPEG peut être effectué en minimisant une fonction
d’énergie basée sur la TV [ADF05]. Traditionnellement, son objectif principal est d’améliorer
la qualité de l’image JPEG, mais cela ne suffit pas pour obtenir une bonne indétectabilité
criminalistique. Aux fins de criminalistique, nous ajoutons à la fonction de minimisation un
autre terme de mesure du blocage JPEG basé sur la TV. En résolvant un nouveau problème de
minimisation basé sur la TV, nous pouvons créer l’image anti-criminalistique avec une bonne
indétectabilité criminalistique en sacrifiant un tout petit peu de la qualité d’image.
A.4.2 Déblocage JPEG en minimisant un problème contraint basé sur la
TV





avec la variation à l’emplacement de (i, j) :
νi,j =
√
(Ui−1,j +Ui+1,j − 2Ui,j)2 + (Ui,j−1 +Ui,j+1 − 2Ui,j)2, (A.2)
où Ui,j est la valeur du (i, j)-ème pixel de l’image U.
Afin d’éliminer les effets de bloc, nous définissons un second terme qui mesure le blocage
JPEG. L’idée est très simple : s’il n’y a pas de compression JPEG, statistiquement la somme
de l’énergie de la variation des pixels près des frontières du bloc devrait être proche de celle
dans le centre du bloc. Nous divisons donc tous les pixels de l’image en deux groupes : A et
B, en fonction de leur position dans le bloc, comme il est illustré dans la figure A.8. Selon










Le problème contraint final basé sur la TV est composé d’un terme de TV et d’un terme
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Figure A.8: Classification des pixels en fonction de leur position dans le bloc de taille 8×8.
mesurant le blocage basé sur la TV :
U∗ = arg min
U∈S
E(U) = arg min
U∈S
(TVb(U) + αC(U)) , (A.4)
où α > 0 est un paramètre de régularisation, et S (paramétrée par le paramètre µ) est un
espace contraint d’images qui évite une trop grande modification des coefficients DCT.
A.4.3 Décalibrage
Dans la pratique, la méthode proposée pour le déblocage JPEG dans la section A.4.2 est
capable de créer des images anti-criminalistiques qui peuvent tromper les huit premiers dé-
tecteurs basés sur des caractéristiques scalaires dans la table A.1. Mais la sortie du détecteur
KL [LB11] (basé sur la caractéristique de calibrage) reste difficile à diminuer sans affecter
sérieusement la qualité de l’image. Afin de résoudre ce problème, l’image obtenue après le
traitement du déblocage est soumise au problème d’optimisation suivant :





dont la fonction de coût a une forme similaire à la fonction de calcul de la caractéristique de
KL [LB11].
A.4.4 Quelques résultats expérimentaux
De chaque image originale I, une image JPEG J est obtenue en compressant I avec un fac-
teur de qualité JPEG choisi de façon aléatoire parmi {50, 51, · · · , 95}. De l’image J , nous
créons notre image anti-criminalistique FJ0 par la procédure du déblocage décrite dans la sec-
tion A.4.2 et le procédé du décalibrage décrit dans la section A.4.3. La figure A.9 rapporte les
courbes ROC obtenues pour différentes images contre différents détecteurs criminalistiques.
Les courbes obtenues par notre méthode sont les plus proches de la ligne de classification













































































































































































































Figure A.9: Les courbes ROC obtenues pour différentes images contre différents détecteurs
criminalistiques. Les résultats sont obtenus à partir de l’ensemble UCIDTest.
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Table A.5: La comparaison de la qualité d’image, où les valeurs PSNR/SSIM sont calculées
avec I comme référence. Les résultats sont obtenus à partir de l’ensemble UCIDTest.
J FJSq FJSqSb FJV FJSu FJ0
PSNR 37.0999 33.4061 30.4591 33.2890 31.6552 35.4814
SSIM 0.9919 0.9756 0.9509 0.9802 0.9719 0.9843
aléatoire, en comparant avec les méthodes anti-criminalistique de l’état de l’art. La compara-
ison de la qualité d’image est explicitée dans la table A.5. La qualité de FJ0 est la meilleure
parmi toutes les images anti-criminalistiques. De ces résultats, on peut conclure que la méth-
ode proposée surpasse les méthodes anti-criminalistiques de l’état de l’art [Sta+10a, Sta+10b,
SL11, VTT11, SS11], au regard tant de la capacité à résister à la détection des méthodes
criminalistiques, que de la qualité de l’image anti-criminalistique produite.
A.5 Anti-criminalistique de compression JPEG avec un lissage
perceptuel de l’histogramme DCT










































Figure A.10: Exemples d’histogrammes DCT de la sous-bande (4, 4), de FJSqSb [Sta+10a,
Sta+10b, SL11] et de FJ0 , respectivement.
La figure A.10 compare un exemple de l’histogramme DCT de l’image anti-criminalistique
FJSqSb [Sta+10b, Sta+10a, SL11] et celui de notre image anti-criminalistique FJ0 créée par la
méthode décrite dans la section A.4. On peut voir que les artefacts de quantification dans le
domaine DCT persistent encore, dans une certaine mesure, dans FJ0 , généralement dans les
sous-bandes de fréquence moyenne de l’image. Cette faiblesse peut potentiellement être utilisée
par les détecteurs criminalistiques avancés. Afin de résoudre ce problème, dans notre seconde
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méthode proposée pour l’anti-criminalistique d’image de compression JPEG, une procédure
de lissage perceptuel de l’histogramme DCT est mis au point. Ce lissage d’histogramme est
estiné à éliminer les artefacts de quantification restants dans l’image traitée par la méthode
de déblocage (mais avec un paramètre différent par rapport à la génération de FJ0 ).
ﬁrst-round TV-based deblocking
perceptual DCT histogram smoothing
second-round TV-based deblocking
de-calibration
Figure A.11: Le processus proposé pour créer l’image anti-criminalistique FJ .
À titre d’amélioration de la méthode dans la section A.4, nous proposons une méthode en
quatre étapes pour créer l’image anti-criminalistique de l’image JPEG, comme illustré dans
la figure A.11 et résumées dans ce qui suit :
• La première étape est le déblocage JPEG en minimisant un problème contraint basé
sur la TV dans le domain spatial. Cette méthode est identique à celle décrite dans
la section A.4.2, mais avec différents paramètres. Après cette étape, l’image générée à
partir de l’image JPEG J est dénotée par FˆJb .
• Les artefacts de quantification dans l’image FˆJb ne sont plus aussi évidents que ceux
présents dans l’image JPEG J . Sous l’hypothèse que les informations DCT récupérées
en partie sont fiables, la prochaine étape sera naturellement de remplir les vides restants
dans l’histogramme DCT. Cette tâche est remplie par la procédure de lissage perceptuel
de l’histogramme DCT, qui sera décrite dans la section A.5.2. FˆJbq désigne l’image
intermédiaire créée à partir de FˆJb pour cette étape.
• Dans le domaine spatial, afin de supprimer le bruit anormal introduit par la seconde
étape, on effectue un second déblocage JPEG. L’image intermédiaire résultante est notée
FˆJbqb.
• Enfin, l’image FˆJbqb est traitée par le décalibrage, qui est identique à celui décrit dans la
section A.4.3, afin de générer notre image anti-criminalistique finale FJ .
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Les méthodes dans les première, troisième, et dernière étapes dans la figure A.11 sont
décrites dans les sections A.4.2 et A.4.3, mais avec différents paramètres. Pour le premier
déblocage JPEG, le paramétrage suivant est utilisé : α = 1.5, µ = 0.5 et tk = 1/k (k =
1, 2, · · · , 50). Pour le deuxième déblocage JPEG, le paramétrage suivant est utilisé : α = 0.9,
µ = 1.5 et tk = 1/(k+1) (k = 1, 2, · · · , 30). La section A.5.2 présentera la méthode permettant
de lisser perceptuellement l’histogramme DCT de l’image FˆJb dans la deuxième étape de la
figure A.11.
A.5.2 Lissage perceptuel de l’histogramme DCT
Afin de lisser l’histogramme DCT, il est important de trouver un bon modèle pour les coeffi-
cients DCT. Dans la littérature, la loi de Laplace est un choix très populaire. Son kurtosis vaut
6. Nous avons calculé le kurtosis pour chaque sous-bande AC de chaque image de l’ensemble
UCID [SS04]. La valeur moyenne est 19.99, qui est beaucoup plus grand que 6, et qui indique
que la distribution réelle des coefficients DCT a généralement un pic beaucoup plus élevé que
la loi de Laplace. D’autre part, 93.68% des valeurs de kurtosis calculés song plus grandes que
6. Ces chiffres montrent que la loi de Laplace n’est peut-être pas très appropriée pour mod-
éliser les coefficients DCT (un exemple peut être trouvé dans la figure A.12-(a)). En outre,
Robertson et Stevenson [RS05] ont souligné que la loi de Laplace fonctionne effectivement bien
pour la classe de quantification 0, mais la loi uniforme est un modèle plus approprié pour les
autres classes de quantification.
Sur la figure A.12-(c), on peut voir que les informations dans le domaine DCT sont
récupérées en partie par le premier déblocage JPEG. Mais les artefacts de quantification
persistent encore, dans un certain mesure, dans FˆJb . Avec ces informations DCT récupérées,
et d’après l’analyse ci-dessus, nous proposons un modèle adaptatif local laplacien afin de
modéliser les coefficients DCT. L’idée principale est de rechercher le paramètre λb de la loi
de Laplace pour chaque classe de quantification b, dès la classe 0, en résolvant le problème
contraint des moindres carrés pondérés suivant :















HUr,c(k)− P (Y = k)
)2
, (A.6)
où Qr,c est le pas de quantification pour la sous-bande AC actuelle, B−r,c (resp. B
+
r,c) est la
classe de quantification non vide avec la valeur la plus petite (resp. grande) au centre de
la classe, wk est le poids, HUr,c est l’histogramme DCT normalisé, et P est la loi discrète de
Laplace. On peut voir ce problème comme celui d’un ajustement local des coefficients DCT
pour chaque classe de quantification b. Si un valeur valide est trouvée λb, la loi de Laplace
sera utilisée par la classe b. Sinon, c’est la loi uniforme qui sera utilisée pour la classe actuelle
b et les suivantes. Pour la sous-bande DC, la loi de Laplace est utilisée pour toutes les classes
de quantification.
En construisant le modèle adaptatif de Laplace local comme décrit ci-dessus, on peut
obtenir la distribution cible pour les coefficients DCT de chaque sous-bande de l’image. Un

















































































Figure A.12: (a) est un histogramme DCT de la sous-bande (2, 2) d’une image originale de
l’ensemble UCID [SS04], et la courbe en rouge est le résultat d’ajustement en utilisant la loi
discrète de Laplace. Cette image est ensuite compressée avec un certain facteur de qualité
JPEG 50 afin de générer l’image JPEG, elle est ensuite traitée par la méthode proposée.
(b), (c), et (d) sont les histogrammes correspondants à l’histogramme (a) de l’image JPEG
J , de l’image FˆJb obtenue à partir de J par le premier déblocage JPEG, et d’image obtenue
à partir de FˆJb par l’injection du signal de tramage local adaptatif, respectivement.
exemple est montré dans la figure A.12-(d). L’histogramme DCT apparaît bien lissé. À
présent, nous décrivons comment modifier les coefficients DCT afin que leur distribution ap-
proche la distribution cible (cf. figure A.12-(d)) et tout en minimsant la distorsion infligée
à l’image par ce traitement précis. Pour ce problème, nous nous proposons un problème
d’affectation et souhaitons trouver une bijection f : Ob → T b de sorte que la fonction de coût
: ∑
o∈Ob
W (o, f(o)), (A.7)
soit minimisée. Ici, pour chaque classe de quantification b, Ob est l’ensemble coefficients
DCT originaux, et T b est celui des valeurs cible des coefficient DCT. La fonction de poids
W : Ob × T b → R est définie comme la perte de valeur SSIM à cause de la modification des
coefficients DCT. Après la résolution d’un problème d’affectation simplifiée pour chaque classe
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de quantification, nous pouvons lisser l’histogramme DCT perceptuellement avec un minimum
de distorsion introduite dans le domaine spatial, puis enfin créer l’image FˆJbq.
A.5.3 Quelques résultats expérimentaux
A.5.3.1 Comparaison de différentes méthodes de tramage
Nous comparons notre méthode de tramage basée sur le modèle adaptatif local de Laplace
avec celle basée sur la loi de Laplace proposée par Stamm et al. [Sta+10a, SL11]. La table A.6
rapporte la différence entre la divergence K-L obtenue par FJSq [Sta+10a, SL11] et celle obtenue
par FˆJbq. Toutes les valeurs de différence listées dans la table A.6 indiquent que la méthode
proposée surpasse constamment la méthode de Stamm et al. [Sta+10a, SL11] pour toutes les
sous-bandes DCT
Table A.6: La différence entre la divergence K-L obtenue par FJSq [Sta+10a, SL11] et
celle obtenue par FˆJbq pour les 64 sous-bandes DCT. La valeur moyenne de la différence est
0.0552 avec une déviation standard 0.0249. Pour une comparaison équitable avec FJSq , les
sous-bandes dont les coefficients DCT sont tous quantifiés à 0 dans l’image JPEG J , ne
sont pas comptés. Les résultat sont obtenus à partir de l’ensemble UCIDTest.
r
c 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
1 0.0001 0.0065 0.0118 0.0278 0.0493 0.0634 0.0663 0.0656
2 0.0042 0.0166 0.0229 0.0363 0.0447 0.0565 0.0504 0.0369
3 0.0161 0.0208 0.0291 0.0442 0.0573 0.0665 0.0634 0.0497
4 0.0200 0.0317 0.0409 0.0470 0.0658 0.0802 0.0553 0.0446
5 0.0357 0.0395 0.0522 0.0678 0.0764 0.0930 0.0927 0.0856
6 0.0441 0.0383 0.0642 0.0610 0.0726 0.0769 0.0806 0.0957
7 0.0538 0.0442 0.0678 0.0595 0.0879 0.0809 0.0948 0.0975
8 0.0619 0.0545 0.0697 0.0528 0.0927 0.0880 0.0854 0.0722
A.5.3.2 Contrer les détecteurs criminalistiques de compression JPEG
Partant d’une image JPEG J , nous la traitons suivant les quatre étapes de la méthode anti-
criminalistique proposée (cf. figure A.11) afin de créer l’image anti-criminalistique FJ . La
figure A.13 montre les courbes ROC obtenues par FJ contre des détecteurs scalaires basés,
qui sont toutes proches de la ligne de classificateur aléatoire. Cela signifie que l’image anti-
criminalistique créée par la méthode proposée est capable d’atteindre une bonne indétectabilité
criminalistique. Cette information se reflète aussi par les valeurs AUC atteintes par FJ (cf.
table A.7), en comparant aux autres méthodes de l’état de l’art. En outre, FJ est capable
d’atteindre des valeurs AUC plus petites que les autres images anti-criminalistiques de l’état de
l’art en variant le taux de remplacement d’image. Selon les résultats de la figure A.14, quand le
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Table A.7: De la deuxième colonne à la huitième colonne, sont listées les valeurs AUC
obtenues pour différentes images contre des détecteurs scalaires ; la comparaison de la qualité
d’image (avec I comme référence) est rapportée dans les deux dernières colonnes. Les
résultats sont obtenus à partir de l’ensemble UCIDTest.
KF KLuo K
Q





J 0.9991 1.0000 0.9996 0.9976 0.9811 0.9860 0.8840 37.0999 0.9919
FJSq 0.9332 0.4328 0.7328 0.9977 0.9946 0.9633 0.9483 33.4061 0.9756
FJSqSb 0.3783 0.0806 0.6288 0.8337 0.5338 0.6309 0.4854 30.4591 0.9509
FJV 0.9889 0.4330 0.8066 0.9834 0.9958 0.9916 0.9574 33.2890 0.9802
FJSu 0.8802 0.9772 0.9475 0.1115 0.9610 0.7052 0.3149 31.6552 0.9719
FJ0 0.6756 0.6046 0.5194 0.6210 0.4490 0.6772 0.5880 35.4814 0.9843
FˆJb 0.7590 0.4830 0.4354 0.8542 0.9588 0.6813 0.5650 36.7405 0.9891
FˆJbq 0.9170 0.4050 0.5244 0.8435 0.9874 0.8081 0.6531 35.9926 0.9872



































Figure A.13: Les courbes ROC obtenues par FJ contre des détecteurs criminalistiques.
Les résultat sont obtenus à partir de l’ensemble UCIDTest.
taux de replacement est relativement petit, notre image anti-criminalistique reste indétectable
contre les deux détecteurs à base de SVM [LLH12, PBF10]. De plus, FJ surpasse les autres
images anti-criminalistiques au point de vue de la qualité de l’image, en l’évaluant cette qualité
tant par le PSNR que par le SSIM.
Par rapport à la méthode proposée dans la section A.4, le lissage perceptuel d’histogramme
DCT remplit explicitement les lacunes dans l’histogramme DCT de l’image JPEG. Cela aug-
mente la performance anti-criminalistique de FJ . Enfin, FJ présente également une meilleure
qualité d’image que FJ0 .
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Figure A.14: La valeur AUC en fonction du taux de remplacement d’image pour différents
types d’images, lorsqu’elles sont testées en utilisant les détecteurs à base de SVM. Les
résultats sont obtenus à partir de l’ensemble UCIDTR pour l’entraînement, et à partir de
l’ensemble UCIDTE pour les tests.
A.6 Amélioration de qualité et anti-criminalistique de l’image
JPEG basée sur un modèle d’image avancé
A.6.1 Introduction et motivation
Les deux méthodes proposées dans les sections A.4 et A.5 utilisent la TV pour le déblocage
JPEG. La TV peut être considérée comme un modèle a priori d’image simple. Puisque cette
thèse suit la ligne de recherche décrite dans la section A.1.3.3, à savoir concevoir des méth-
odes anti-criminalistiques en s’appuyant sur la restauration d’image, cette section traite la
possibilité d’utiliser un modèle a priori d’image plus avancé que la TV. Dans notre troisième
méthode d’anti-criminalistique JPEG, présentée dans cette section, nous essayons tout d’abord
d’améliorer la qualité de l’image JPEG J . De cette façon, nous espérons que non seulement
la qualité de l’image JPEG sera améliorée, mais aussi que le coût pour créer l’image anti-
criminalistique avec une bonne indétectabilité criminalistique sera également réduit par cette
étape de restauration d’image.
A.6.2 Amélioration de qualité de l’image JPEG
Dans la littérature de la restauration d’image, afin d’améliorer la qualité de l’image JPEG, il
est courant de modéliser le processus de la compression JPEG comme une addition de bruit
dans le domaine spatial nq à l’image originale x pour générer l’image JPEG y : y = x+ nq.
Le bruit de compression nq est supposé être une quantité aléatoire, qui peut être modélisé en
utilisant une gaussienne multivariée de moyenne nulle. De plus, nq et x sont supposés être
indépendants. L’estimateur du MAP est souvent employé afin d’estimer l’image restaurée xˆ.
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Dans la méthode proposée, le problème d’optimisation basé sur le MAP est :
















dont le premier terme utilise la gaussienne multivariée de moyenne nulle pour modéliser le
bruit de compression, et le deuxième terme utilise le modèle de GMM dans le cadre EPLL
[ZW11] pour modéliser les patches d’image. Ici, Piu est le i-ème patch extrait de l’image u.
La table A.8 compare l’image obtenue en résolvant le problème d’optimisation de
l’équation (A.8), à celle traitée par une méthode de l’état de l’art [SC07]. On peut voir
que la méthode proposée est très compétitive en terme de gain en PSNR. De plus, il est en-
viron dix fois plus rapide de traiter une image par la méthode proposée que par la méthode
proposée par [SC07].
Table A.8: Valeurs de PSNR (avec l’image originale comme référence) pour quatre images
classiques et trois différentes matrices de quantification fournies par [SC07].
Image JPEG Basée sur le FoE [SC07] Proposée
Lena
Q1 30.71 31.95 32.06
Q2 30.08 31.44 31.48
Q3 27.45 28.83 28.94
Peppers
Q1 30.72 32.04 32.09
Q2 30.17 31.61 31.59
Q3 27.66 29.35 29.40
Barbara
Q1 25.95 26.65 26.94
Q2 25.60 26.31 26.56
Q3 24.05 24.86 25.00
Baboon
Q1 24.32 24.77 24.84
Q2 24.14 24.62 24.68
Q3 22.14 22.61 22.61
A.6.3 Anti-criminalistique de compression JPEG
Afin de supprimer les artefacts de quantification de l’image JPEG, il convient de lisser
l’histogramme DCT. À cette fin, nous proposons la méthode suivante basée sur le calibrage
de l’image JPEG J de facteur de qualité q :
• Récupérer l’image IˆJ de J en résolvant le problème d’optimisation de l’équation (A.8)
;
• Découper IˆJ à partir du 1ème pixel diagonal afin d’obtenir l’image calibrée Iˆc ;
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• Soustraire les coefficients DCT de l’image Jˆc à ceux de Iˆc, afin d’estimer le bruit de
quantification DCT Nˆq ;
• Ajouter Nˆq à IˆJ dans le domaine DCT, afin de créer l’image FˆJc avec l’histogramme
DCT lissé.
Nous comparons cette méthode de lissage de l’histogramme DCT basée sur le calibrage,
à celle proposée dans la section A.5.2. La table A.9 rapporte la divergence K-L obtenue
par FˆJbq et celle obtenue par FˆJc . Les valeur positives dans la table A.9 indiquent que le
lissage d’histogramme basé uniquement sur le calibrage surpasse notre précédente méthode
(cf. section A.5.2) dans les sous-bandes de basses fréquences. Mais cette nouvelle méthode
basée sur le calibrage est beaucoup plus rapide pour créer l’image avec l’histogramme DCT
lissé, et est conceptuellement plus simple.
Table A.9: La différence entre la divergence K-L obtenue par FˆJbq et celle obtenue par
FˆJc pour les 64 sous-bandes DCT. La valeur moyenne de la différence est -0.0239 avec une
déviation standard de 0.0431. Les résultat sont obtenus à partir de l’ensemble UCIDTest.
r
c 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
1 -0.0081 -0.0001 0.0096 0.0121 0.0075 0.0126 0.0171 -0.0265
2 0.0037 0.0081 0.0127 0.0025 -0.0013 0.0201 0.0056 -0.0393
3 0.0171 0.0120 0.0098 -0.0036 -0.0062 -0.0050 -0.0099 -0.0663
4 0.0133 0.0046 -0.0013 -0.0110 -0.0194 -0.0086 -0.0097 -0.0708
5 0.0106 0.0022 -0.0037 -0.0159 -0.0291 -0.0237 -0.0591 -0.1173
6 0.0090 0.0114 -0.0104 -0.0179 -0.0323 -0.0253 -0.0692 -0.1229
7 0.0353 0.0223 -0.0124 -0.0079 -0.0660 -0.0690 -0.0936 -0.1067
8 -0.0050 -0.0332 -0.0730 -0.0720 -0.1385 -0.1372 -0.1235 -0.0357
Dans l’image FˆJc , il faut encore atténuer le bruit introduit par la procédure de lissage de
l’histogramme DCT. À cette fin, nous proposons le problème suivant :


















Cette fonction de coût est composée de trois types de termes. Le premier terme est relatif à
la fidélité à l’image JPEG y. Les deuxième et troisième termes sont destinés aux fins anti-
criminalistiques. La dernière partie de cette fonction se rapporte au modèle a priori d’image,
en utilisant le GMM dans le cadre EPLL [ZW11]. Ici, λ, α, β et γ sont des paramètres de
régularisation, uc est l’image calibrée obtenue en coupant u au cème pixel diagonal [FGH02,
LB11], {zi} est un ensemble de variables auxiliaires pour faciliter l’optimisation [ZW11], ι(·)
représente la TV de l’image donnée, νk(·) renvoie la variance de la k-ème sous-bande de hautes
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fréquences (définie dans [LB11]) de l’image donnée, tandis que σˆ2k est la variance estimée de
l’image originale de la k-ème sous-bande de hautes fréquences de FˆJc .
FJ1 désigne notre image anti-criminalistique finale créée par la méthode proposée dans
cette section. La figure A.15 montre les courbes ROC obtenues par FJ0 contre des détecteurs
scalaires. En comparant la figure A.15 à la figure A.9-(f) et la figure A.13, on constate que la
méthode proposée dans cette section ne surpasse pas les deux méthodes proposées précédem-
ment. Cela apparaît également dans la table A.10. Une raison possible est que l’estimation
du bruit de quantification Nˆq est peut-être encore trop rudimentaire : cela introduit un bruit
dans le domaine spatial, qui réduit non seulement l’indétectabilité criminalistique mais aussi
la qualité de l’image anti-criminalistique finale. La performance de la méthode proposée ici
peut être améliorée par une estimation du bruit de quantification précise et l’intégration de
davantage de termes anti-criminalistiques dans l’équation (A.9). Par ailleurs, il est à noter que
même si la méthode décrite dans cette section n’est pas la meilleure parmi les trois méthodes
anti-criminalistiques pour la compression JPEG, elle surpasse encore largement l’état de l’art


































Figure A.15: Les courbes ROC obtenues par FJ1 contre des détecteurs criminalistiques.
Les résultat sont obtenus à partir de l’ensemble UCIDTest.
A.7 Amélioration de la qualité et anti-criminalistique de
l’image filtrée par le filtre médian à l’aide d’une décon-
volution variationnelle d’image
A.7.1 Introduction et motivation
Nous suivons la ligne de recherche décrite dans la section A.1.3.3, à savoir concevoir des
méthodes anti-criminalistiques d’image en s’appuyant sur la restauration d’image. À cette
fin, il faut un modèle pour décrire le processus de filtrage médian ainsi qu’un modèle a priori
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Table A.10: De la deuxième colonne à la huitième colonne, sont listées les valeurs AUC
pour différentes images contre des détecteurs scalaires ; la comparaison de la qualité d’image
(avec I comme référence) est rapportée dans les deux dernières colonnes. Les résultats sont
obtenus à partir de l’ensemble UCIDTest.
KF KLuo K
Q





J 0.9991 1.0000 0.9996 0.9976 0.9811 0.9860 0.8840 37.0999 0.9919
FJSqSb 0.3783 0.0806 0.6288 0.8337 0.5338 0.6309 0.4854 30.4591 0.9509
IˆJ 0.9997 0.9982 0.9528 0.7851 0.9698 0.9878 0.8779 37.8930 0.9927
FˆJc 0.9994 0.8147 0.5949 0.7383 0.9868 0.9868 0.8944 35.3209 0.9876
FJ1 0.5522 0.7291 0.3594 0.7394 0.5272 0.7750 0.5787 35.2568 0.9832
FJ0 0.6756 0.6046 0.5194 0.6210 0.4490 0.6772 0.5880 35.4814 0.9843
FJ 0.5398 0.6425 0.4598 0.6159 0.4344 0.5894 0.5317 35.9855 0.9866
d’image approprié afin de construire un problème d’optimisation basé sur le MAP pour le
problème inverse du filtrage médian.
De fait, le processus de filtrage médian pourrait être décrit comme une procédure de
convolution linéaire spatialement hétérogène. Pour une fenêtre locale, le noyau de convolution
est une matrice de taille 3 × 3 dont un seul des 9 éléments prendrait la valeur 1, et les 8
autres éléments seraient tous nuls. La forme du noyau est alors complètement dépendante des
statistiques d’ordre des pixels encadrés par la fenêtre du filtre. Pourtant, cette information est
définitivement perdue pendant le processus de filtrage médian. Afin de simplifier ce modèle,
la convolution avec un noyau spatialement homogène k est utilisée pour se rapprocher du
processus de filtrage médian. L’analyse développée ici donnera le premier terme de l’équation
(A.10) dans la section A.7.2.
Dans les méthodes criminalistiques proposées dans l’état de l’art [KF10, Cao+10, Yua11],
la différence de valeurs de pixels d’image est souvent la caractéristique de base des détecteurs.
En général, l’histogramme de différence de valeurs de pixels (à savoir la dérivée de l’image)
a un pic plus haut dans l’image MF que celui de l’image originale, autour de la classe 0 (cf.
les exemples dans la figure A.7). Pour régulariser la différence de valeurs de pixels, la loi
gaussienne généralisée (paramétrée par le paramètre d’échelle α et le paramètre de forme β)
de moyenne nulle est utilisée pour la modéliser. L’analyse de ce paragraphe donnera le dernier
terme de l’équation (A.10) dans la section A.7.2.
A.7.2 Déconvolution variationnelle d’image
D’une manière similaire à celle utilisée en anti-criminalistique de compression JPEG
[Fan+13b], nous proposons un problème de déconvolution variationnelle d’image afin de créer
une image MF anti-criminalistique, basé sur l’analyse développée dans la section A.7.1, et
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Dans cette équation, y contient les valeurs des pixels de l’image MF sous forme vectorisée, cette
image MF ayant été produite à partir de l’image originale x. La variable u est utilisée pour
représenter génériquement une image. Ku désigne la multiplication matricielle correspondant
à une convolution d’image avec le noyau k. J filtre(s) de dérivée d’image sont utilisés afin
de calculer différents types de dérivées d’image. Fju est la multiplication matricielle servant
à calculer la j-ème (j = 1, 2, · · · , J) dérivée d’image, en utilisant le j-ème filtre linéaire avec
le noyau f j . αj et βj sont les deux paramètres de la loi gaussienne généralisée de moyenne
nulle utilisée pour modéliser la j-ème dérivée de l’image. λ et ω sont deux paramètres de
régularisation pour équilibrer l’énergie des différents termes.
Il y a trois termes dans l’équation (A.10). Comme discuté ci-dessus, le processus de filtrage
médian est simplifié, et approché par une convolution d’image avec un noyau spatialement
homogène – ce qui constitue le premier terme de l’équation (A.10). Le deuxième terme est
conçu pour que l’image MF anti-criminalistique produite soit dans une certaine mesure proche
de l’image MF. Le troisième terme est l’a priori d’image, qui sert à régulariser la dérivée de
l’image en utilisant la loi gaussienne généralisée de moyenne nulle. Dans la pratique, on utilise
les filtres suivants (J = 4) de dérivées d’image: f1 = [1,−1], f2 = [1,−1]T , f3 = [1, 0,−1], et
f4 = [1, 0,−1]T . D’autres filtres pourraient être ajoutés dans l’équation (A.10), au prix d’une
complexité de calcul plus élevée, mais pour un impact mineur sur les résultats finaux.
Pour le terme d’a priori d’image, il faut connaître les valeurs des deux paramètres α et β de
la loi gaussienne généralisée de moyenne nulle. En fait, ces deux paramètres sont directement








où Γ(·) est la fonction gamma. Donc, si la variance et le kurtosis sont connus, les deux
paramètres αˆ et βˆ peuvent être estimés en utilisant une méthode numérique [BS99]. Par
conséquent, il faut estimer la variance σˆ2 et la kurtosis κˆ de l’image originale à partir de
l’image MF. À cette fin, une régression linéaire est employée pour leur estimation, en utilisant
l’image MF donnée et ses versions encore plusieurs fois filtrées par le filtre médian. Pour le
j-ème type de filtre de dérivée d’image, la variance σˆ2(Fjx) et le kurtosis κˆ(Fjx) de l’image























où σˆ2(·) et κˆ(·) sont respectivement la variance et le kurtosis de l’echantillon, et MF (m)(·)




m sont les coefficients de la
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régression linéaire : ils peuvent être obtenus depuis un ensemble d’images par une procédure
d’apprentissage. Dans la pratique, fixer M à 5 donne de bons résultats.
L’optimisation directe de la fonction de coût dans l’équation (A.10) n’est pas triviale. En
pratique, elle peut être résolue en utilisant la méthode “ Half Quadratic Splitting ” [KF09]
et la méthode de Bregman [GO09, KTF11]. Après l’introduction d’un ensemble de variables
auxiliaires {wj}Jj=1, le problème d’optimisation dans l’équation (A.10) peut être ré-écrit sous














∥∥Fju− αjwj∥∥22 + ∥∥wj∥∥βjβj
) . (A.13)
où γ est un paramètre de régularisation. Ensuite, l’itération de Bregman est appliquée à
l’équation (A.13). La méthode de Bregman résout le problème à la (k+1)-ème (k = 0, 1, 2, · · · )
































A.7.3 Amélioration de qualité de l’image MF
En paramétrant de manière appropriée, nous pouvons créer une image de meilleure qualité à
partir de l’image MF, en résolvant le problème d’optimisation dans l’équation (A.14). Pour
estimer k dans l’équation (A.10), 6 types de noyaux ont été étudiés expérimentalement sur
l’ensemble MFTE100 : le noyau moyenne, le noyau gaussien, le noyau inspiré par [Yua11], et,
pour chaque image, les trois noyaux estimés en utilisant les trois noyaux précédents comme
estimation initiale pour la méthode [KTF11]. Les résultats expérimentaux montrent qu’un
bon choix pour k est le noyau estimé par [KTF11] en utilisant le noyau moyenne comme
estimation initiale. Pour l’amélioration de qualité de l’image MF, le paramétrage suivant est
utilisé : ω = 0.4, λ = 1000 et γ = 1200. Ces paramètres sont obtenus depuis l’ensemble
MFTE100.
La table A.11 compare la qualité d’image de l’image bruitée par le bruit sel et poivre, celle
puis filtrée par le filtre médian, puis à celle traitée par la méthode proposée. L’efficacité de la
déconvolution variationnelle d’image décrite dans la section A.7.2 est bien validée : la qualité
de l’image MF est améliorée en utilisant les métriques d’évaluation PSNR et SSIM. Ce fait
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est aussi reflété par les valeurs PSNR/SSIM pour l’image Mp listées dans la table A.12, en
comparaison avec l’image MF M.
Table A.11: Les valeurs moyennes du PSNR et du SSIM de l’image bruitée par le bruit sel
et poivre, celle puis filtrée par le filtre médian, et enfin celle traitée par la méthode proposée,




PSNR 25.1365 37.1336 38.0723
SSIM 0.8308 0.9827 0.9892
2%
PSNR 22.1257 36.9719 37.8236
SSIM 0.7185 0.9822 0.9885
3%
PSNR 20.3642 36.7957 37.5155
SSIM 0.6388 0.9818 0.9876
4%
PSNR 19.1161 36.6114 37.2058
SSIM 0.5793 0.9813 0.9867
5%
PSNR 18.1466 36.4031 36.7914
oSSIM 0.5327 0.9807 0.9850
6%
PSNR 17.3540 36.1758 36.2933
SSIM 0.4948 0.9801 0.9828
7%
PSNR 16.6851 35.8924 35.7542
SSIM 0.4632 0.9793 0.9803
Table A.12: Du deuxième au troisième rang, sont listées les valeurs moyennes de
PSNR/SSIM; les valeurs AUC pour différentes images contre des détecteurs scalaires sont
rapportées dans les quatre rangs suivants ; les divergences K-L pour différents histogrammes
de différence de valeurs de pixels sont listées dans les deux derniers rangs. Les résultats sont
obtenus à partir de l’ensemble UCIDTest.
M Mp FMW FMD FM
Qualité d’image
PSNR 37.2847 38.2953 33.6033 33.4272 37.5184
SSIM 0.9831 0.9896 0.9552 0.9714 0.9901
Performance
anti-criminalistique
KK 0.9722 0.7839 0.4592 0.5347 0.5595
KˆK 0.9824 0.8375 0.6586 0.4635 0.5061
KC 0.9938 0.8213 0.6668 0.7479 0.6490
KY 0.9984 0.7922 0.3336 0.6518 0.5886
divergence K-L
f1 0.1632 0.0990 0.1148 0.0547 0.0484
f2 0.1611 0.0949 0.1338 0.0563 0.0449
f3 0.0775 0.0525 0.0619 0.0383 0.0272
f4 0.0753 0.0495 0.0689 0.0389 0.0238
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Figure A.16: Courbes ROC obtenues pour : l’image MF M, l’image produite par Wu et
al. FMW [WSL13], Dang-Nguyen et al. FMD [DN+13], et la méthode proposée FM , contre
les quatre détecteurs scalaires KK [KF10], KˆK [KF10], KC [Cao+10], et KY [Yua11]. Les
résultats sont obtenus à partir de l’ensemble MFTE.
A.7.4 Anti-criminalistique de filtrage médian
En résolvant le problème d’optimisation de l’équation (A.10) sur l’image MF, il est possible
de créer une image MF anti-criminalistique dotée d’une bonne immunité à la détection anti-
criminalistique, mais sa qualité visuelle laissera à désirer. Afin d’obtenir une image MF anti-
criminalistique présentant une bonne immunité sans beaucoup de diminution de la qualité
d’image, cette section propose une stratégie de perturbation légère de la valeur des pixels de
l’image MF, avant qu’elle soit utilisée dans l’équation (A.10).






















































































Figure A.17: La valeur AUC en fonction du taux de remplacement d’image pour différents
types d’images, lorsqu’elles sont testées en utilisant les détecteurs à base de SVM. Les
résultats sont obtenus à partir de MFTR pour l’entraînement et à partir de MFTE pour les
tests.
Les sorties de KK [KF10], KC [Cao+10] et KY [Yua11] sont toutes implicitement ou ex-
plicitement reliées à une différence de valeurs de pixels, elles réagissent d’autant plus fortement
dans les régions texturées de l’image. Le but ici est de réduire la fréquence d’occurrence de
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la différence 0 par une modification légère de l’image MF. Si trois pixels adjacents vérifient
yi+1 = yi+2 = yi+3, la modification de yi+2 à yi+2±1 changera deux différences de valeurs de
pixel de 0 à ±1. De façon similaire, si deux pixels adjacents ont la même valeur, le pixel qui a la
variance locale plus élevée que l’autre est modifié. De cette manière, la fréquence d’occurrence
de la différence 0 est efficacement réduite, avec un impact très limité sur la qualité de l’image.
De même qu’à la section A.7.3, pour k nous utilisons à nouveau le noyau estimé par
[KTF11], avec le noyau moyenne comme estimation initiale. Afin de créer l’image MF anti-
criminalistique en résolvant le problème d’optimisation de l’équation (A.13), le paramétrage
suivant est utilisé : ω = 0.1, λ = 1500 et γ = 500. Ces paramètres sont obtenus depuis
l’ensemble MFTE100.
Pour des raisons de concision, FM représente l’image MF anti-criminalistique créée à
partir de l’image MF par la méthode proposée. La table A.12 rapporte la qualité d’image (les
valeurs de PSNR et de SSIM sont calculées en utilisant l’image originale comme référence) et la
performance anti-criminalistique. Les courbes ROC obtenues pour différents types d’images et
pour les détecteurs KK [KF10], KC [Cao+10] ou KY [Yua11] sont tracées dans la figure A.16.
Les images MF anti-criminalistiques FM créées par la méthode proposée induisent, pour les
détecteurs criminalistiques, des courbes ROC qui sont au plus proche d’une décision aléatoire.
Ce fait est également reflété par des valeurs AUC proches de 0.5 dans la table A.12 pour FM .
De plus, la méthode proposée produit une meilleure qualité d’image que les autres images
MF anti-criminalistiques de l’état de l’art [WSL13, DN+13]. Enfin, la table A.12 rapporte la
divergence K-L obtenue par FM et celles obtenues par les images anti-criminalistiques de l’état
de l’art. Les valeurs de la divergence K-L obtenues par FM sont plus petites, indiquant une
meilleure performance de la méthode proposée afin de restaurer l’histogramme de différence
de valeurs de pixels que l’état de l’art. Les courbes AUC dans la figure A.17 montrent que
notre image anti-criminalistique a une meilleure indétectabilité criminalistique globale contre
les détecteurs à base de SVM que l’état de l’art, sauf contre KS10AR [Kan+13].
A.8 Conclusions et perspectives
A.8.1 Résumé des contributions
Dans cette thèse, nous avons présenté nos travaux de recherche sur l’anti-criminalistique
d’image sur la compression JPEG et le filtrage médian. Au cours de notre étude de l’anti-
criminalistique d’image concernant le codage ou le traitement d’images, on constate des simil-
itudes entre l’anti-criminalistique d’image et la restauration d’images. Toutes les deux visent
à récupérer au mieux les informations perdues lors de la dégradation de l’image. Cependant,
en plus de la qualité d’image, l’anti-criminalistique d’image a un autre objectif indispensable,
i.e. : une bonne indétectabilité contre les détecteurs criminalistiques. À cette fin, nous intro-
duisons des concepts/méthodes avancés de la restauration d’image pour concevoir de nouvelles
méthodes anti-criminalistiques, en intégrant certains termes/stratégies anti-criminalistiques.
Les résultats expérimentaux montrent que les méthodes proposées surpassent les méthodes
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de l’état de l’art pour créer des images anti-criminalistiques avec une meilleure indétectabilité
criminalistique contre les détecteurs existants, ainsi qu’une meilleure qualité d’image. Bien
que la restauration d’image elle-même ne soit pas notre sujet principal de recherche dans cette
thèse, nous proposons également deux méthodes d’amélioration de la qualité d’image pour la
compression JPEG et le filtrage médian, respectivement. Elles servent d’étape préliminaire
dans les méthodes anti-criminalistiques proposées, mais sont également avérés avoir de bonnes
performances en termes de gain de PSNR/SSIM par rapport à l’image JPEG ou l’image MF.
Les contributions de cette thèse sont résumées comme suit.
Proposer une nouvelle ligne de recherche pour concevoir des méthodes anti-
criminalistiques d’image via la restauration d’image : Après l’examen de la littéra-
ture, nous trouvons courant d’utiliser le traitement d’image simple pour cacher les traces
laissées par une opération d’image ciblée aux fins d’anti-criminalistique. Par exemple, le
filtrage médian est utilisé pour l’anti-criminalistique JPEG afin d’éliminer les artefacts de
blocage. L’injection de bruit est utilisée pour cacher les traces de filtrage médian. Ces méth-
odes peuvent être efficaces pour attaquer détecteurs criminalistiques ciblés, mais peuvent par
contre être détectées par plusieurs détecteurs avancés. En outre, l’image anti-criminalistique
résultante souffre d’une faible qualité visuelle, ce qui peut susciter spontanément le doute
sur son authenticité. Dans cette thèse, nous proposons une nouvelle ligne de recherche en
s’appuyant sur les concepts/méthodes avancés de la restauration d’image afin de concevoir
des méthodes d’anti-criminalistique d’image. Étant donnée une image dégradée par une
opération irréversible de traitement d’image, par exemple, la compression JPEG ou le fil-
trage médian, l’objectif de l’anti-criminalistique d’image est de cacher les traces de traitement
d’image tout en conservant une bonne qualité d’image. En se fondant sur les similitudes entre
l’anti-criminalistique d’image et la restauration d’image, les cadres de travail et les termes de
l’optimisation introduits en restauration d’image aident à supprimer en partie les traces, tout
en gardant une bonne qualité d’image (même meilleur parfois) par rapport à l’image dégradée
donnée. La bonne performance anti-criminalistique est obtenue en ajoutant des termes anti-
criminalistiques au cadre de l’optimisation ou en utilisant des stratégies anti-criminalistiques
supplémentaires. Nous suivons cette ligne de recherche tout au long de cette thèse pour l’anti-
criminalistique de compression JPEG ainsi que l’anti-criminalistique de filtrage médian. Sa
supériorité sur les méthodes anti-criminalistiques de l’état de l’art est bien prouvée par des
résultats expérimentaux, avec une meilleure indétectabilité criminalistique et une meilleure
qualité de l’image traitée. À notre connaissance, nous sommes les premiers à utiliser systéma-
tiquement la restauration aux fins d’anti-criminalistique. Nous espérons également que cette
nouvelle ligne de recherche serait utile pour plusieurs problèmes d’anti-criminalistique d’image
relatifs à d’autres traitements, par exemple le rééchantillonnage, l’amélioration du contraste,
etc.
L’anti-criminalistique JPEG en utilisant le déblocage basé sur la TV : Nous avons
proposé une méthode anti-criminalistique de compression JPEG en utilisant la méthode de
déblocage basé sur la TV. Cela est mis en œuvre par l’optimisation d’un problème de min-
imisation contraint basé sur la TV avec un terme de TV et un terme de mesure du déblocage
par la TV. Pendant ce temps, la qualité d’image traitée est contrôlée par une projection QCS
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modifiée. En outre, un détecteur puissant à base de calibrage est trompé par la minimisa-
tion d’une fonction de coût proche de la fonction de calculant la caractéristique basée sur le
calibrage. Cette méthode parvient à bien éliminer les artefacts de blocage dans le domaine
spatial. En outre, les artefacts de quantification dans le domaine DCT sont aussi largement
atténués, dans la mesure où l’image anti-criminalistique créée est capable de passer comme
n’ayant jamais été compressée face à des détecteurs scrutant les artefacts de quantification.
L’anti-criminalistique améliorée de compression JPEG avec une lissage perceptuel
d’histogramme DCT : En effet, la méthode de déblocage JPEG basée sur la TV précédem-
ment proposée est capable de réaliser une bonne indétectabilité criminalistique contre tous
les détecteurs criminalistiques actuels de compression JPEG existants, y compris ceux qui
examinant les artefacts de quantification. Cependant, l’histogramme DCT n’est pas toujours
bien lissé, en particulier dans les sous-bandes de moyennes fréquences. Cette faiblesse n’en
est pas une face aux détecteurs criminalistiques actuels de compression JPEG, mais peut être
détectée par des algorithmes criminalistiques potentiellement plus avancés. Afin de remédier à
ce problème, nous avons proposé une méthode anti-criminalistique améliorée en quatre étapes
avec un lissage perceptuel de l’histogramme DCT. À l’aide des informations DCT estimées en
partie après le déblocage JPEG basé sur la TV, une méthode de tramage adaptatif local est
proposée en combinant la loi de Laplace et la loi uniforme. Les coefficients DCT sont modifiés
par la résolution d’un problème d’affectation simplifié qui minimise la perte de qualité SSIM.
On effectue un dernier déblocage léger basé sur la TV et le décalibrage pour améliorer encore
l’indétectabilité criminalistique avec une perte de qualité d’image très mineure.
L’amélioration de qualité et l’anti-criminalistique de l’image JPEG basées sur un
modèle d’image avancé : Nous avons proposé une autre méthode anti-criminalistique JPEG
basé sur un modèle a priori d’image sophistiqué, qui est décrite par les étapes suivantes :
• L’amélioration de qualité d’image JPEG en utilisant un modèle a priori d’image so-
phistiqué : L’efficacité de l’utilisation de la TV dans l’anti-criminalistique JPEG nous
motive à utiliser les modèles a priori d’image plus sophistiqués, avec l’espoir d’améliorer
les performances d’anti-criminalistique JPEG. À cette fin, nous utilisons le cadre EPLL
avec le GMM comme a priori pour les patches d’image. Le bruit de compression dans
le domaine spatial est modélisé en utilisant la loi gaussienne multivariée de moyenne
nulle, dont 64 types de matrices de covariance sont apprises pour chaque facteur de
qualité JPEG. Par conséquent, un procédé d’amélioration de qualité d’image JPEG a
été proposé en minimisant la fonction de coût en tenant compte des deux termes ci-
dessus. L’image JPEG de qualité améliorée peut être obtenue en résolvant un problème
d’optimisation à l’aide d’une étape d’estimation approximative du MAP. Cette méthode
nous permet d’obtenir un bon gain de qualité d’image pour l’image JPEG, en particulier
pour la compression JPEG très forte.
• Le lissage non paramétrique d’histogramme DCT basé sur le calibrage : En plus de
notre méthode de lissage perceptuel d’histogramme DCT précédemment proposé, nous
proposons un autre lissage d’histogramme DCT basé cette fois sur le calibrage, sans
utiliser aucun modèle statistique. Basé sur les statistiques d’image et l’efficacité de
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l’astuce du calibrage, le bruit de quantification dans le domaine DCT peut être estimé
en découpant légèrement l’image JPEG de qualité améliorée et en recompressant l’image
calibrée. L’histogramme DCT est lissé en ajoutant le bruit de quantification DCT estimé
à partir de l’image JPEG de qualité améliorée. Cette nouvelle méthode de lissage non-
paramétrique d’histogramme DCT ne permet pas d’obtenir une meilleure performance
globale, mais a de meilleures performances dans les sous-bande DCT de basses fréquences
que la méthode de lissage perceptuel précédemment proposée. En outre, la méthode
basée sur le calibrage a un coût de calcul beaucoup plus faible que la perceptuelle.
• L’indétectabilité criminalistique est considérée au travers de la minimisation d’une fonc-
tion de coût avec un terme d’image de fidélité, une terme d’a priori d’image à base
d’EPLL, et plusieurs termes anti-criminalistiques inspirés des algorithmes criminalis-
tiques existants.
Pour récapituler, la méthode proposée pour l’amélioration de la qualité JPEG est illustrée par
des expériences sur 4 images classiques de test et sur l’ensemble UCIDTest pour améliorer
la qualité de l’image JPEG. En effet, la méthode anti-criminalistique proposée doit être
améliorée, mais surpasse encore les méthodes de l’état de l’art proposées par Stamm et al.
[Sta+10a, Sta+10b, SL11] en termes d’indétectabilité criminalistique ainsi que de qualité de
l’image traitée.
L’amélioration de qualité et l’anti-criminalistique de l’image MF via une décon-
volution variationnelle d’image : Nous avons proposé une déconvolution variationnelle
d’image pour à la fois l’amélioration de qualité de l’image MF et l’anti-criminalistique de fil-
trage médian. Un noyau de convolution spatialement homogène est utilisé pour approcher le
processus de filtrage médian. En ce qui concerne l’a priori d’image, la loi gaussienne général-
isée de moyenne nulle est utilisée pour modéliser la différence de valeurs de pixels dont les
statistiques changement considérablement après filtrage médian. Basé sur l’analyse ci-dessus,
la fonction de coût de minimisation proposée est composée d’un terme de convolution, d’un
terme de fidélité d’image par rapport à l’image MF, et d’un terme d’a priori. L’image MF de
qualité améliorée peut être obtenue en résolvant ce problème de minimisation, avec une qualité
d’image meilleure que l’image MF. Avec un autre paramétrage et une perturbation de valeur de
pixel supplémentaire, l’image anti-criminalistique est également générée depuis l’image MF.
La méthode proposée est capable d’atteindre une indétectabilité criminalistique contre les
détecteurs criminalistiques actuels de filtrage médian et une qualité d’image meilleures par
rapport aux méthodes anti-criminalistiques de filtrage médian de l’état de l’art.
En résumé, la caractéristique/nouveauté principale de cette thèse est d’introduire
des concepts/méthodes avancés de la restauration d’image pour concevoir des méthodes
d’anti-criminalistique d’image. Plus précisément, nous avons conçu des méthodes anti-
criminalistiques pour la compression JPEG et le filtrage médian, misant sur les éléments
suivants de la restauration d’image : la TV, le cadre de EPLL avec le GMM comme mod-
èle d’a priori pour les patches d’image, et le cadre de déconvolution d’images fondé sur le
MAP. Pour un problème anti-criminalistique d’image donné, certains termes/stratégies anti-
criminalistiques sont intégrés pour tromper les détecteurs existants. Pour la compression
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JPEG, un terme de mesure de blocage JPEG basé sur la TV est utilisé pour le déblocage
JPEG. En outre, deux méthodes de lissage d’histogramme DCT sont proposées pour sup-
primer les artefacts de quantification dans le domaine DCT : une procédure de lissage per-
ceptuel de l’histogramme DCT, et une procédure non paramétrique de lissage de l’histogramme
DCT basé sur le décalibrage. Certains termes anti-criminalistiques inspirés des algorithmes
criminalistiques existants sont également intégrés dans le cadre de l’optimisation à base de
MAP, pour tromper les détecteurs criminalistiques. Quant au filtrage médian, le modèle d’a
priori d’image est choisi spécifiquement afin de régulariser les différences de valeurs de pixels
d’image, qui sont explicitement ou implicitement utilisées dans les algorithmes criminalistiques
existants. En outre, une procédure de perturbation de valeur de pixel est également proposée
afin d’améliorer encore l’indétectabilité criminalistique, avec perte très mineure de qualité
d’image.
A.8.2 Perspectives
À court terme, les perspectives de cette thèse comprennent l’amélioration de la performance de
l’anti-criminalistique d’image, et la poursuite de la ligne de recherche proposée pour concevoir
des méthodes anti-criminalistiques concernant d’autres traitements.
L’amélioration de l’anti-criminalistique d’image JPEG pour générer l’image anti-
criminalistique avec une qualité plus haute que l’image JPEG : Dans les sections A.4-
A.5, la TV est employée depuis la restauration d’image aux fins d’anti-criminalistique JPEG.
La TV peut être considéré comme un a priori d’image simple mais efficace. La section A.6
présente la suite logique sur l’anti-criminalistique de compression JPEG, où un a priori plus
sophistiqué que la TV est utilisé. Cependant, la nouvelle méthode anti-criminalistique JPEG
ne surpasse pas celles basées sur la TV. L’analyse et les possibles raisons en sont fournies à la
fin de la section A.6.3. Un problème anti-criminalistique difficile mais très intéressant pour la
compression JPEG est de savoir si on peut créer l’image anti-criminalistique avec une qualité
encore plus élevé que l’image JPEG, ne serait-ce que pour montrer la relativité de ces mesures.
Une direction de recherche possible pourrait être la combinaison de l’amélioration de la qualité
de l’image JPEG, le déblocage basé sur la TV, et le lissage perceptuel d’histogramme DCT.
En fait, un objectif similaire a déjà été réalisé dans la section A.7.4 pour le filtrage médian :
l’image anti-criminalistique MF a une qualité encore plus élevée que l’image MF dans le test
sur l’ensemble MFTE.
Le développement d’autres méthodes anti-criminalistiques en misant sur la restau-
ration d’image : Dans cette thèse, nous avons choisi de travailler sur la compression JPEG
et le filtrage médian pour l’anti-criminalistique d’image. En traitement d’image, il existe beau-
coup d’autres opérations dont le problème d’anti-criminalistique peut également être formulé
comme un problème inverse mal posé. Par exemple, l’anti-criminalistique du rééchantillonnage
peut partager certaines similitudes avec la super-résolution [PPK03]. L’anti-criminalistique
d’amélioration du contraste peut être liée à l’estimation de la transformation de la lumi-
nosité des pixels [ZL14]. Idéalement, une bonne performance anti-criminalistique ne peut être
atteinte que si des concepts/méthodes de la restauration d’image sont bien combinés avec
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certains termes/stratégies anti-criminalistiques.
À long terme, l’un des buts ultimes de la criminalistique d’image et de l’anti-criminalistique
est de développer des méthodes universelles sans viser des méthodes (anti-)criminalistiques
spécifiques. Cela afin d’éviter au maximum un éternel “ jeu du chat et de la souris ” entre
la criminalistique et l’anti-criminalistique. Bien que le travail de recherche de criminalistique
(ou d’anti-criminalistique) d’image s’étale maintenant sur plus d’une décennie, il existe très
peu de méthodes universelles. Actuellement, la seule méthode anti-criminalistique d’image est
probablement celle proposée par Barni et al. [BFT12]. Toutefois, elle fait aussi l’hypothèse
que les détecteurs criminalistiques examinent seulement les statistiques du premier ordre.
Nous sommes conscients que les méthodes anti-criminalistiques proposées appartiennent tous
à la catégorie “ ciblées ” selon la classification d’anti-criminalistique d’image proposée par
Böhme et Kirchner [BK13]. Cependant, nous croyons que les méthodes anti-criminalistiques
proposées ont le potentiel requis pour être généralisées en vue du développement d’une anti-
criminalistique d’image universelle.
Vers une anti-criminalistique d’image universelle: Dans les sections A.6-A.7, les
problèmes d’optimisation à base de MAP sont proposées pour calculer les images anti-
criminalistiques de compression JPEG et de filtrage médian, respectivement. L’universalité
du cadre de restauration d’image variationnelle peut être vu à travers ces deux problèmes.
En matière de codage/traitement d’images, l’objectif de l’anti-criminalistique est de créer une
image anti-criminalistique qui soit aussi “ naturelle ” que possible. À cette fin, le problème
de la génération d’image “ naturelle ” peut être formulé comme un problème de restauration
d’image, pour obtenir une image qui semble n’avoir jamais été traitée. Afin de résoudre ce
type de problèmes inverses, on peut utiliser des méthodes statistiques comme l’estimateur
du MAP. Dans ce cadre, un bon modèle d’a priori d’image est indispensable. Par ailleurs, le
terme de vraisemblance, qui décrit le processus de dégradation de l’image causée par un certain
traitement d’image, devrait varier en fonction de différents problèmes anti-criminalistiques. “
L’universalité ” ici est que le cadre anti-criminalistique est générique : il peut être utilisé pour
cacher les traces laissées par diverses autres opérations de traitement d’image.
En outre, certains autres problèmes de recherche ouverts et étroitement liés à cette thèse
sont répertoriés comme suit :
• Est-il possible de concevoir une attaque en une seule étape pour l’anti-criminalistique
d’image JPEG, compte tenu que plusieurs détecteurs criminalistiques travaillent dans
deux domaines différents ?
• Comment peut-on estimer le noyau de convolution spatialement hétérogène pour le fil-
trage médian ?
• Est-il possible de créer une image anti-criminalistique, de sorte que dans son ensem-
ble elle puisse paraître comme jamais traitée face aux détecteurs à base de méthodes
d’apprentissage automatique ?
Ces questions soulignent également quelques directions futures de recherche intéressantes dans
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le vaste domaine de l’anti-criminalistique d’image. En outre, concernant le lien étroit entre
l’image et la vidéo, les méthodes d’anti-criminalistique d’image proposées sur la compression
JPEG et le filtrage médian peuvent également certainement contribuer à l’anti-criminalistique
de vidéo.
Dans cette thèse, nous procédons à l’étude de l’anti-criminalistique d’image de compres-
sion JPEG et de filtrage médian, en s’inspirant de la restauration d’image. Ces deux prob-
lèmes spécifiques d’anti-criminalistique d’image constituent seulement une petite fraction de
l’anti-criminalistique d’image. Nous sommes également conscients que cette ligne de recherche
nouvellement formée peut être appliquée uniquement aux problèmes d’anti-criminalistique
d’image, où le codage/traitement d’image est impliqué. Pour les autres problèmes d’anti-
criminalistique d’image, par exemple, celui basé sur la physique ou la géométrie [Far09a], cette
ligne de recherche peut être inadéquate. Par exemple, dans notre travail d’anti-criminalistique
d’image basé sur l’estimation environnementale de lumière [Fan+12], c’est une tout autre ligne
de recherche qui est suivie.
En conclusion, pour les problèmes d’anti-criminalistique d’image impliquant des
codages/traitements d’image, nous croyons que les statistiques d’images naturelles sont es-
sentielles dans la création d’une image anti-criminalistique avec une bonne indétectabilité
criminalistique ainsi qu’une haute qualité d’image. À cette fin, certains concepts/méthodes
avancés de la restauration d’image sont introduits et combinés avec des termes/stratégies anti-
criminalistiques pour la compression JPEG et le filtrage médian. Les travaux de recherche
présentés dans cette thèse ne représentent qu’une petite partie du potentiel énorme des
statistiques d’images naturelles appliquées à l’anti-criminalistique d’image, la criminalis-
tique d’image et la restauration d’image. Böhme et Kirchner [BK13] soulignent également
l’importance du modèle statistique d’image naturelle dans la bataille entre la criminalistique
et l’anti-criminalistique. Par conséquent, en dépit de beaucoup de points sujets à améliora-
tion, notre travail peut servir de bon point de départ pour de futures recherches sur un large
éventail de problèmes criminalistiques et anti-criminalistiques.
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Title: Towards Digital Image Anti-Forensics via Image Restoration
Abstract: Image forensics enjoys its increasing popularity as a powerful image au-
thentication tool, working in a blind passive way without the aid of any a priori embedded
information compared to fragile image watermarking. On its opponent side, image anti-
forensics attacks forensic algorithms for the future development of more trustworthy forensics.
When image coding or processing is involved, we notice that image anti-forensics to some
extent shares a similar goal with image restoration. Both of them aim to recover the
information lost during the image degradation, yet image anti-forensics has one additional
indispensable forensic undetectability requirement. In this thesis, we form a new research line
for image anti-forensics, by leveraging on advanced concepts/methods from image restoration
meanwhile with integrations of anti-forensic strategies/terms. Under this context, this
thesis contributes on the following four aspects for JPEG compression and median filtering
anti-forensics: (i) JPEG anti-forensics using Total Variation based deblocking, (ii) improved
Total Variation based JPEG anti-forensics with assignment problem based perceptual DCT
histogram smoothing, (iii) JPEG anti-forensics using JPEG image quality enhancement
based on a sophisticated image prior model and non-parametric DCT histogram smoothing
based on calibration, and (iv) median filtered image quality enhancement and anti-forensics
via variational deconvolution. Experimental results demonstrate the effectiveness of the
proposed anti-forensic methods with a better forensic undetectability against existing forensic
detectors as well as a higher visual quality of the processed image, by comparisons with the
state-of-the-art methods.
Keywords: Anti-forensics, digital image, image restoration, JPEG compression, me-
dian filtering
Titre : Vers l’anti-criminalistique en images numériques via la restauration d’images
Résumé : La criminalistique en images numériques se développe comme un outil
puissant pour l’authentification d’image, en travaillant de manière passive et aveugle sans
l’aide d’informations d’authentification pré-intégrées dans l’image (contrairement au tatouage
fragile d’image). En parallèle, l’anti-criminalistique se propose d’attaquer les algorithmes de
criminalistique afin de maintenir une saine émulation susceptible d’aider à leur amélioration.
En images numériques, l’anti-criminalistique partage quelques similitudes avec la restauration
d’image : dans les deux cas, l’on souhaite approcher au mieux les informations perdues
pendant un processus de dégradation d’image. Cependant, l’anti-criminalistique se doit de
remplir au mieux un objectif supplémentaire, i.e. : être non détectable par la criminalistique
actuelle. Dans cette thèse, nous proposons une nouvelle piste de recherche pour la criminalis-
tique en images numériques, en tirant profit des concepts/méthodes avancés de la restauration
d’image mais en intégrant des stratégies/termes spécifiquement anti-criminalistiques. Dans
ce contexte, cette thèse apporte des contributions sur quatre aspects concernant, en crimi-
nalistique JPEG, (i) l’introduction du déblocage basé sur la variation totale pour contrer les
méthodes de criminalistique JPEG et (ii) l’amélioration apportée par l’adjonction d’un lissage
perceptuel de l’histogramme DCT, (iii) l’utilisation d’un modèle d’image sophistiqué et d’un
lissage non paramétrique de l’histogramme DCT visant l’amélioration de la qualité de l’image
falsifiée; et, en criminalistique du filtrage médian, (iv) l’introduction d’une méthode fondée
sur la déconvolution variationnelle. Les résultats expérimentaux démontrent l’efficacité des
méthodes anti-criminalistiques proposées, avec notamment une meilleure indétectabilité face
aux détecteurs criminalistiques actuels ainsi qu’une meilleure qualité visuelle de l’image
falsifiée par rapport aux méthodes anti-criminalistiques de l’état de l’art.
Mots clés : Anti-criminalistique, image numérique, restauration d’image, compres-
sion JPEG, filtrage médian
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